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Who whispers in the King’s ear, for how long, and to what effect? The primary 
hypothesis guiding this study is that economists gain influence when the international 
resources they can deliver are valued and desired by the country’s political leadership; 
and economists lose influence when those resources are not valued or desired. Alternate 
hypotheses that consider the role of increasing complexity in international economic 
relations, epistemic communities, emulation, and economists’ political activity are also 
considered. These hypotheses are evaluated through a study of the experiences of 
economists in Iran under both the Pahlavi monarchy and the Islamic regime. Results 
indicate support for the primary hypothesis that economists are desired for their ability to 
signal competence and gain the trust of the international financial and donor 
communities. Surprisingly, especially in the Islamic Republic, epistemic communities of 
economists are also found to have been very successful in using moments of political or 
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Chapter One: Introduction and Literature Review 
Shortly after the 1979 Iranian revolution, the Plan and Budget Organization 
(PBO)—a thirty year old institution that had led the country’s economic planning and 
development drive since 1949—was summarily disbanded. The revolution’s leaders were 
suspicious of an organization staffed by Western-educated economists that had served the 
despised capitalist Pahlavis through a planning process that was judged incompatible 
with faith and reliance upon Divine Providence. Less than a decade later, however, a 
team of U.S. and European educated economists from the reconstituted PBO joined with 
like-minded professionals at the Central Bank of Iran and Ministry of Finance to 
spearhead a World Bank style reform program comprised of privatization, exchange rate 
unification, repeal of subsidies, and the reduction of trade barriers. With fits, starts, some 
reversals, some progress, this program guided the economic policymaking process in Iran 
for the next 16 years. How did Western-educated economists touting a ‘Washington 
Consensus’ reform program regain the trust of a political leadership for which communal 
chants of ‘Death to America’ were only the most visible expression of the country’s 
continued rejection of the Western model?  
The converse puzzle can be observed in the pre-revolutionary era of the Pahlavi 
monarchy. In the 1960s a team of Harvard, Princeton, and Stanford trained economists 
guided the country through what was called the “Golden Decade” of enviably high 
growth and low inflation. Their concerns and advice were entirely ignored, however, 
when they warned the Shah during the oil boom that the absorptive capacity of the 
economy could not handle the scale and volume of investments he desired. How did a 
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monarch who referred to Westernization as “our welcome ordeal” come to lose his 
confidence in his economic team about whom he was now heard to say one should “listen 
to economists and always just do the opposite” (Milani, 2008: 28, Pahlavi, 1961: Chapter 
7)?  
Most explanations for the ability of economists and other experts to capture the 
policymaking agenda rely heavily on the favorable or altered worldview of the political 
leadership. Such leaders are expected to turn to experts out of dissatisfaction with current 
policies and a conviction that expert knowledge can be relied upon to navigate complex 
economic events and issues. These explanations are challenged to explain how a pro-
Western monarchy explicitly modeling itself on the West might reject its Western-
educated advisors while an anti-capitalist theocracy explicitly rejecting the Western 
model would embrace them.  
An alternative view is that the source of expert power stems from their ability to 
deliver domestic (votes or political power) or international (loans, grants, etc.) goods. I 
argue that economists are especially well placed to access and deliver international goods 
and that the observed similarities of economists cycling in and out of power under two 
vastly different types of regimes in Iran result primarily from fluctuations in the extent to 
which the goods they can deliver are valued.  
The purpose of this study is to shed light on the circumstances under which 
economists successfully “whisper in the king’s ear” through an investigation of the 
experiences of economists in pre-and post- revolutionary Iran. Before examining the 
details of the case study, however, the present chapter establishes the importance of 
studying economists, examines the current state of the scholarly literature relevant to this 
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topic, and delineates the hypotheses under consideration as well as the research design 
used to guide the investigation.  
Why Study Economists? 
It is reasonable to begin by considering whether and why the study of economists 
is important for an understanding of economic policy outcomes. Indeed, a number of 
structuralist accounts of economic policy formulation suggest that expert advisors, 
politicians, and other agents are largely epiphonomenal to international flows of goods 
and capital, or the natural resource base of the economy. Unfortunately, however, such 
approaches are unable to fully account for observed economic policy outcomes in Iran.  
The literature on globalization suggests that increasing international economic 
integration has created competitive pressures between and among states to gain access to 
export markets and attract investments by multinational corporations and international 
capital; and that these pressures have resulted in predictable economic policy responses 
(Drezner, 2001, Mishra, 1999). In order to increase the marketability of exports, for 
example, states have privatized inefficient state-owned enterprises, reduced taxes that 
might inhibit the activity of domestic firms, and cut down on borrowing and investment 
activities that might crowd out the private sector. In order to entice multinational 
corporations, regulations regarding labor relations and environmental protections have 
been rolled back (Brecher and Costello, 2000, Brickman et al., 1985). And in order to 
attract portfolio investment and reduce the likelihood of capital flight, governments have 
adhered to a wide range of economic policies perceived favorably by the international 
financial market (Andrews, 1994, Gill and Law, 1989, Strange, 1996). Theoretical and 
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empirical work in this area suggest that, perhaps, globalization pressures alone account 
for much of the observed convergences in policy outcomes. 
The theorized relationship between exposure to the global economy and policy 
convergence has, however, come under increasing scrutiny particularly as a result of 
empirical studies that have failed to find predicted outcomes. In an investigation of 
OECD countries from 1985 to 1995, for example, Garrett (1998:b) found no evidence 
that globalization leads to a policy race to the bottom. Similarly Stephens (2003) study of 
EU housing finance systems finds that despite the European Single Market, national 
governments continue to “have rather more control over housing policy than convergence 
theory suggests” (p.1024). A number of scholars have even found that globalization may 
in some cases lead to increasing divergence of national regulatory policies. In a detailed 
examination of the development trajectories of South Korea, Argentina, and Spain, 
Guillen (2001) found that these three countries, initially very similar on a number of 
measurements, have diverged a great deal as a result of globalization which “actually 
encourages diversity in economic action and organization form rather than convergence” 
(p. 4). Guillen’s conclusions are supported by Garrett (1998:a) and Scruggs and Lange 
(2002) who also find that globalization has led to divergence in OECD economic policy 
regimes and union density.  
There is also the problem that Iran is simply not very integrated with the global 
economy. As compared with the OECD countries that constitute the usual objects of 
globalization studies, Iran has been much less open to international trade and investment 
flows over the last thirty years as a result of high tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, heavy 
handed financial market regulation, an unpredictable investment environment, and 
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international economic sanctions. If the globalization thesis is only ambiguously 
supported in highly integrated OECD nations, it is much less likely to be relevant to a 
study of the economic policies of a country that is in many ways isolated from the global 
economy.  
Rentier state theory is another structuralist approach that would seem to be 
particularly relevant to the study of an oil exporting nation like Iran. A rentier state is one 
that receives a substantial portion of its income from external rents that accrue directly to 
the government and are largely independent of domestic production processes 
(Shambayati, 1994). Such dependence on the oil sector has been observed to lead to 
similar economic institutions and policies in a number of countries with otherwise very 
different political, cultural, and economic histories (Karl, 1997, Shafer, 1994). 
Specifically, the domestic economies of rentier states are expected to be dominated by 
governments that: invest oil proceeds into a multitude of inefficient state owned 
enterprises; subsidize the private sector with easy credit, guaranteed business contracts, 
and protection from international competitors; and provide favored employment 
opportunities in overstaffed bureaucracies and public enterprises. 
The rentier state literature can be criticized, however, for overgeneralizations that 
fail to take into account differences among and developments within oil-based 
economies. Indonesia in the 1970sand 80s, for example, is generally acknowledged to 
have weathered the ups and downs of the oil market much more successfully than many 
of its OPEC counterparts (Lewis, 2007). Similarly, several of the Gulf monarchies have 
recently been observed to have refashioned their public enterprises as well as their overall 
development models in a manner that suggests oil wealth is less determinative of 
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economic policy than previously thought (Hertog, 2010, Hvidt, 2011). Furthermore, even 
the strongest proponents of the ‘resource curse’ acknowledge that times of “low oil prices 
provide the opportunity to create a different development dynamic” (Karl, 1999: 48). 
Unfortunately, however, they provide little guidance as to the variables relevant to the 
best usage of such opportunities. 
In contrast to the structuralist approaches described above, the present study is 
grounded in a more agency based perspective that views economic policymaking 
outcomes as resulting from inter-elite bargaining and negotiation. Economists are an 
important object of study insofar as they are often major participants in such bargaining 
and negotiations. The central argument driving this study is that economists are more 
likely to influence this process when they are able to access and deliver international 
goods that are valued by domestic actors. The following two sections considers the 
scholarship on economists and the variables that have been identified as contributing to 
their ability to dominate the economic policymaking process. 
The Ubiquitous Rise of Economists 
The presence of professional economists in high-level policymaking positions has 
become so commonplace, it can be difficult to remember that this is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. In the United States, for example, none of the first nine chairman of the 
Federal Reserve held a degree in economics at any level and as recently as 1979, the post 
was held by a lawyer with no formal economics training. A similar pattern can be 
observed in the economic leadership histories of other countries. In the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, and Japan, among others, economic policymaking 
7 
 
was traditionally the domain of generalists such as lawyers, businessmen, or politicians 
(Babb, 2001, Bergh, 1981, Dezalay and Garth, 2002, Markoff and Montecinos, 1993, 
Pechman, 1989). In the Middle East, as late as 1978, only 24% of Central Bank 
Governors, and Ministers of Economics, Finance, Trade, or Industry had an economics 
background (Askari and Cummings, 1978: 350).  In countries like Italy and Israel, 
professional economists experienced outright disdain from bureaucrats and officials who 
felt their ‘cold-hearted’ numbers-based approach was inappropriate to the country’s 
culture or goals (Ferraresi and Ferrari, 1981, Kleiman, 1981). 
By the late 1970s, however, the policymaking role of economists had become 
pervasive enough that it began to capture the attention and research agendas of social 
scientists. Rhoads (1978: 113) reports that by 1973, 43% of PhD social scientists working 
in the U.S. government were economists and by 1975, economists comprised 74% of the 
257 social scientists working at the highest levels of the federal government (GS 16 and 
above). Outside the United States, the growing power of economists was noted in articles 
and books that highlighted their experience and role in dozens of countries (Camp, 1977, 
Coats, 1981, Giles, 1979, Pechman, 1989).  
More recently, both empirical and case-based investigations have confirmed the 
growing role of economists—especially U.S. educated economists—around the world. 
Using a 50-year database of the educational backgrounds of world leaders, Hira 
concludes that “there has been a notable rising importance of economics as a background 
for leaders in Latin America, Africa, and Asia (2007: 326). Hira’s work is corroborated 
by a number of case studies conducted primarily in Latin American countries such as 
Chile, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina (Babb, 2001, Dezalay and Garth, 2002, Markoff 
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and Montecinos, 1993) that highlight the growing importance of economists in general 
and U.S.-trained economists in particular 
Explaining the Phenomenon 
How is it that a group of self-proclaimed experts entirely lacking the votes or 
dollars of traditional interest groups came to dominate policymaking in an arena where 
politically sensitive decisions about the distribution of material resources are made? 
Scholarship on this topic can be roughly categorized based on the relative weight 
accorded ideational versus material factors. As discussed below, the literature on 
functionalism, epistemic communities, and mimetic isomorphism suggest that economists 
gain power as a result of the changed convictions of political leaders who are convinced 
of the value of economists’ advice. By way of contrast, the literature on interest groups 
and coercive isomorphism suggest that economists gain power to the extent that they are 
able to deliver valued goods from the domestic (votes) or international (loans, grants) 
arenas. The hypothesis guiding this investigation is that economists are particularly well 
placed to access and deliver international goods. Below this scholarship is reviewed in 
greater detail. 
International resources 
As compared with other domestic actors, economists have significant advantages 
in being able to access and deliver highly valued international goods such as aid, grants, 
loans, and investment. International financial institutions, investment banks, or aid 
organizations are often run by fellow economists that are more likely to trust members of 
their own profession with the grants, loans, and investments they are requesting. A 
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number of studies of Latin American countries have documented that countries desperate 
for such funds will push to the top of their economic policy making teams those 
individuals that are most likely to inspire the trust and loosen the purse strings of 
counterparts for whom the presence of familiar and trusted economists signal a well-run 
economy and the responsible use of requested funds. Sarah Babb (2001), for example, 
has demonstrated that U.S. trained economists  came to dominate the policymaking 
process in Mexico in large part because their presence served to reassure international 
investors that the economy was in knowledgeable and appropriately trained hands. 
Similarly, in a study of Latin American technocrats in the 1980s, Ben Schneider (1998) 
considers several different explanations for their simultaneous ascendance in countries 
that varied greatly in terms of political and economic structure. Schneider concludes that 
the only explanation that fully accounts for observed outcomes is that “political leaders 
seek out technocrats in order to signal government commitment to economic reform and 
thereby restore investor confidence” (Schneider, 1998). 
This explanation is particularly compelling for the Iranian case insofar as it 
explains why economists might have had such similar experiences under two 
ideologically opposing regimes. That is, the pro- or anti- Western orientation of the 
regime would have had much less impact on the experience of economists than the extent 
to which the political leadership sought loans, grants, or investments from the 




Economists as political interest groups 
While the primary hypothesis driving this investigation is that economists gain 
influence due to their advantages in delivering international goods, another view is that 
political leaders turn to economists insofar as they can deliver votes and dollars just like 
any other interest group (Schneider, 1998: 80-82). The ability of a given group to 
mobilize and influence policy has been identified, within the traditional literature on 
interest groups, as dependent upon group size (the smaller the better) and the votes or 
dollars available to support sympathetic electoral candidates (Brenner, 1969, Olson, 
1965). While economists—particularly Western-educated economists in developing 
countries like Iran—may be a relatively small group with relatively few collective action 
problems, they clearly do not command the financial or electoral resources of more 
traditional groups. Researchers have found, however, that policymakers can be 
responsive to the interests of diffuse groups and may, therefore, be willing to embrace 
policy options that economists frame as being beneficial to (and thereby resulting in votes 
from) large portions of the electorate (Bailey, 2001). Furthermore, in many developing 
countries, foreign-educated economists are of necessity members of wealthy, elite, well-
connected families with the means to send their children abroad to study for several 
years. As such, economists are more likely to have family and/or other associational ties 
with wealthy or influential individuals that they might ‘deliver’ to policymakers in order 
to increase the likelihood that their preferred policy choices will be adopted (Schneider, 
1998: 81). 
Noting these various means by which technocrats actively pursue the 
implementation of their policy ideals, Guillermo O’Donnell (1973) has analyzed their 
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role in Latin American and concluded that they are so powerful that their activities can be 
inimical to the democratic conduct of governance. In O’Donnell’s account, technocrats 
quickly become frustrated by the inability of messy democracies to indentify, select and 
stick to effective policies. Concluding that parliaments are an obstacle and hindrance to 
growth-promoting strategies, technocrats ally themselves with the military and others in a 
coup coalition that overturns populist democracies in favor of what O’Donnell labels a 
‘bureaucratic-authoritarian’ form of government. Technocrats and economists are, 
according to this narrative, not only a powerful interest group within a pluralist society 
but also a group powerful enough to help overturn pluralist societies deemed an obstacle 
to its preferred policies. 
Functionalism 
The two processes described above assume that political leaders turn to 
economists because they believe economists can deliver something of value. In contrast, 
earlier theories about the role of economists assumed that political leaders become 
convinced of the need to hire economists because of the increasing complexity of the 
world, the superiority of the advice economists provide, or the example of successful 
states in the system.  
One of the first literatures to note (and applaud) the growing power of economists 
was functionalism (Haas, 1968, Mitrany, 1968, Rosamond, 2000). In the words of David 
Mitrany: “We have traveled far from the glittering parade of princes at the Congress of 
Vienna to the sober meetings of civil servants, scientists and technicians” (Mitrany, 1968: 
67). The technification of governance was seen by functionalists as a natural and 
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predictable response to the growing complexity of the modern world and the increasing 
responsibilities of welfare states to their citizens (Schneider, 1998: 78). Governments and 
the politicians who ran them did not have the expertise needed to function effectively in 
this new and uncertain environment. They therefore turned to neutral experts to help them 
determine their interests and how they might be attained (Rosamond, 2000: 31-38). 
The growing power of experts was, according to functionalists, not only 
inevitable but was also a normatively positive trend. In the hands of economists, 
engineers, and other scientists, policy decisions would be guided by rational science 
rather than the self interest of rulers and politicians. This process would, furthermore, 
lead to increased international cooperation and integration—the primary interest of 
functionalists—as scientists worked together across national boundaries to address shared 
issues and problems. 
This rosy view of the role of technocrats has been challenged on several fronts. 
Critics have pointed out that very few government decisions are purely technical and/or 
lacking in distributive implications (Rosamond, 2000: 40). Insistence that such decisions 
be removed from the arena of political or public debate would, therefore, eliminate 
citizen involvement in decisions that materially affect their welfare thereby severely 
diminishing the quality of democratic governance (Centeno, 1993, Laird, 1993, Nelkin, 
1975). A different line of critique has been offered by radical constructivists who 
question the ontological and epistemological bases by which individuals are defined as 
‘experts’. Asserting that knowledge is a social construction whose correspondence with 
reality is impossible to determine, such critics suggest that scientific claims of objectivity 
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and/or privileged access to reality are contestable (Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay, 1983, 
Woolgar, 1988).  
Functionalists have also been criticized on theoretical grounds for failing to 
describe the reasons why and process by which politicians were expected to cede 
significant power to experts or how the proper experts for the job would be determined. 
Neofunctionalists, among others, were uncomfortable with the seemingly agent-less 
assumptions that such processes were inexorable and would proceed with little 
contestation from politicians or those experts not selected for the job (Haas, 1968: 31 & 
59).  
Most troubling for the present investigation of Iran, however, are functionalism’s 
predictions regarding the inexorable and unidirectional nature of change in the position of 
economists as a response to the growing challenge of navigating the complex 
international economic order. Such assumptions are challenged by the actual experience 
of economists during various episodes of Iranian history—such as the 1973 oil boom as 
well as the immediate post-revolutionary period—when economists were unable to 
influence policy decisions and even lost positions of power. 
Epistemic Communities 
The theoretical framework and research agenda for this body of literature was 
most clearly laid out in a special International Organization issue on Epistemic 
Communities in which Peter Haas and Emanuel Adler elaborated upon a concept 
originally conceived by John Ruggie (Adler and Haas, 1992, Haas, 1992, Ruggie, 1975). 
Frustrated by the dominance and limitations of neorealist structuralism, Haas, Adler and 
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other contributors to the issue sought to identify and highlight a ‘nonsystemic origin for 
state interests and…a dynamic for persistent cooperation independent of the distribution 
of international power” (Haas, 1992: 4). Such an origin was believed to have been found 
in transnational epistemic communities of scientists or experts that share causal beliefs 
and normative values and work toward common policy goals by informing the interests 
and beliefs of the various states they serve in a manner that often leads to policy 
convergence and increased international cooperation. In his theoretically rich introduction 
to the special issue, Haas describes the defining characteristics of this new analytical 
category and discusses the traits which distinguish epistemic communities (ECs) from 
other associations such as interest groups, professions or bureaucracies. In epistemic 
communities, these scholars identified an important channel for a state’s identification of 
interests and relevant cause-and-effect relations—a process which was believed to be 
entirely ignored or underspecified in neorealist and other structuralist accounts of 
international relations 
The epistemic communities approach shared many of functionalism’s 
assumptions—albeit more clearly delineated—regarding the reasons why and the 
processes by which governments and politicians entrust sensitive policy decisions to 
experts and professionals. Like the functionalists, scholars of epistemic communities 
emphasize the increasing uncertainty policymakers face in our modern and complex 
world (Adler and Haas, 1992: 387). Scholars of epistemic communities do not assume, 
however, that politicians automatically recognize this growing complexity or necessarily 
conclude that their own skills are no longer sufficient for the task of governing.  A crisis 
or other unexpected shock to the system is required to render political leaders more open 
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to the advice of experts who can help them understand what caused the crisis, what the 
state’s interests are or should be, what policy options are available, and what new 
institutions might be necessary to carry them forward (Haas, 1992: 14). During and 
following such a crisis, political leaders are expected to be particularly amenable to 
expert influence in those areas for which they have few preconceived ideas or when the 
advice they receive is a good fit with core beliefs they already hold (Haas, 1992: 29). 
Like functionalists, scholars of epistemic communities have also been criticized 
for their overly optimistic view of the role scientists and experts may play in informing 
the views of policymakers. Critics have questioned their assumptions that scientists are 
neutral and unbiased advisors by highlighting examples of their propensity to ignore 
empirical evidence that contradicts their “cherished models” (Jacobsen, 1995: 302). More 
damningly, critics point to cases where experts seem to ‘sell out’ by adapting their 
positions to suit the preferences of the agencies or individuals employing them (Jacobsen, 
1995: 301-02). Proponents of the epistemic communities approach might point out that 
scientists that do ‘sell out’ or refuse to be budged by empirical evidence are likely to very 
quickly lose their standing as a member of the epistemic community in question (Kogan, 
2005: 10). Such cases do highlight, however, the real possibility that epistemic 
communities may at times serve as nothing more than a fig leaf of pseudo-scientific 
respectability for the policies politicians wish to implement for their own self-interested 
purposes. 
As regards the Iranian case, epistemic communities of Western-educated or 
Western-associated economists and technocrats might be expected to gain influence 
during the Pahlavi era of an explicitly pro-Western monarchy. Their influence would be 
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expected to wane, however, under the fiercely anti-Western and anti-capitalist theocrats 
ruling the Islamic Republic. Scholarship on epistemic communities is challenged, 
therefore, by the observation that economists in fact experienced similar cycles of falling 
in and out of favor under both regimes. 
Mimetic Isomorphism  
Mimetic isomorphism refers to the process by which organizations or states 
emulate the forms and practices of the most prominent or successful examples in their 
field. Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell (1983) have described this process as a way of 
minimizing uncertainty. An organization or nation-state lacking perfect information about 
the optimal structure or practices with which to interact with complex events can look to 
other successful models as guides. Simmons and Elkins (2004) have described emulation 
as stemming from reputational costs associated with maintaining alternative policies or 
structures. When interacting with counterparts from other countries and in international 
organizations, policy elites may experience some discomfort from representing a country 
with ‘backward’ policies or institutions. A good example of this purposeful emulation 
can be found in Eleanor Westney’s (1987) account of imperial Japan which, starting in 
1859, actively sought to learn about and incorporate Western practices. Westney details 
the process by which Japanese leaders created a national police system based on the 
French model, a national postal system based on the English model, and a thriving media 
sector based on a general Western model. In part due to this active observation and 
adaptation of the models provided by economically and militarily superior countries, 
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Japan transformed itself over a fifty year period from an isolated feudal society to one of 
the world’s major powers and became itself a model for emulation by other countries.  
The process of mimetic isomorphism might influence the hiring of economists in 
developing nations in at least two ways. For example, noting that the United States and 
other dominant nations within the international system incorporate expert advice into 
their policymaking processes, the leaders of developing countries might do the same in 
the hopes that imitating stronger countries’ methods will lead to similar results. Second, 
policymakers might be more likely to trust and hire those economists that share their 
admiration for and wish to replicate the capitalist economic models of the U.S. and other 
dominant nations. It is not difficult to imagine that Mohammad Reza Pahlavi who openly 
admired and sought to guide his nation toward the economic and military success of the 
West would emulate its forms of governance including the prominent role accorded 
economists. Given the Islamic Republic’s explicit rejection of the Western model, 
however, theories of mimetic isomorphism are harder pressed to explain, for example, 
Khatami’s endorsement of a World Bank-inspired reform program spearheaded by 
Western-educated economists. 
Hypotheses and Variables Under Investigation 
The dependent variable in this investigation is the influence of economists. The 
first step in systematizing measurement of this variable is to clarify what is meant by 
‘economists’. An economist can refer to an individual that has attained a formal degree, 
usually a masters or PhD, in the study of economics. For the purposes of the present 
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study, however, the focus is on those individuals advocating liberal economic policies 
preferred by Western nations and international financial institutions.  
The next step is to clarify what is meant by ‘influence’. There are two ways in 
which the waxing and waning of liberal economists’ power can be conceptualized. The 
first is to consider the extent to which such individuals are appointed to or otherwise 
attain prominent policymaking positions such as the Minister of Finance, Central Banker, 
or Head of the Plan and Budget Organization. 
A second way to conceptualize the power of liberal economists is to investigate 
the extent to which these individuals are able to successfully promote their policy 
preferences over the objections of opposing ministers, parliamentarians, members of 
court or clerics. In order to measure this, we must first define the economic policies and 
policy preferences held by liberal economists.  Throughout the time period under 
consideration, these individuals promoted: a) fiscal policy discipline and avoidance of 
large fiscal deficits; b) tax reform to broaden the revenue base; c) redirection of public 
spending away from subsidies and consumption; and d) strengthened legal protections for 
property rights. There are a few economic policy areas, however, in which liberal 
economists’ recommendations have changed reflecting a global trend away from 
Keynesianism and toward neoliberalism. Specifically, prior to the 1980s, liberal 
economists were more supportive of government investment in capital-intensive public 
enterprises, more tolerant of government regulation of and protections for domestic 
industries, and less concerned about controls on exchange rates, interest rates, and trade 
barriers. More recently, however, liberal economists have become associated with the 
Washington Consensus package of reforms that insists upon privatization of public 
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enterprises, the liberalization of exchange and interest rates, and the reduction of trade 
barriers. 
Luckily, for the purposes of the present study, the shift in preferences of liberal 
economists roughly coincides with the occurrence of the Islamic revolution. Prior to the 
revolution, therefore, the dependent variable can be defined by the extent to which liberal 
economists are able to see their Keynesian preferences actualized into policy decisions. 
While after the revolution, the dependent variable can be defined by the extent to which 
liberal economists are able to see their neoliberal preferences actualized into policy 
decisions.  
Throughout both time periods, particular attention is paid to those policy areas 
that are especially sensitive or controversial. Fiscal policy, for example, is an area that 
inspires strong opinions given the material consequences associated with decisions about 
how much, from where, and on what the government should obtain and spend money. 
Similarly controversial are fundamental structural reforms that seek to change the 
government’s role in the economy, increase market efficiencies, and eliminate rents. In 
seeking to implement these types of reforms economists were often opposed by 
individuals with ideological commitments to a larger government role in the economy or 
a desire to capture additional rents for themselves or their constituents. The extent to 
which economists promoting the preferred policies of the international financial 
community were able to dominate decisions in these two areas will serve, therefore, as a 
useful measure of their power or influence.  
Based on the chronological narrative of economists’ experiences that follows in 
chapters 2 through 9, ten distinct eras or ‘cases’ can be identified in which liberal 
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economists attained positions of power and were able to dominate policymaking in the 
policy areas defined above. A summary of this evaluation is presented in Table 1. 






1 1953-1958 High 
2 1959-1962 Low 
3 1963-1972 High 
4 1973-1976 Low 
5 1977-1978 High 
6 1979-1987 Low 
7 1988-1992 High 
8 1993-1997 Low 
9 1997-2004 High 
10 2004-2009 Low 
 
Having defined the dependent variable, attention can now be turned to the 
hypotheses and independent variables under investigation. The primary hypothesis can be 
defined as: 
Hypothesis A: Economists gain influence when the international resources they 
can deliver are valued and desired by the country’s political leadership; Economists lose 
influence when those resources are not valued or desired. 
The independent variable—the desire and need for international resources—can 
be measured by the extent to which Iran’s leaders actively solicited and depended upon 
international grants and loans from international institutions, powerful nations (such as 
the United States or other Western powers) and international investors, particularly as a 
result of budgetary or balance of payments pressures. 
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The alternative hypotheses under consideration are drawn from scholarship that 
credits the influence of economists to changes in the worldview of political leaders or the 
ability of economists to deliver domestic goods such as votes or dollars. They are stated 
and defined more formally below. 
Hypothesis B1 (Pluralism): Economists gain influence when they are able to 
deliver domestic resources, primarily votes, dollars, or power. Economists lose influence 
when they are unable to deliver domestic resources. 
The independent variable is the extent to which economists created or led political 
parties or enjoyed personal political popularity in ways that might have allowed them to 
deliver political power to individuals or parties associated with them. 
Hypothesis B2 (Functionalism): Economists gain influence over time as 
uncertainty due to modernization increases; Economists never lose influence. 
Functionalists explain the growing dependence of politicians and policymakers 
upon economists as resulting from the complexity of the modern world which is assumed 
to have increased steadily over time. Time is therefore a sufficient proxy or measure of 
the independent variable or complexity of the modern world.  
Hypothesis B3 (Epistemic Communities): Economists gain influence when an 
epistemic community of economists is formed and able to use periods of political or 
economic crisis to offer new solutions when policymakers have become aware of 
increasing uncertainty and the limitations of earlier policy choices. Economists’ influence 
is lessened or remains stable in the absence of such political or economic crises or in the 
absence of a strong epistemic community. 
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Scholarship on epistemic communities suggests that each instance of an increase 
in economists’ power ought to have been preceded by a shock or crisis that would jolt 
policymakers into recognizing the modern worlds growing complexity as well as earlier 
limitations in interpreting and identifying the nation’s interests within it. Such time 
periods constitute a ‘teachable moment’ that a strong epistemic community can use to 
promote its own interpretations of the reasons for the crisis as well as the appropriate 
policy response. The joint independent variables therefore are the presence or absence of 
an epistemic community in combination with the presence or absence of political or 
economic crises preceding changes in the influence of economists. The existence of such 
an epistemic community can be determined by the strength of professional and 
associational ties between individuals sharing a common commitment to developing the 
country along the lines preferred by the international financial and donor communities. 
Hypothesis B4 (Mimetic Isomorphism): Economists gain influence when their 
countries’ leaders seek to import models of governance from successful Western states 
within the international system. Economists lose influence when political leaders reject 
Western models of governance. 
The independent variable is the extent to which Iran sought to emulate Western 
models of governance. The clearest variation in the independent variable occurred at the 
time of the revolution when a pro-Western pro-capitalist monarchy was replaced by a 
vehemently anti-Western anti-capitalist theocracy. More subtle variations in the extent to 
which the West might have served as a governing template will also be evaluated based 
upon public and private statements of political leaders in this regard. 
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Case Justification and Significance 
Two characteristics make Iran a uniquely useful case with which to investigate 
these hypotheses. First, Iran constitutes a ‘least-likely’ test of the proposition that access 
to material resources rather than changes in the world-view of political leaders is what 
drives the relative influence of economists and other experts. There are few nations that 
have rejected the Western model more vehemently than the Islamic Republic. Iran’s turn 
to Western-educated economists and its embrace of a World Bank inspired economic 
reform program in the late 80s suggests that the need for international resources overrode 
its ideological commitment to maintaining the purity of its anti-capitalist and anti-
Western identity.  
Second, while a great deal of theoretical and empirical work has been done to 
conceptualize and test the conditions under which economists gain policymaking power, 
very little exploration has been done of the conditions under which economists might lose 
power. Studies of functionalism or the role of epistemic communities are based, for 
example, on assumptions of increasing complexity of the world. Studies of economists as 
political interest groups look at how economists’ increased political activism results in 
greater policy power but fail to investigate whether subsequent political quietude causes 
them to lose that power. There are also few studies that examine the way that resource 
INdependence might cause economists to lose their positions of power or the way that a 
once-dominant country’s fall from power might slow or reverse mimetic tendencies 
among developing countries.  
Part of the problem is that there are simply very few cases or countries in which 
both directions of change in the dependent and independent variables can be observed. 
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Iran is in this regard a uniquely useful case with which to investigate hypotheses about 
both the rise and fall of economists given the cyclical nature of their ascendance and fall 
from power under both the Pahlavi and Islamic regimes. Over the sixty year period under 
investigation, Iran has also experienced great variation in the primary independent 
variables of interest. The Shah, for example, overtly sought to model his country on the 
powerful Western nations that had achieved economic prosperity and global dominance. 
Leaders of the Islamic Republic, in contrast, adamantly rejected the Western model and 
all things related to it. As an oil exporting nation, Iran has also experienced significant 
variation in its dependence upon or independence from the favor of international financial 
institutions or investors. Bidirectional variation in the political activism of economists as 
well as the experience of periods of crisis followed by periods of calm also facilitate the 
researcher’s ability to trace linkages between the independent and dependent variables 
under a variety of conditions. The following section provides additional background 
information on Iran. 
Background on Iran 
The nation-state of Iran is the cultural, linguistic, and ethnic heir of the Persian 
empire. The modern era of Iran’s history can perhaps be said to have begun in 1921 when 
Reza Khan overthrew the remnants of the weakened Qajar rulers to establish his own 
dynasty. Reza Khan ruled the nation until being forced to abdicate in favor of his young 
son Muhammad Reza by Allied forces that objected to his support for Germany during 
World War II. Muhammad Reza Shah ruled the nation for almost forty years surviving 
exile and numerous assassination attempts and overseeing the country’s transformation 
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from an agrarian society to—with the aid of petrodolloars—a modest industrial power 
(Abrahamian, 2008, Gasiorowski and Byrne, 2004, Halliday, 1979, Katouzian, 1981).  
The Shah was overthrown in the 1979 revolution that ushered in the Islamic 
Republic under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The new regime 
combined elements of democracy (an elected parliament and president) with theocracy 
(absolute rule by the Supreme Leader). The 1980s were marked by revolutionary turmoil 
and a grinding war with neighboring Iraq. After Khomeini’s death, the pragmatic 
President Rafsanjani sought to rebuild the war-torn country and de-emphasized religious 
fervor in favor of economic progress. The next president, Khatami, was primarily 
interested in political reforms but continued and strengthened Rafsanjani’s economic 
programs as well. In 2005, the populist hardliner Ahmadinejad became the country’s first 
non-clerical president. Emphasizing a return to revolutionary values, Ahmadinejad rolled 
back many of his predecessors reforms. The contested 2009 election in which 
Ahmadinejad’s opponents claimed election fraud resulted in mass demonstrations and 
arrests that rocked the nation for months (Abrahamian, 2008, Amuzegar, 1993, Wehrey et 
al., 2009, Wright, 2010). See Appendix I for a more comprehensive review of major 
political events in Iranian history. 
Iran has long hosted one of the largest economies (second after Saudi Arabia in 
2009) and largest populations (second after Egypt in 2011) in the Middle East and North 
Africa region (See Figure 1and Figure 2). Its resulting per capita GDP, however, has 
remained in the bottom half of its regional group, peaking in the 1973 oil boom at a level 




Figure 1: GDP for MENA countries (World Bank, 2012) 
 
 




















































































































































































































































Figure 3: Per capita GDP for MENA countries
1
 (World Bank, 2012) 
Iran’s economy and government is heavily dependent upon the hydrocarbons 
sector. Iran has the world’s fourth largest oil reserves and second largest gas reserves 
(See Figure 4and Figure 5). In 2011 Iran was still the world’s third largest exporter of oil 
(after Saudi Arabia and Russia) but may soon face the prospects of being edged out due 
to declining production capacity as well as tightening sanctions (OPEC, 2012: Table 
3.18). Iran has not emerged as a top exporter of natural gas due to underdevelopment in 
the sector as well as heavy domestic use (EIA, 2012: pages 7 - 11, OPEC, 2012: Table 
3.22). Since 1993, revenue from the sale of oil has comprised 35 to 75% of the 
government’s total revenues (See Figure 6). Oil revenues have also made up a large part 
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 Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE, all of whom had per capita GDPs well in excess of $20,000 during this time 
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of export revenues—78% in 2011, down from a peak of 88% in 2000 and a sizeable 
portion of GDP (13 to 41% since 1993; See Figure 7 and Figure 8). Other important 
sectors of the economy include services which in 2007 contributed 45% of GDP, and 
agriculture which contributed 10% (see Figure 9). 
 
Figure 4: Largest holders of oil reserves (EIA, 2012) 
 
Figure 5: Largest holders of gas reserves (EIA, 2012) 




























Figure 7: Oil revenue in dollars and as a ratio of total export revenues
3
 
                                                 
2
 Data compiled from IMF Article IV consultations conducted in the years 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2007, 2008, 2009, and 2011, as well as 1998 IMF Report 98-27 on Recent Economic Developments; Data 



























































Figure 8: Oil as a percentage of GDP (World Bank, 2012) 
 
Figure 9: Sectors of the Iranian Economy (World Bank, 2012) 
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Over the past fifty years, the amount of Iranian trade with the international 
community—consisting primarily of oil exports and the import of intermediate 
products—has varied widely. Trade as a percentage of GDP was highest during and 
immediately following the oil boom of 1973 and fell dramatically after the revolution and 
war with Iraq (see Figure 10). Iran’s biggest trading partners have shifted eastward in 
recent years. In 2011, Iran’s top five export markets were China, Japan, Taiwan, Turkey, 
and India as compared with Japan, Italy, France, South Africa, and Korea in 1995.  
Similarly, the top five countries of origin for Iran’s imports in 2011 were the U.A.E, 
China, Korea, Germany, and Turkey, whereas in 1995 they were Germany, Japan, 
Argentina, Russia, and the UK  (UNCTAD, 2012). 
 
Figure 10: Trade as a percent of GDP 
Iran, perhaps unsurprisingly, has not been a particularly attractive environment for 
foreign investment. In only five of the last forty years has inward FDI comprised more 




























































































































Figure 11: FDI in dollars and as a percentage of GDP 
A more comprehensive timeline of political and economic events in Iran can be 
found in Appendix I. 
Data and Methods 
Data for this investigation was drawn from a number of primary and secondary 
source materials. Fifty-two semi-structured interviews were conducted in Iran during the 
summer of 2004, summer of 2006, and winter of 2009. Participants included high-level 
former officials at the Plan and Budget Organization, Central Bank, and Ministry of 
Finance in addition to journalists, economic analysts, officials in various ministries, and 
private sector actors. While government economic policy was for many years a relatively 
‘safe’ topic for discussion and even critique, this is no longer the case. The government’s 
sensitivity to criticism in this regard has increased greatly since the contested 2009 
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felt in 2011. As such, information or quotes from interviews are not attributed in order to 
protect the anonymity of the subjects.  
Additional primary source material has been drawn from interviews conducted by 
third parties. Bahman Ahmadi-Amouee has published many such interviews with some of 
the most important members of the Islamic Republic’s economic policymaking teams. 
The Harvard Iranian Oral History Project as well as the Foundation for Iranian Studies 
include recordings and transcripts of interviews with many of the most influential 
economists and economic policymakers from the Pahlavi era that were also very useful. 
State Department archives housed in the National Archives in College Park, MD 
were also consulted. Monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, and annual economic reports in 
addition to various memoranda from field offices in Tehran, Isfahan, Tabriz and other 
cities provided a great deal of information for the years 1953-1973.   
Current and archival news reports from the English and Persian press were also 
very useful. Secondary sources were also consulted including a number of biographies of 
notable personalities from the Pahlavi period and various economic histories of Iran from 
both the Pahlavi and Islamic periods. 
These data were incorporated into a historical and chronological narrative—the 
first of its kind—of the experiences of economists and the extent of their influence in the 
years since the Mossadegh coup in 1953 that comprises chapters two through eight. 
Chapter nine divides the narrative into ten distinct cases—five from the Pahlavi period 
and five from the Iranian Republic—and considers the extent to which each independent 
variable is responsible for variation observed in the dependent variable throughout the 
entire seventy year period. 
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Chapter Two: After the coup (1953-1961) 
In late 1950, under the leadership of the fiery nationalist Mohammad Mossadegh, 
Iran’s parliament (Majles) rejected a revised oil concession agreement negotiated 
between the Iranian government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC)
4
. Having 
determined that the original 1936 agreement had been signed under duress and that, in 
ensuing years, the British had employed a variety of shady accounting practices to avoid 
paying Iran the stipulated percentage, the Majles moved to nationalize its oil industry 
(CIA, 1951, Farmanfarmaian, 1997: 205, 07-12, 34-64). Although Iran was willing to 
compensate AIOC for its investments and other sunk costs, it was unwilling to accede to 
British demands for additional reparations for potential future losses (Ross, 1952). After a 
two year battle of wills in which the British imposed a total embargo on Iranian oil while 
Mossadegh traveled to the United Nations and World Court to successfully defend Iran’s 
right to nationalize (Sullivan, 1951), the issue was mooted by a CIA and MI6 sponsored 
coup d’etat that toppled Mossadegh in mid-August 1953 and secured the throne for 
Mohammad Reza Shah (Gasiorowski and Byrne, 2004, Kinzer, 2007). 
The story of technocrats in Iran begins in the aftermath of this coup. Having 
placed its bets on the Pahlavi monarchy, the U.S. was determined to see it succeed. Over 
                                                 
4 A great number of primary and secondary source materials are available on the Mossadegh era. The CIA, 
for example, produced a number of  Intelligence Estimates during this time including “The Current Crisis 
in Iran: Secret Special Estimate SE-3,” March 16, 1951; “Current Developments in Iran: Special Estimate 
SE-6” May 22, 1951; “Probably Developments in Iran in 1952 in the Absence of an Oil Settlement: 
National Intelligence Estimate NIE-46,” February 4, 1952; and “Probable Developments in Iran through 
1953: National Intelligence Estimate NIE-75,” November 13, 1952.” For an account of domestic politics 
during this period see Sepehr Zabih’s The Mossadegh Era. For a first-hand account of British oil policies 
in Iran see Manuchehr Farmanfarmaian’s Blood and Oil.  
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the next decade, millions of dollars of aid was poured into the country. Among other 
things this money was used to create the institutions needed for economic development 
that were often staffed with Western advisors and Western-educated Iranians to run them. 
Iran’s first economists 
Within days of the successful coup, America’s new role of patron to Muhammad 
Reza Shah’s throne became clear as U.S. officials began hinting that the emergency 
financial aid requested by but long withheld from Mossadegh would be made available to 
the new pro-Shah cabinet headed by Prime Minister General Zahedi (Decision up to 
President About U.S. Help for Iran, 1953). While furious discussions were underway in 
Washington DC as to the appropriate amounts and methods by which to disburse such 
aid, Embassy officials in Tehran were scrambling to secure the personnel support 
necessary to fulfill their new responsibilities (Byroade, August 25, 1953, Henderson, 
August 21, 1953). By September 10
th
, less than a month after the coup, the United States 
had deposited the first tranche—$5.3 million—of the $45 million emergency aid it 
promised to provide over the next 9 months (Doty, 1953, Iran Gets $5,300,000 of New 
Aid from U.S., 1953). A further $23 million was provided that year in the form of Point 
IV—the precursor to USAID—aid (CIA, 1953). In December 1953, Vice-President 
Nixon visited Tehran to show further U.S. support for the Shah and emphasize that the 
goal of US aid was to help “this [Iranian] Government and this people to be strong, 




Chosen to head the Shah’s economic team were two men destined to have a 
strong hand in determining the shape and direction of Iran’s new institutions of economic 
development. The first, Ali Amini, was the scion of a wealthy and aristocratic family that 
had served the Qajar monarchy as ministers and prime ministers for a hundred years. 
Educated in France, he had received a PhD in economics with a dissertation on the 
foreign trade monopoly in Iran. A politically ambitious man, he was known to have 
already set his sights on becoming Prime Minister. With the help of his American 
friends—his rumored closeness with John Kennedy in particular—he would eventually 
achieve this goal less than a decade later (Farmanfarmaian, 1997: 308-10, Milani, 2008: 
63-71). 
Named Minister of Finance within hours of General Zahedi’s victory over 
Mossadegh, Amini’s immediate challenge was figuring out how to keep the country 
running despite a severe lack of revenue or savings. The British embargo had prevented 
Iran from selling a single drop of oil over the previous two years such that by the time of 
the August coup, the treasury was bare and the country owed at least $500 million (CIA, 
1953: paragraphs 14-16, Henderson, August 28, 1953, Iranians Are Told Oil Dispute's 
Cost, 1953). Amini attacked this task in three ways. The first was to beg and borrow as 
much as possible from the new American benefactor. Given the U.S. role in the recent 
change of government, the Iranians had high hopes for financial aid, expecting something 
on the order of $300 million to tide them over to such time as oil revenues would pick up 
again. They were bitterly disappointed by the actual amounts they received. Iranian 
officials complained that such stop-gap funding was not nearly enough for the 
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employment-generating investments the country needed to solidify support for the new 
regime (Henderson, September 3, 1953, Henderson, September 10, 1953, U.S. Aid Total 
Criticized, 1953). Prime Minister Zahedi even threatened to resign as “it would be 
dishonorable for him to stay in office if it should become clear he [is] unable to carry out 
promises made to Iranian people who were trusting him” (Henderson, September 11, 
1953).  Despite these disappointments, Amini continued to work doggedly with Embassy 
staff and officials in DC to identify and explore additional sources of funding.  
Amini’s second task was to negotiate a deal with the British that would end the oil 
embargo and allow Iran to resume receipt of the oil revenues it so desperately needed. 
Despite the removal of Mossadegh, the British refused to lift the oil embargo until a new 
oil concession was signed
5
. Dr. Amini headed the ministerial commission that negotiated 
the new deal with British and American interests (Amini, 1995). The U.S. proposed a 
consortium of oil companies that would take control of Iranian oil production with 
AIOC—now re-named British Petroleum—holding a 40% share (Hangen, 1954, Kinzer, 
2007: 196). The final agreement stipulated that Iran pay BP $40 million in compensation 
for ‘rupture of agreement’; and refused to allow any Iranians to join the board of directors 
or be permitted to audit the consortium’s books. In presenting the deal for ratification by 
the Majles, Amini glumly declared that it was not a great deal for Iran, but it was the best 
                                                 
5
 Indeed, the British were also adamantly opposed to American aid—beyond emergency levels—for fear it 
might serve as a disincentive for Iranians to swiftly conclude a deal. See Bailey, Michael. (2001) Quiet 




that could be got (Amini, 1995: 99-100, Farmanfarmaian, 1997:305-10)
6
. The deal was 
ratified by the Senate on October 28
th
 and tankers began moving Iranian oil out of 
Abadan three days later (Love, 1954).  
Amini’s final approach to generating revenue was to launch a campaign to reform 
the country’s customs and tax-collecting agencies (Amini, 1995: 102-03). Widespread tax 
evasion among the wealthy combined with corruption and graft among government 
workers had resulted in an unfair burden of direct and indirect taxes on the poorer classes. 
Proclaiming a ‘holy war’ on these problems, Dr. Amini pledged an overhaul of the tax 
collection machinery and institutions to implement the country’s first comprehensive 
progressive tax structure (CIA, 1954: 9, Doty, 1953). These efforts culminated in the 
introduction and passage of a new tax law in August 1955 (Semi-Annual Economic and 
Financial Review, Iran, January-June, 1955, August 22, 1955: section 9b). Amini also 
relied upon U.S. technical and financial aid toward the development of more orderly 
mechanisms for budgeting and tax collection.(Rountree, 1955). 
Ebtehaj 
Working in concert with Amini was Abol Hassan Ebtehaj, the descendent of a 
slightly less illustrious family of middle-class government functionaries. His father 
managed the land and accounts of a wealthy and often-absent landowner and did well 
enough to send his sons to study abroad in Paris and later at the American School in 
                                                 
6
 Majles deputy Abdul Rahman Faramarzi said of the vote: “When there is only one road ahead of you you 
have to take it whether it is good or bad” See: Byroade, Henry. (August 25, 1953) Memorandum of 
Conversation with Harold Beeley. 
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Beirut. Less politically motivated than Amini, Ebtehaj was rumored to have turned down 
several offers for the position of Prime Minister in favor of jobs that gave him influence 
over economic policy decisions. While he was never formally trained in economics, his 
sixteen years at the British-owned Imperial Bank of Persia—for many years the informal 
central bank of Iran— as well as his years heading Iran’s new national bank provided him 
with a formidable expertise in banking, finance and development economics that was 
recognized by more traditionally trained colleagues as well as the International Monetary 
Fund which hired him to head their Middle East Department (Bostock and Jones, 1989, 
Iran Gives Post to Banker, 1954, Milani, 2008: 735-43). After several years in 




 was created in 1949 to administer the country’s very first 
seven-year economic plan which had been drawn up with the help of the American 
consulting firms Morrison Knudsen and Overseas Consultants Incorporated (OCI). The 
goal was to shield oil revenues from budgetary demands by creating an independent body 
empowered to invest them in the capital and infrastructure projects needed to support 
Iran’s economic growth and development (Bostock and Jones, 1989: 94-99). Unhappily, 
however, the First Plan and Plan Organization (PO) were launched just as Iran was 
sliding into the tumultuous Mossadegh years and the British oil embargo. Starved of 
funds, by the time Ebtehaj arrived in 1954, the PO was virtually bankrupt and indebted to 
                                                 
7
 Over its seventy year life, the Plan Organization (PO) has been renamed the Plan and Budget 
Organization (PBO) and, later, the Management and Planning Organization (MPO). All three names and 
acronyms refer, however, to the same organization. 
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numerous foreign contractors while the First Plan itself had been wholly abandoned 
(Bostock and Jones, 1989: 112, Taylor, April 26, 1958:Introductory Background).  
Ebtehaj’s first order of business was to assess the current status of the First Plan, 
terminate it and lay the groundwork for a clean start with the Second Plan. To this end, 
Ebtehaj initiated an audit of the PO’s finances in order to compile a centralized record of 
the contractual obligations, debts, and projects it was committed to (Bostock and Jones, 
1989: 113, Henderson, October 7, 1954). Since Mossadegh’s overthrow the year before, 
various ministries and government bodies had been spending profligately with easy credit 
available due to expectations of the imminent resumption of Iranian oil exports. With the 
help of a newly created Economic Council made up of the Prime Minister, Ministers of 
Finance and Economy, and the governor of the Central Bank, Ebtehaj quickly moved to 
halt this uncoordinated spending and reassert the Plan Organization’s authority over 
expenditures related to major development projects (CIA, 1954: paragraph 40, Love, 
1954). These efforts were strongly supported by the Americans whose growing concerns 
over Iranian spending practices were manifest in new stipulations that additional aid “be 
used to pay off American creditors first, that additional purchases be limited to essential 
goods and that any transaction above $15,000 be cleared with Washington” (Byroade, 
October 13, 1954, Love, 1954). 
Ebtehaj’s next step was to draft an interim plan designed to guide the country’s 
development program over the short term while a second development plan was being 
prepared and approved. In so doing, his stated priority was the big infrastructure 
projects—roads, railroads, ports, and dams—that he believed were necessary to support 
the country’s development and economic growth (Bray, June 22, 1955). Ebtehaj also set 
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out to combat corruption through a number of changes in the way contracts were awarded 
and managed. Among other things, Ebtehaj sought to ensure that major project were 
awarded on the basis of international tender rather than the prevailing system of contract-
hunting by local agents of international corporations. Ebtehaj also insisted that all new 
contracts contain a clause that would void the agreement if bribes were found to have 
taken place (Bostock and Jones, 1989: 113 & 24).  
In the process of preparing the Second Plan, Ebtehaj also sought to restructure and 
transform the Plan Organization itself into a more active, effective, and influential 
institution. He began developing and staffing two major new departments. The Technical 
Bureau was charged with appraising the technical aspects of proposed projects as well as 
overseeing their actual implementation by the PO or foreign contractors. The Economic 
Bureau was expected to produce future Development Plans based upon thorough study of 
the country’s macroeconomic indicators and development needs; it also played a role in 
considering financial arrangements and agreements for funding proposed 
projects(Bostock and Jones, 1989: 123). In staffing these two departments, Ebtehaj 
heavily favored foreign advisors and/or foreign-trained Iranian nationals and made 
special arrangements to ensure that the compensation available for these positions would 
be enough to make them attractive to the most capable candidates
8
 (Memorandum of 
                                                 
8
 Creation of the Economic Bureau, for example, would have been impossible without a large grant from 
the Ford Foundation which enabled the Plan Organization to not only pay the full salaries of international 




Conversation: "Staffing of the Economic Bureau of the Seven-Year Plan Organization", 
March 13, 1958).  
In short order, Hector Prud’homme, a senior member of the World Bank’s staff 
agreed to head the Technical Bureau while Kenneth Hanson, suggested by the noted 
Harvard University economist Edward S. Mason, took over the Economic Bureau (Kerr, 
February 29, 1956, Taylor, September 21, 1957). Under these men a growing cadre of 
foreign-educated Iranian nationals was recruited and trained, including individuals such 
as Khodadad Farmanfarmaian, Manuchehr Gudarzi,  and Reza Moghadam, all of whom 
were destined to play a growing role in guiding the country’s economic development 
drive over the following decades, (Bostock and Jones, 1989, Farmanfarmaian, November 
10, 1982, Gudarzi, 1999, Majidi, 1999, Taylor, July 9, 1958).  
Iran’s Second Seven-Year Development Plan was launched in April 1956 with 
majles approval of 70 billion rials ($920,000,000) to be spent over the next seven years. 
The Plan reflected Ebtehaj’s preference for long-term development over immediate 
improvements in living standards and consisted primarily of spending targets for priority 
sectors with 22% of funds going to agriculture and irrigation, 33% to transport and 
communications, 15% for industries and mines, and 26% for social development 
(Brewer, 1956, Kerr, April 18, 1956). The Second Plan law included several extremely 
controversial stipulations insisted on by Ebtehaj. First, the Plan Organization was to 
receive 60% of the country’s oil revenues until March 1958 after which its allocation 
would be increased to 80% of oil revenues (Bostock and Jones, 1989, Brewer, 1956: 
128). Second, despite traditional mistrust of international creditors, the Plan Organization 
was authorized to take on up to $240 million in foreign loans to ensure available funding 
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for approved projects (Taylor, April 26, 1958). Finally, the Plan Organization—and 
Ebtehaj himself, as Managing Director—was to be accorded a great deal of power. In its 
analysis of the proposed legislation, the American Embassy in Tehran wrote that the bill 
“makes it clear that the Plan Organization will enjoy fiscal independence of the 
Government, that its authority to formulate development plans is supreme and 
unchallenged, and that it enjoys almost complete discretion in determining the terms and 
conditions under which its approved development projects will be executed” (Bray, July 
16, 1955). Due to these and other misgivings, debate over the Second Plan lasted nearly 
nine months and involved several different drafts. In the end, it was approved with only 
minor changes (Kerr, April 18, 1956). 
The Shah and his economic team 
Throughout this crucial time period, the Shah was generally supportive of his 
economic team. Ebtehaj in particular attracted a great deal of ire from members of 
Parliament who often seemed determined to undermine him and the Plan Organization at 
every turn. Shortly after the passage of the second Seven Year Plan, for example, Ebtehaj 
negotiated an unusual $75 million World Bank loan that, contrary to usual practice, was 
not tied to a specific project. Opposition in the Majles and Senate was overwhelming and 
vitriolic. The agreement was called “an insult to Iran” that would force the country to 
“mortgage everything we have” (Clock, November 21, 1956). Despite the concerted 
opposition of the President of the Senate and Speaker of the Majlis, the Shah stood 
behind Ebtehaj applying heavy pressure on individual legislators to ensure that the loan 
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would be approved by both legislative bodies in a timely manner (Clock, January 3, 
1957). 
Cabinet ministers were also resentful, and likely jealous, of the absolute powers 
Ebtehaj enjoyed to disburse oil revenues, take on foreign loans, and oversee development 
projects as he saw fit
9
. They were offended by his obvious disdain for the capabilities of 
the ministries which he proclaimed were corrupt, inefficient, and bloated bureaucracies 
(Taylor, April 26, 1958). And they complained that as cabinet ministers accountable and 
answerable to the parliament, they ought to have more power over projects related to 
their areas of responsibility than the unaccountable Plan manager
10
 (Kerr, February 29, 
1956). Some cabinet members retaliated by seeking to obstruct or even compete with PO 
projects. The Minister of roads, for example, did everything in his power to deny 
approval for PO road construction projects (Kerr, October 15, 1956) while the Minister of 
Mines and Industry submitted competing applications for loans from the Ex-Im bank for 
favored projects (Kerr, May 23, 1957).  
Ebtehaj also had frequent confrontations with the Prime Ministers with whom he 
worked. General Zahedi—who had led the successful coup that saved the Shah’s 
throne—could not abide Ebtehaj’s defiant independence and refusal to accept his 
authority over the PO. The clashes between the two men became so heated that at one 
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 The American Embassy said “For five years Ebtehaj has been the terror of Cabinets”. See:  Love, 
Kennett. October 22, 1954 Iranian Deputies Ratify Oil Pact. New York Times.  
10
 As the Economist noted: “Not unreasonably did the minister of roads think that roads were the 
responsibility of his department. The minister of defence thoughtthat topographical surveys were his 
business. The minister of agriculture wanted to control loans for agricultural machinery. But the Plan 
Organisation was doing all these things”. See:  Bowling, John W. (February 21, 1959) Foreign Service 
Despatch 583: Political and Economic Aspects of the Fall of Plan Organization Director Ebtehaj. 
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point Zahedi, a former General, sent a tank with soldiers to the Plan Organization 
ostensibly to remove Ebtehaj by force (Farmanfarmaian, November 10, 1982: transcript 
#3). The Shah intervened, making clear to Zahedi that Ebtehaj was to be allowed free 
reign. Resentful that his service to the throne had been poorly repaid, Zahedi resigned 
shortly thereafter only to be replaced by an Ebtehaj friend and ally, Hossein Ala’ 
(Rountree, 1955, Rountree, 1955).  
Ebtehaj’s saving graces throughout this time were his immaculate reputation for 
financial probity, and, more importantly, the Shah’s support. Without the Shah’s strong 
backing, Ebtehaj simply could not have withstood the barrage of criticism and power 
plays that he was continually subjected to from influential political enemies.  
With Amini, the Shah had a slightly more complicated relationship. Given his 
political skills, powerful family, and general popularity, the Shah had less need to shield 
Amini from critics. Indeed, his popularity combined with his well-known ambition, and 
American friends maed Amini a clear political threat to the Shah who was still licking his 
wounds from the humiliating Mossadegh experience. Nonetheless, the Shah retained 
Amini in a series of important posts. Minister of Finance until May, 1955, Amini was 
briefly moved to the less influential position of Minister of Justice
 11
 where the Shah 
continued to rely upon him in negotiations with the Americans so much that the U.S. 
Embassy staff became confused about his real role (Chapin, 1955, Chapin, 1955, Dulles, 
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 At the time, the Economist protested that “Dr. Amini’s immense capacity is much more needed at the 
Treasury, where there is no one of his caliber to replace him and where firmness and experience are 
essential if the government is to extract from the rich and powerful the new direct taxation that has just 
been imposed” See: Persians Salvage Their Dreams. April 18, 1959 The Economist. 
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1955, Oil Negotiator Is Named Justice Minister of Iran, 1955). Shortly thereafter, Amini 
was sent to serve as ambassador to the U.S. where his expert knowledge of Iran’s 
economic needs in addition to his personal friendships with government officials made 
him an extremely effective negotiator for additional technical, financial, and military aid 
(Amini, 1995: 104, Iranian Minister Named Envoy to Washington, 1955).  
The Shah’s support falters 
By 1959, Ebtehaj was facing off against the third Prime Minister of his tenure. Dr. 
Manouchehr Eghbal, like his predecessors, needed funds for government expenditures 
and hoped to balance his budget by reducing the Plan Organization’s allotted share of oil 
revenues. Ebtehaj, violently opposed to such a scheme, pointed out that the World Bank’s 
$75 million loan had been conditional upon Iran’s commitment of oil revenues to the 
PO’s economic development activities (Bostock and Jones, 1989). Eghbal responded by 
going to Parliament with a bill transferring the powers and responsibilities of the PO’s 
Managing Director to the office of the Prime Minister (Walz, March 1, 1959). Having 
survived machinations of this sort in the past, Ebtehaj might reasonably have expected 
that the Shah would once again ensure that nothing came of this latest effort. The king, 
however, seemed to have tired of Ebtehaj who had of late been causing more headaches 
than usual with his opposition to a pet fertilizer plant project in Shiraz, and his 
embarrassing complaints to American officials about the need for economic rather than 
military aid (Bowling, February 21, 1959, Farmanfarmaian, November 10, 1982). In 
sacrificing Ebtehaj, the Shah could rid himself of an irritating constraint on his freedom 





, Ebtehaj was informed by his deputy Khosrow Hedayat that the Majlis with 
an unusual burst of speed had passed the law transferring his powers to the Prime 
Minister that morning after merely a week of deliberations (Walz, March 1, 1959). 
Ebtehaj resigned his position within hours and would never work for the government 
again (Bostock and Jones, 1989). 
By this time, Ali Amini had also fallen out of favor with the Shah. A year earlier, 
the Shah had uncovered a plot by a group of prominent military and political men to force 
him to “reign and not rule” as a constitutional monarch with greatly limited powers. The 
group, headed by General Valiollah Qarani, commander of the Army’s intelligence staff, 
had gone so far as to establish regular contact with the American embassy and other 
officials at the state department who did little to discourage their ‘soft coup’ planning. 
The Shah was incensed and arrested the plotters immediately. Suspected of having been 
peripherally involved with the group, Ali Amini was made persona non grata much to the 
chagrin of the U.S. State Department. He was promptly recalled from Washington DC 
and spent the next few years outside of government. The Shah reportedly said “I will 
make Amini take his dream of becoming a prime minister to [his] grave,” (Dulles, 
February 28, 1958, Gasiorowski, 1993, Milani, 2008: 66-7 & 445-49). 
Amini’s return 
In the absence of Ali Amini and Abol Hassan Ebtehaj, many of the institutional 
reforms and programs they had launched foundered. The Ministry of Finance stagnated 
and soon gained a reputation for corruption and opposition to any reforms that might 
threaten its vested interests over the country’s taxation and budgeting apparatus (Eliot, 
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September 8, 1964). Without a strong director to protect its mission and finances, the 
Plan Organization became subject to political and patronage pressures that eroded its 
revenue base and diminished its control over development projects (Eliot, February 12, 
1963, Taylor, March 17, 1959, Walz, September 14, 1962). The PO was reorganized so 
that the execution of development projects was no longer carried out by itself but by the 
ministries instead (Swihart, April 11, 1964, Taylor, October 1, 1959). The only sub-
division of the Plan Organization to retain a certain amount of power was the Economic 
Planning Bureau due, according to the U.S. Embassy, to its being the only group “really 
qualified to prepare acceptable loan applications” (Taylor, August 10, 1959). The young 
economists and technocrats Ebtehaj had hired, mentored, and promoted grieved his 
departure as a signal of that the political leadership had “rejected the goal of economic 
development, the goal of progress” (Majidi, 1999: 243). 
By 1960, several years of persistent budget deficits had resulted in a serious 
inflation problem while escalating expenditures were making it more and more difficult 
for Iranians to pay back their rapidly accumulating debt (Taylor, August 15, 1959). By 
the middle of the year, the Government was forced to turn to the IMF for $55 million in 
loans. In return, the government was forced to accept a series of reforms intended to 
quickly stabilize the economy (Herter, July 1, 1960, Walz, September 12, 1960). 
Simultaneous with the government’s attempts to implement these austerity measures a 
political crisis unfolded as the Shah’s clumsy attempts to manipulate parliamentary 
elections backfired (Wailes, August 4, 1960). The combined political and economic 
crises culminated in a teacher’s strike on May 4, 1961 over pay cuts in which 50,000 
demonstrators clashed with the Iranian Army. Prime Minister Sharif Emami and his 
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entire cabinet tendered their resignations. By May 6, in a surprisingly swift turnabout, the 
Shah had asked his nemesis Ali Amini, to form a new cabinet to lead as Prime Minister 
(Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 Volume Xvii, near East, 1961–1962, 
Document 41, May 4, 1961).  
Understanding the Shah’s support 
The 1950s were an interesting and, perhaps, confusing time for economists. 
Immediately following the 1953 coup, Ebtehaj and Amini had free reign to implement the 
policy reforms they felt would best further the country’s economic development. By 1959 
both men were out of power but only two years later, Amini was heading another reform-
minded cabinet, this time as Prime Minister. How can the Shah’s vacillating support for a 
strong economic team and their economic reforms best be understood? 
Functionalist and epistemic communities approaches attribute the increasing 
power of economists to growing uncertainty arising from rapid modernization or periods 
of political/economic crises.  It is certainly true that Iran in the 1950s was in the midst of 
a period of rapid modernization in which its leaders were grappling with the difficult task 
of learning about and finding Iran’s place within a complicated international economic 
system. Furthermore, the Mossadegh’s oil nationalization, oil embargo, and subsequent 
U.S.-backed coup constitute exactly the kind of political and economic crisis that scholars 
of epistemic communities have predicted might render political leaders more open to the 
advice of experts who can help them understand the causes of the crisis as well as the 
policy options that might prevent its recurrence. The historical record, however, does not 
indicate that the Shah, overwhelmed by a sense of uncertainty, had lost the confidence to 
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conduct his economic policy without the guidance of recognized experts in the field. 
Indeed, even as he publicly defended Ebtehaj and Amini and retained their services, the 
Shah often worked at cross-purposes to their overall goals and vision. In his interview 
with the Harvard Iranian Oral History Project, Amini refers to his strong disagreements 
with the Shah over the issue of taxes as a primary reason for his transfer to the Ministry 
of Justice and suggests that the Shah often opposed his proposals despite their obvious 
utility and/or popularity (Amini, 1995: 102-05). At the Plan Organization, Ebtehaj grew 
increasingly frustrated with the Shah’s insistence on military spending that he felt 
threatened the economic development program he labored to promote. Reflecting this 
frustration, at one point, Ebtehaj went so far as to suggest to his deputy that the PO ought 
to commit to more projects than it could afford because “If I don’t commit those funds, 
the government will take away those funds and misspend it on military projects” 
(Farmanfarmaian, November 10, 1982: transcript #3). The Shah’s eventual firing of 
Amini and Ebtehaj, furthermore, suggest that his commitment to their economic program 
was never particularly strong. 
Mimetic isomorphism describes the way that states lacking means of identifying 
optimal goals, structures, or practices can look to the examples of particularly successful 
models as guides. Observing, for example, the fact that the United States actively solicits 
and incorporates the advice of economists might have inspired the Shah to have done the 
same. The Shah might also have been partial to economists that favored the American 
capitalist model. Certainly there is evidence that the Shah seems to have made a 
conscious decision to identify with and pattern his country after the West and the United 
States. In a chapter titled “Westernization: Our Welcome Ordeal” in his book Mission for 
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My Country, the Shah writes: “Today we have far to go to catch up [to the West] and it is 
not enough merely to ‘catch up’” (Pahlavi, 1961: 132). Additional evidence that the Shah 
had ideologically aligned his nation with the West comes from his decision to abandon 
Iran’s official neutrality and, over strenuous Soviet objections, join the Baghdad Pact 
coalition which had been created by the U.S. and U.K. as a bulwark against Communist 
expansion in the Middle East (Hangens, November 27, 1955, Milani, 2001, Soviet Tells 
Iran Mid-East Linkage Threatens Peace: Protests Teheran's Decision to Join Turk-Iraqi 
Treaty, October 13, 1955). There is little evidence, however, that the Shah’s admiration 
of and desire to achieve Western success varied in ways that might explain variation in 
the experience of economists during this time. 
Political Interest Group analyses highlight the way experts mobilize political 
power to influence policy decisions by, among other things, forming or supporting 
political parties or tacitly endorsing nondemocratic methods that weaken or eliminate 
political rivals. Ebtehaj, as discussed above, was famously unpopular and apolitical and 
had very few supporters besides the Shah and his loyal deputies
12
. Amini, however, as a 
prince of the pre-Pahlavi monarchy, had the connections, money, and political support to 
be a formidable force. And his participation, however peripheral, in the Qarani affair 
suggests he was not opposed to using such power to achieve his ends. Ultimately, 
however, the Shah successfully clipped his wings at every opportunity through transfers, 
overseas assignments that separated him from a potential base of support, and banishment 
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 Indeed the American Embassy in Tehran noted that “Ebtehaj has persistently made enemies at a rate 
which showed some kind of negative genius”. See: Drift in Iran. June 25, 1955 The Economist, 1135-36. 
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from government office after his flirtations with treason were discovered. Indeed, the 
Shah’s behavior toward Amini suggests that potential political power may sometimes 
even be a liability for economists in autocratic systems of government where the monarch 
may be extremely jealous of his absolute power. Certainly, Amini’s political viability 
seemed to impede his ability to be effective as the Shah, feeling threatened even before 
the Qarani affair, was constantly undercutting him. 
The Shah’s behavior vis-à-vis his economic advisors and their preferred policies 
might best be understood as stemming from his need for international resources. In the 
immediate aftermath of the U.S. sponsored coup d’état, Iran was wholly dependent upon 
the generosity of the United States to support its budget on a month-to-month basis. Even 
after a new oil deal was negotiated and revenues renewed, Iran’s treasury required several 
years to repay debts and get the country’s finances in order. Indeed, U.S. Embassy reports 
and State Department memos from this period are almost entirely monopolized by 
discussions of Iran’s requests for and American deliberations regarding technical, 
economic, and military aid. Given the Shah’s desperation for such aid, he might have 
been willing to tolerate Ebtehaj’s and Amini’s liabilities based on the reasonable 
expectation that their perfect English, USAID and World Bank friendships and widely 
acknowledged economic expertise made them the individuals most capable of inspiring 
trust and loosening purse strings. 
Several years after the coup, however, there is evidence that the Shah was feeling 
less urgency about remaining in the Americans’ good graces. A State Department profile 
of the monarch in 1957 noted that “[d]uring the past five years probably the most 
significant aspect of the Shah’s development has been his growing self-confidence and 
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assertiveness” (Cassilly, March 11, 1957). Having consolidated his grip on power since 
the coup, the Shah was confident that domestic threats had been eliminated. The Shah 
also had reason to believe U.S. aid would be forthcoming irrespective of the kinds of 
advisors he maintained or the type of economic policy he pursued. The continuing Cold 
War combined with a shocking series of coups and revolutionary activity in countries like 
Iraq, Turkey, and South Korea rendered the United States more concerned with 
preserving its friends than influencing their economic policy behavior. The Shah might 
have surmised the conclusions of the State Department’s Planning Board that the “U.S. 
wants to keep Iran independent, pro-Western and stable. Substantial military and 
economic aid are the price needed to achieve this result” (Boggs, February 5, 1957). 
In 1961, however, the Shah’s newfound confidence seems to have crumbled in the 
face of domestic political strife and economic pressure. In selecting his new Prime 
Minister, the Shah seemed to be counting on a positive response from the new Kennedy 
Administration to their trusted friend Amini (Rockwell, May 20, 1987). Indeed within 
four days of Amini’s premiership, the U.S. State Department and Embassy in Tehran 
were engaged in discussions over actions that could be taken to support and strengthen 
Amini and the Shah that ultimately resulted in grants for millions of dollars of budgetary 
support (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 Volume Xvii, near East, 
1961–1962, Document 51: Record of Action No. 2427 Taken at the 484th Meeting of the 
National Security Council, May 19, 1961, Wailes, May 10, 1961).  A plausible 
explanation for the king’s turn to a political rival he suspected of treason is that the 
country’s political and financial straits were dire enough that the most important 
requirement of any candidate for Prime Minister was that they be able to inspire the trust 
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and financial backing of the United States. Under the circumstances, Ali Amini was the 




The events of 1959-1962 in a less dramatic fashion resemble and foreshadow the 
Shah’s behavior during the oil boom and bust of the 1970s. As discussed below, when oil 
revenues began flooding into the country and the Shah gained the position of creditor—
no longer debtor—of loans to the United States, he felt at great liberty to fashion Iran’s 
economic policy as he saw fit with little input from his army of ignored policy advisors. 
When the boom turned to bust, however, the Shah scrambled to find a new technocratic 
Prime Minister and economic team to address the country’s financial woes. 
Before discussing the 1970s, however, the following chapter discusses the post-
Amini era when the Shah found a way to balance the American preference for dealing 
with technocrats and economists against his personal distaste for political rivals. In Ali 
Mansur, Amir Abbas Hoveyda and their group of Western educated young men the Shah 
found a perfect combination of technocratic aptitude to please the West and political 
obeisance to shore up his absolute rule. 
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 In a 1987 interview with Habibi Ladjevardi of Harvard’s Iranian oral History Collection, Stuart Rockwell 
who worked in the American Embassy at the time of Amini’s appointment denied any knowledge of 
overt U.S. pressure for the appointment of Amini but speculated that “…it is possible also that the Shah 
felt that the appointment of Amini as Prime Minister might cause the United States to be more generous 
in providing economic assistance….It could be that the Shah thought we would like it, and I guess we did 
like it, because we thought Amini was a good man but we did not take it upon ourselves to tell the Shah 
that we thought he should appoint him” Bowling. Foreign Service Despatch 583: Political and Economic 
Aspects of the Fall of Plan Organization Director Ebtehaj.. 
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Chapter Three: The White Revolution, the Young Turks, and 
the start of the Golden Decade (1962-1969) 
The Amini administration did not last long. The Shah’s animosity toward his 
Prime Minister only increased over time. He was annoyed when Amini refused to include 
his trusted aide Assadollah Alam in the new cabinet and instead stocked it with 
controversial and opposition-affiliated individuals such as Dr. Mohammad Derakhshesh 
one of the leader’s of the teacher’s strike, Nura-al Din Alamuti a former communist party 
leader, and Hasan Arsanjani a rabble-rouser who had for many years agitated for land 
reform to distribute property to peasants (Amini, 1995: 145, Milani, 2008). The Shah was 
further angered when Amini  made the embarrassing announcement that the nation was 
on the verge of bankruptcy as a result of the actions of “incompetent and traitorous 
officials [that]had misused government funds and built up personal wealth” (Iran 
Warning Voiced: Country near Fiscal Collapse, Premier-Designate Says, May 8, 1961).  
The Shah’s opportunity to rid himself of his irritating Prime Minister arose just a 
year after Amini’s appointment. Faced with a looming budget deficit that could not be 
pared down Amini’s only options were to convince the Shah to agree to cuts in military 
spending or convince the Americans to give more aid (Dr. Amini's Defeat, 1962). The 
Shah, however, was both fiercely protective of the military budget (Amini, 1995: 147-48) 
and indifferent to Amini’s troubles
14
 while the Americans, tired of perpetual shakedowns 
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and facing their own balance of payments problems, refused to give any more than the 
$67 million of grants and loans that had already been given over the past year (Komer, 
July 19, 1962). Amini proceeded to offer his resignation, a move that has been interpreted 
as a bluff intended to spur the Shah and/or State Department to action (Milani, 2008: 69). 
To Amini’s apparent surprise, however, his resignation was accepted by the Shah who in 
appointing his close friend and ally Assadollah Alam effectively began running the 
government himself (Amini, 1995:150-51, CIA, 1962, Komer, July 19, 1962). Unable to 
wheedle additional funding or solid statements of support out of the U.S. Government, 
Amini had become an expendable resource
15
. 
In contrast to the first time he got rid of Amini, however, this time the Shah did 
not allow his departing Prime Minister’s reforms to end with his tenure. Indeed, over the 
next five years, the Shah transformed his image from that of a conservative monarch 
reluctantly endorsing his advisor’s reforms under U.S. pressure into the champion of a 
reform program he claimed as his very own. This transformation began with his co-
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 The Shah’s successful trip to the United States in April 1962 may have also convinced him that the 
Americans would not object too strongly were Amini to be removed. During the trip, the Americans 
rarely mentioned Amini by name. President Kennedy went so far as to agree with the Shah that for “Iran 
to succeed its government would have to act firmly for a time and…the United States would not insist 
that Iran do everything in an absolutely legal way”. This may have given the Shah the confidence to rid 
himself of Amini without fearing the wrath of the U.S. Government Komer, Robert. (June 15, 1962) 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 Volume Xvii, near East, 1961–1962, Document 294: 
Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special 
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy). http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-
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that he had a green light from Kennedy to do as he saw fit” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–
1963 Volume Xvii, near East, 1961–1962, Document 246: Memorandum of Conversation. (April 13, 
1962), edited by United States Department of State: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-
63v17/d246, Milani, Abbas. (2008) Eminent Persians: The Men and Women Who Made Modern Iran, 
1941--1979. Syracuse: Syracuse University. 
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opting of the land reform program into his ‘White Revolution,’ a six-point plan he 
obtained the nation’s overwhelming approval for in a 1963 referendum (Pahlavi, 1967, 
Swihart, May 27, 1963, The World: Reform in Iran, January 28, 1963). Concurrently, the 
Shah recruited a government of young, foreign-educated but politically weak technocrats 
to run the nation’s business under his own personal direction. Over the next ten years, 
these young technocrats guided Iran through its “Golden Decade,” a stable period of high 
growth with little inflation during which countless factories, dams, roads, hospitals, and 
universities were built while socioeconomic indicators such as literacy, poverty, child 
mortality, etc. improved.  
This chapter details the initiation and accomplishments of the White Revolution 
as well as the rise and impact of the Shah’s new technocratic managers. It also 
investigates and considers likely motives for the Shah’s new enthusiasm for and 
sometimes even leadership of the reform movement. 
The White Revolution 
Iran’s traditional social structure was loosely feudal with the large majority of the 
population working as peasants or tenant farmers on land owned by a small (and often 
absent) landowning class (Pahlavi, 1967: 21). By the 1950s, such a social structure was 
not only anachronistic but was also believed to be extremely inefficient as profit 
incentives for increased peasant productivity were largely absent (Richards, 1975, The 
World: Reform in Iran, January 28, 1963). In its study of the matter, the Plan 
Organization concluded that meaningful agricultural development was impossible until 
such time as the structure of land ownership was reformed (Farmanfarmaian, November 
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10, 1982: Transcript Number 9). Early on, the Shah took a few tentative steps toward 
addressing this with the distribution of Crown Lands and the passage of an extremely 
weak land reform bill in March 1960 (Boggs, April 7, 1960). Landowner objections were 
powerful enough, however, that the Shah was unable or unwilling to actually enforce 
implementation of the new law and the issue of land reform was largely ignored until the 
following year when the Amini cabinet took over. 
The Plan Organization’s study of land ownership and proposal for its 
restructuring were taken up by Dr. Hassan Arsanjani, Amini’s new Minister of 
Agriculture (Farmanfarmaian, November 10, 1982: Transcript number 9). Arsanjani was 
a lawyer, journalist, and politician with a reputation of something of an anti-capitalist 
radical. He had been agitating for land reform for many years though he had little 
technical knowledge of how it might be done (Milani, 2008: 85-91, Zonis, 1971: 53-61). 
In May, 1961, when Amini asked Arsanjani to join his cabinet as the new Minister of 
Agriculture, Arsanjani hit the ground running. Within two weeks he had convened a land 
reform seminar and by the end of the year he had prepared a new land reform law based 
on the PO’s proposal that—in the absence of a temporarily dissolved parliament—was 
swiftly adopted by the cabinet and signed into law by the Shah (Calhoun, 1979: 121, 
Iran's Peasants to Get More Land, January 11, 1962, Shah Signs Bill for Iran Reform: 
Landless Peasants Will Get Portions of Big Estates, January 16, 1962).  
The 1962 Land Reform law departed from the Plan Organization’s original 
proposal in that it only attempted to break up the big mega-estates and allowed 
landowners to retain as much one whole village. Any land over and above a single 
village, however, was required to be sold to the government who would subsequently 
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resell plots to those farmers that had been working it for the previous three years 
(Unhappy Alliance, January 27, 1962). When PO officials complained to Arsanjani about 
the inherent unfairness that a peasant’s opportunity to own land should be dependent 
upon the size of the estate in which he resided, Arsanjani agreed and suggested that 
political pressure had prevented him and the Shah from implementing the whole plan. 
Arsanjani correctly predicted, however, that this first step would create the political 
momentum necessary to carry land reform into the smaller holdings as well 
(Farmanfarmaian, November 10, 1982: Transcript 9). By March the first transfers began 
in the northern Maragheh region, chosen according to Dr. Arsanjani because it was home 
to the “most wicked landlords of Iran, who whip the peasants like serfs” (Iran Begins 
Land Transfer, March 4, 1962, Shah Signs Bill for Iran Reform: Landless Peasants Will 
Get Portions of Big Estates, January 16, 1962).   
When the Amini government fell in July 1962, it would not have been a surprise 
if Arsanjani had left with it. The Shah had never been very enthusiastic about the 
appointment of this radical reformer who was believed to have taken inspiration for his 
land program from the Eastern European experience with the Kholkhozes and who was 
also implicated in the Qarani coup attempt (Gasiorowski, 1993, Telegram Number 784 
from the U.S. Embassy in Tehran to the Department of State, March 19, 1963, United 
States Department of State Airgram a-518: Land Reform in Iran, February 18, 1963). In 
fact, however, Arsanjani was not only asked to stay on as Minister of Agriculture but was 
also empowered to intensify the land reform program which was soon incorporated into 
and encompassed by the White Revolution—the Shah’s signature ‘revolution from 
above’ which was intended to “radically chang[e] the face of our society” and “construct 
60 
 
a modern and progressive Iran on sound and strong foundations” (Pahlavi, 1967). 
Arsanjani was kept on until the following year when land reform was well underway and 
his growing political popularity among the peasant population began to look dangerously 
powerful to the Shah (Swihart, March 19, 1963, Zonis, 1971: 59-60).  
The White Revolution consisted of a six-point plan (later expanded to twelve) 
which was presented at the National Congress of Rural Cooperatives in Tehran on 
January 9, 1963 (Bill, 1970: 2-3, Pahlavi, 1967) and overwhelmingly supported in a 
referendum held later that month (The World: Reform in Iran, January 28, 1963). In 
addition to extending land reform to smallholders, the Shah’s plan included: profit-
sharing programs for urban laborers; women’s suffrage; literacy and health corps; 
nationalization of forests, pastures, and waterways; and civil service reform (Bill, 1970: 
31-32). In rhetoric and substance the plan was an assault on the wealthy and landowning 
classes and thereby comprised a major shift in the Shah’s relationship with and policy 
toward the moneyed classes he had hitherto been reluctant to alienate (Furnas, January 
21, 1963, United States Department of State Airgram a-508: The Iranian Revolution - 
Some Thoughts and Speculation, February 11, 1963). 
Contemporary and later critics have argued that the ultimate impact of land 
reform and the White Revolution was not altogether positive for the peasants or other 
lower classes (Farmanfarmaian, 1997: 368, Yeganeh, 1985). Having destroyed a feudal 
system that for all its flaws had been operating relatively successfully for thousands of 
years, the government lacked the administrative means to speedily and efficiently create 
an alternative. Peasants who had been accustomed to relying on landowners to determine 
crop schedules, coordinate the use of machinery, and resolve disputes were suddenly on 
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their own. Naturally, some peasants and landowners were quicker than others to adjust to 
and find ways to benefit from the new social order while the less talented often found 
themselves worse off than they were before (Parvin and Zamani, 1979). 
Nevertheless, while the so-called “Revolution of the Shah and the Nation” often 
fell short of its rhetoric, it did indeed fundamentally alter social relationships between the 
classes and transform landownership in Iran from a system of tenancy to one of owner-
occupation (Lambton, 1969, Majd, 1987). A new middle class of farmers and small 
landowners was created with the freedom to develop its own political strength. The 
literacy and health corps which sent military conscripts into villages to teach reading, 
writing, and hygiene further lifted the prospects of the children of villagers. Increasingly, 
parliamentarians as well as high-level bureaucrats and ministers hailed from these classes 
rather than the landed aristocracy which had maintained its control over these levers of 
power for so many years (Amuzegar and Fekrat, 1971, Bill, 1970: 36, Meyer, May 22, 
1967: 118, Moghaddam, 1972).  Certainly the American embassy saw the program as 
both progressive and in line with its own interests in Iran’s long-term stability. The Shah 
was seen to have “made a clean and irrevocable break with the traditional moneyed, land-
owning, and religious elites on whom he relied so heavily in the past” (Furnas, January 
21, 1963) while the success of the reform program was seen by both the Secretary of 
State and US Ambassador to Iran as being “fundamental to our interests”(Holmes, May 
15, 1963).  
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The ‘Young Turks’ 
Concurrent with the launching of the White Revolution, the Shah began to groom 
a new group of individuals to help him run the country and institute the reforms 
necessary to spur economic growth. These individuals—often described as the ‘Young 
Turks” by the American Embassy—had three defining characteristics. First, nearly all 
were foreign-educated and well-versed in the international language of technocrats. 
Second this group was carefully culled to ensure that independent-minded, politically 
viable, or politically ambitious individuals like Ebtehaj or Amini were not included. 
Finally, these individuals were young. Unlike the elder generation of government 
functionaries who had “seen the Shah in his most vulnerable hours, when he was weak, 
marginalized or on the run…the new elite had had its political baptism when the Shah 
was well ensconced on his throne in the full regalia of an authoritarian, modernizing 
monarch” (Milani, 2001: 163). Emblematic of this new elite was the Shah’s support for 
the transformation of the Progressive Circle (or dowreh) into the New Iran political party 
which under the leadership of Hassan Ali Mansur and Amir Abbas Hoveyda was to 
dominate Iranian politics in the 1960s and 70s. 
In Iran, political salons or dowrehs were a traditional forum where groups of like-
minded men met on a regular basis to discuss the nation’s problems and form political 
alliances in the relaxed and informal setting of someone’s living room (Zonis, 1971). By 
the early 1960s one such dowreh was the Progressive Circle led by Mansur and Hoveyda 
and comprised almost entirely of young, foreign-educated technocrats. Interestingly, 
neither Mansur nor Hoveyda could rightly be called technocrats. Mansur, born in 1923 to 
an aristocratic and political family—his father served as prime minister in 1941 during 
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the Allied attack on Iran—had completed a bachelor’s degree in political science at 
Tehran University (Milani, 2008: 229-35) and spent some time studying political science 
and economics in Paris (Schmidt, January 27, 1965). Hoveyda who had grown up abroad 
as his father served in various diplomatic missions in Damascus and Beirut, eventually 
made his way to Europe where he received his degree, also in political science, from the 
Free University in Brussels (Milani, 2001). Both men joined the Foreign Service where 
they became fast friends while rooming together during several years of work at the 
Iranian Embassy in Germany.  
Despite their non-technical backgrounds both men seem to have developed a 
strong appreciation for and faith in the power of technocrats—particularly foreign-
educated technocrats—to lead the nation out of its backwardness and solve all manner of 
social and economic ills. In a series of essays with titles like “Today Responsibility Must 
Lie with the Technocrats and There Are Not Enough Technocrats” Hoveyda wrote of the 
urgent need for the government to train, recruit, and promote much-needed technocrats to 
positions of power (Milani, 2001: 140-41). Mansur and Hoveyda also seemed to have the 
self-confidence necessary to surround themselves with individuals that were better-
educated and arguably smarter than themselves. The Progressive Circle included many 
foreign-educated individuals with advanced and doctoral degrees that helped to define the 
group’s positions on a variety of issues under consideration. 
The Mansur Government 
In May, 1963, the Progressive Circle was catapulted to prominence when the 
Shah announced his support for the group and his reliance on it for economic advice in 
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particular (Iranian Reformer: Hassan Ali Mansour, January 22, 1965, Milani, 2008: 232, 
Milani, 2001: 154). One month later, Stuart Rockwell of the American embassy reported 
on a conversation  with the Shah in which he shared his plans for a new political party 
which would be established “to become the main political force in [the] future” and 
which would “be organized…by Hassan Ali Mansur and his progressive group” 
(Rockwell, June 24, 1963). Over the next nine months, it became common knowledge 
that Mansur would soon be appointed to the post of Prime Minister. In anticipation of his 
accession, Mansur formalized the Progressive Circle into the political party New Iran 
which, with the Shah’s support and a certain amount of election fixing, swept the 
parliamentary elections in October capturing 138 out of 188 available seats (Rockwell, 
October 14, 1964). Mansur next began preparing for the premiership, discussing cabinet 
posts with friends, and developing a plan of action for his anticipated time in office. 
American Embassy officials began meeting with members of the Progressive Circle in 
addition to Alam’s lame duck cabinet in order to divine the future directions of Iranian 
policy (Jernegan, March 2, 1964, Swihart, February 10, 1964). Finally, on March 7
th
, the 
new government took power (Eliot, March 9, 1964). It was “…in many ways, different 
from all of its predecessors. It was a younger cabinet, primarily consisting of foreign-
trained technocrats. As the Shah had told the American embassy, a changing of the guard 
was at hand” (Milani, 2001: 163). 
The Mansur government got off to an energetic start, swiftly attracting the 
attention of foreign reporters who wrote that “[f]or the first time in Iran’s history, a 
Government rising from a political party had come into office with a detailed program” 
(Walz, April 7, 1964). The new cabinet launched its series of reforms with a concerted 
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assault upon a bastion of traditionalism and reputed corruption—the Ministry of Finance. 
For many years, efforts by the Plan Organization to streamline the country’s budgeting 
process and combine all development, administrative, and military expenses into one 
overarching budget had been firmly and successfully resisted by this body 
(Farmanfarmaian, November 10, 1982: tape 3). Much to the consternation of Finance 
Ministry bureaucrats, one of Hoveyda’s first acts as the new Minister of Finance was to 
surrender all budgetary functions to the Plan Organization under Harvard-educated Majid 
Majidi (Eliot, March 23, 1964). Hoveyda next turned his attention to reforming the tax 
code as well as the process of tax collection and administration. To this end, he enlisted 
Berkely-graduate Jamshid Garachedaghi to help him computerize ministry operations 
thereby eliminating the chaos that contributed to and resulted from “deep layers of vested 
interest that had hitherto defined the ministry” (Milani, 2001: 165). Hoveyda also worked 
with IMF advisors to develop a new tax law that would simplify taxation and remove 
loopholes while increasing government revenues (Eliot, December 14, 1964, Eliot, 
February 8, 1965, Swihart, November 18, 1964). To underscore his commitment to 
rooting out corruption, Hoveyda also removed “a sizeable number of undesirable” 
employees and referred some of them to the Civil Service Tribunal for investigation 
(Eliot, December 14, 1964). Hoveyda also publicized his fight against corruption in 
statements to the press about his intentions to “weed out corrupt and incompetent 
officials” (Eliot, September 8, 1964). 
While Hoveyda was whittling away at the traditional turf of the Finance Ministry 
other members of Mansur’s team were working to expand and enlarge the mandate of the 
Plan Organization which had withered since Ebtehaj’s departure. The Mansur team 
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worked swiftly to reverse this trend. While the responsibility for execution of projects 
was left to the ministries, the Plan Organization was empowered to vet, choose, and 
prepare the projects ministries were expected to implement under its own supervision 
(Swihart, April 11, 1964).  The transference of the Ministry of Finance’s budgetary 
function to the Plan Organization also gave the PO power to resist attempts to raid its 
development funds for administrative or consumptive purposes.  
In addition to these major institutional reforms, the new technocrats pursued a 
number of smaller policy changes intended to spur private sector investment and increase 
the efficiency of the public sector. By the end of the year, the government—often with 
the help of foreign consultants or advisors from USAID, the World Bank or the IMF—
had drafted or submitted a number of new bills designed to, among other things: 
modernize Iran’s banking system; reform the Civil Service Code to allow the discharge 
of redundant or incompetent government employees; and launch a stock exchange on the 
model of the New York Stock Exchange (Eliot, October 5, 1964, Stave, May 4, 1964).  
It was, perhaps, inevitable that opposition would arise to the assault on traditional 
practices and values resulting from Mansur’s broad reform program.  The old guard 
struck back through obstructionism and sometimes outright defiance. A number of 
employees of the Ministry of Finance even wrote and circulated a pamphlet attacking 
Hoveyda (Eliot, September 8, 1964). Those who sympathized with the old guard saw 
them as the last vestiges of those traditional bureaucrats who attained their positions after 
years of hands-on experience managing agricultural lands in the provinces. These 
individuals had slowly worked their way up the bureaucracy and were intimately familiar 
with “how the land was managed, what the problems were among the people, and what 
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the real value was of goods, services, water, and transport” (Farmanfarmaian, 1997: 161). 
They were now being replaced by foreign-educated technocrats with no roots in or 
respect for these traditions. One member of the old guard lamented: “O God! To whom 
can we complain that in this land, the more you are alien to the culture, the more you are 
likely to be embraced by the powers that be?...Why have our elite become so confused, 
insecure, and reckless that they show no fear of what they should be afraid of, and know 
nothing other than how to inadequately mimic strangers?” (quoted in Milani, 2001: 164) 
An opposing view of the traditional bureaucrats as essentially corrupt, however, is 
provided by the U.S. Embassy in Tehran which reported that “[i]t is not surprising that 
the ‘old guard’ among the civil servants… has attempted to strike back…as any thorough 
reform would endanger or destroy the numerous rackets of these officials” (Eliot, 
September 8, 1964). In the eyes of embassy officials such as Stuart Rockwell, the new 
technocrats were a huge improvement insofar as they understood and could communicate 
“the complexities of the economic relationship” in a manner that was familiar to the 
Americans (Rockwell, May 20, 1987).  
Resentment against the Prime Minister and his team was not limited to 
disgruntled government bureaucrats. The general public was particularly incensed by the 
passage of the hugely unpopular Status of Forces Agreement which granted American 
military personnel and their dependents immunity from prosecution in Iran. It was further 
irritated by austerity measures taken by the Mansur government, such as the doubling of 
the price of gasoline, a forty percent increase in the price of kerosene, and the 
implementation of a large exit tax. Religious Iranians were also upset by the 
government’s treatment of the respected cleric Ruhollah Khomeini who was exiled to 
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Turkey after criticizing government policy. On January 21, 1965 at ten o’clock in the 
morning, the Prime Minister was on his way to Parliament to present the latest oil 
agreement negotiated between Iran and the consortium. Before he could enter the 
building, Mansur was shot by a young man carrying, in addition to his gun, a copy of the 
Qur’an and a picture of Khomeini (Howison, January 21, 1965).  
Hoveyda 
An assassin’s bullet could not, however, interrupt a reform program that clearly 
enjoyed the endorsement of the crown. In a memo on “The Significance of the 
Assassination of Prime Minister Hasan Ali Mansur” Thomas Hughes, Director of the 
State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research predicted that: “the character of 
[the] regime will remain unchanged” (Hughes, January 28, 1965). Indeed, within hours of 
Mansur’s death, his Minister of Finance, best friend, and almost-brother-in-law
16
 Amir 
Abbas Hoveyda was appointed Prime Minister and introduced a virtually unchanged 
cabinet—a development interpreted as indicative of the Shah’s determination to “see the 
reform measures begun by the slain Premier continued” (Iran's Finance Minister 
Succeeds Slain Premier, January 28, 1965). Hoveyda himself soon announced that his 
economic program “is the same as Mansur’s” and confirmed his continued commitment 
to the various reforms—the new tax law, the Civil Service Code, and the new budget 
bureau—initiated by his predecessor (Eliot, February 8, 1965). 
                                                 
16
 Shortly after Mansur’s death, Hoveyda married Leila Emami, the sister of Mansur’s widow. 
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In implementing the new reforms, Hoveyda had something which Mansur 
tragically did not…time. Much to the surprise of those who had seen five different Prime 
Ministers in the past five years, Hoveyda managed to remain in his post until 1977, 
becoming Iran’s longest serving Prime Minister ever (Milani, 2001: 184-5). Whether his 
longevity was due more to his effectiveness as Premier or his ability to manage his 
relationship with an insecure monarch, the fact is that this period of political stability 
provided the context necessary to consolidate important economic reforms and unleash 
an era of rapid economic growth with—at least before the oil boom—little price inflation.  
Diplomatic reports as well as newspaper accounts attest to the speed with which 
Iranian industrialization took place in the mid to late 60s. A Biweekly Economic Review 
from the U.S. Embassy’s economic officers in December 1967, for example, states that in 
the reporting period, four new industrial facilities had been dedicated in Khuzistan 
Province, the Iran Aluminum Company was founded, Iran State Railways continued 
negotiations to purchase 30 new locomotives, a woolen textile mill in Tabriz had 
contracted to sell its entire output to the Soviet Union for the next two years, and a new 
department store had been opened (Prince, December 11, 1967). Around this same time, 
Walter Cutler, a U.S. consular officer stationed in Tabriz wrote in his End of Tour 
Reflections that “…when I look around carefully at the rapidly changing countryside, at 
foundations being dug for giant machine tool factories and tractor plants…I am reminded 
that Iran’s northwest, once so important but so long in the decay, is already undergoing 
what I believe is a major renaissance” (Cutler, October 28, 1967). The New York Times 
and Wall Street Journal, meanwhile were filled with headlines like: Iran Builds Oil Port 
on Kharg Island (New York Times December 19, 1965), Allied Chemical in Iran 
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Venture: Pact Calls for a $100 Million Petrochemical Facility (New York Times October 
27, 1965), Indiana Standard Unit, Goodrich Approve Join Ventures With Iran: Firms to 
Take Part in $46 Million of Sulphur and Petrochemical Plans with National Oil Company 
(Wall Street Journal February 15, 1966), and Belgian Concern Will Build Three Sugar 
Mills in Iran (Wall Street Journal June 6, 1967). 
U.S. intelligence reports and policy papers on Iran also began to note the 
economic boom and credit it for Iran’s increasing domestic stability. In a 1966 letter to 
Assistant Secretary of State Raymond Hare, Ambassador Armin Meyer wrote:  “It has 
been years since the political atmosphere has been as sluggish, as self-satisfied, or as 
resigned to the status quo. This…is in large measure attributable to economic 
prosperity….A rising new middle class is on the march economically and, in the short run 
at least, appears to be developing an interest in political stability” (Meyer, October 22, 
1966). A State Department Background Paper prepared on the occasion of the Shah’s 
visit to Washington DC similarly noted that: “The internal Iranian political scene has not 
been as stable as it is today since World War II….[The Shah’s] programs for economic 
development, land reform, health and education and many other improvements have 
engaged the cooperation of most Iranians and have outdone the slogans and proposals of 
the opposition to his rule” (Newberry and Mulligan, August 15, 1967). 
Indeed Iran’s economic growth was so impressive that the U.S.—bogged down by 
heavy military expenses in Vietnam—began winding down its military and economic aid. 
On November 29, 1967, Iran was officially declared to have ‘graduated’ from the 
American aid program that had delivered $605 million in budgetary and development aid 
since 1951. Military aid as well as shipments of surplus food under the Food for Peace 
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program were expected to continue for a few more years but end by June 1969 (U.S. And 
Iran Celebrate the End of Aid Program, November 30, 1967). Hoveyda used the formal 
phase-out ceremonies as an opportunity to encourage the American private sector to take 
a more active role in Iran, and wrote to Secretary of State Dean Rusk “Iran’s Fourth Plan 
will offer new opportunities to your private sector to participate in the economic progress 
which we can justifiably expect….I hope you will extend a cordial invitation to the 
American private sector to examine carefully the opportunities which Iran offers and to 
explore further cooperative ventures mutually beneficial to both countries” (Meyer, 
November 21, 1967). 
Throughout this time period, the Shah was a driving force pushing his economic 
team to squeeze additional growth out of the economy through whatever means 
necessary. At times, his demands and expectations seemed unrealistic and even 
delusional. In reporting on a 1967 discussion with Court Minister Assdollah Alam, U.S. 
Ambassador Armin Meyer noted that the Shah’s impatience for accelerated progress was 
evident in his “virtually impossible” proclamation that “within three years 90% of the 
components of vehicles produced here will be manufactured in Iran” as well as his 
demands for the accelerated completion of three large dams in Khuzistan (Meyer, April 
1, 1967). In preparing Iran’s Fourth Development Plan, officials of the Plan Organization 
confided to the American Embassy that the upward revision of growth numbers in the 
Plan’s final version was insisted upon by the Shah (Prince, October 17, 1967). While 
acknowledging that the Shah “tends toward wishing progress [is] more rapid than is 
realistic” senior officials like Hoveyda and Alam understood the Shah’s impatience as 
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reflective of his desire to see Iran modernized “up to European standards before his reign 
comes to an end”(Meyer, April 1, 1967, Meyer, January 24, 1967). 
The Technocrats 
Translating the Shah’s ambitions into actual results was a dedicated group of 
technocrats whose shared educational experiences, unity of purpose, and longevity in 
public office resulted in a strong, cohesive team that lead the government’s economic 
policy process in a consistent manner throughout the 1960s and early 70s. All of these 
individuals were foreign-educated as economists or engineers—sometimes at the same 
institutions—and, therefore, shared a common language as well as a common cognitive 
framework for identifying problems and proposing solutions
17
. These individuals shared 
the Shah’s belief in economic growth as the ultimate gauge of successful policy and were 
willing to sacrifice alternative measures of development like relative equality as they 
worked to determine the government interventions necessary to produce growth 
(Farmanfarmaian, November 10, 1982: transcript 2). Working under and benefitting from 
the political stability of Hoveyda’s tenure, many of these individuals were also able to 
hold their own positions for relatively long periods of time thereby developing strong 
relationships with one another that further contributed to the cohesiveness and 
consistency of Iran’s economic policy team during this time. 
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 Indeed, there were subtle differences between members of this group depending upon the country in 
which they had studied. The French-educated Asfia and Alikhani were more apt to consider government 
spending and other interventions in the market, English and American-educated Samii, Farmanfarmaian, 
and Amuzegar favored the private sector as the primary engine of the economy Rockwell. 
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Mehdi Samii, for example, who trained at the London School of Economics, 
alternately headed the Central Bank of Iran (CBI), Plan Organization, and then the CBI 
again over a seven year period from 1964 to 1970. Samii had a reputation as an excellent 
banker who was highly respected in both domestic and international circles (Eliot, May 
16, 1966, Farmanfarmaian, November 10, 1982: transcript 10). Samii’s major 
contribution at the CBI was to establish a strong tradition of central bank independence 
from the Ministry of Finance and other political forces (Farmanfarmaian, November 10, 
1982: transcript 10, Milani, 2008: 765). He also was a major proponent of developing 
indigenous Iranian talent through, for example, scholarship programs for promising 
young students to study abroad and a successful push to prohibit foreign banks from 
employing non-Iranian managers of their domestic business (Eliot, October 5, 1964, 
Eliot, January 27, 1964). Samii—well respected by the Americans and trusted by the 
Shah—soon became the main Iranian negotiator with U.S. officials particularly during 
the annual economic reviews established by the U.S. embassy as a requirement for 
approval of military purchases (Meyer, March 15, 1968, Meyer, May 3, 1967).  
Working closely with Samii at the Central Bank and Plan Organization was 
Khodadad Farmanfarmaian a PhD economist with degrees from Stanford and the 
University of Colorado. Farmanfarmaian was originally recruited away from a 
prestigious position with Princeton by Abol-Hassan Ebtehaj to help create and head the 
Plan Organization’s new Economics Bureau. Several years later, Farmanfarmaian agreed 
to serve as Mehdi Samii’s deputy at Iran’s Central Bank, himself becaming Governor five 
years later when Samii moved to head the Plan Organization. Apparently sensing a 
mismatch, it wasn’t long before Samii and Farmanfarmaian traded jobs and 
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Farmanfarmaian moved back to the Plan Organization to run it for the next four years. 
The American Embassy thought extremely highly of Farmanfarmaian, and welcomed 
every successive appointment of this “brilliant, aggressive, and development-minded” 
economist (Meyer, March 13, 1969, Swihart, July 30, 1963).   
Jamshid Amuzegar, Minister of Finance for ten years from 1965 to 1974, was also 
U.S. educated, having received his PhD from Cornell University in hydraulics 
engineering (Afkhami, 2009: 272-4, Milani, 2008: 72). Given the Ministry of Finance’s 
long-standing animosity toward the Plan Organization and Central Bank, a certain level 
of rivalry with Samii and Farmanfarmaian was inevitable. Such rivalry remained 
respectful, however, and the three men worked successfully together to, among other 
things, avert the potentially negative side effects of the swift economic expansion of the 
60s (Farmanfarmaian, November 10, 1982: transcript 10, Meyer, April 30, 1969). An 
important part of Amuzegar’s portfolio was representing Iran at the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In this capacity, Amuzegar successfully pushed 
Iran’s hard line position with respect to oil prices. As chairman of the OPEC team 
negotiating with the oil companies, Amuzegar gained international recognition when, 
under the Shah’s direction, he successfully coerced the companies to accept a series of 
price hikes (Afkhami, 2009: 276-9, Tenacious Iranian Negotiator: Jamshid Amouzegar, 
February 15, 1971). Amuzegar enjoyed the respect and confidence of the Shah who 
ultimately elevated him to succeed Hoveyda as prime minister. As discussed in the 
following chapter, Amuzegar’s premiership was short-lived, however, as the Islamic 
Revolution began to gather steam.  
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Safi Asfia, a French-educated engineer, headed the Plan Organization for six 
years. Like Farmanfarmaian, Asfia was recruited and trained by Ebtehaj during the PO’s 
early years to head its Technical Bureau. Asfia oversaw implementation of the Third 
Development Plan as well as the planning for the Fourth. He worked to decentralize the 
Plan Organization through the creation of provincial bureaus that participated in the 
selection and implementation of local projects. He developed a new system for evaluating 
and categorizing contractors according to their capabilities (Afkhami, 2009: 321, Milani, 
2008: 95). He also worked to generate more public awareness of PO activities and 
successes to counteract negative perceptions of ineffectiveness (Dunn, November 18, 
1963). Asfia was succeeded in 1968 by Samii when he left the PO to become deputy 
prime minister for social and economic development. In this capacity, he remained 
involved in identifying and selecting development projects throughout the remainder of 
Hoveyda’s tenure (Milani, 2008: 95). 
Alinaghi Alikhani was another French-educated member of this economic team. 
Having received his PhD in Economics from Paris University, Alikhani returned to Iran 
where he began working for the economic bureau of the country’s brand new intelligence 
service SAVAK. After several years with SAVAK and, later, the national oil company, 
Alikhani—only 32 at the time—was asked to help combine the Ministry of Commerce 
and the Ministry of Industry into a new Ministry of Economy that he would head for the 
next seven years (Milani, 2008: 60, Stave, March 11, 1963). Among the ministry’s 
primary tasks was to determine the country’s import and export policies. Alikhani 
pursued somewhat interventionist and protectionist policies using tariffs to protect infant 
industries and a variety of incentives to encourage non-oil exports (Stave, March 26, 
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1963). Alikhani also favored strengthening indigenous capabilities and management 
within the private sector going so far as to publicly speak out against ‘foreign 
domination’ of Iran’s economy (Panos, January 11, 1965). While the U.S. embassy 
thought highly of Alikhani’s courage and capabilities it also, perhaps unsurprisingly 
given its implications for U.S. business, resented his ‘etatist’ approach (Meyer, April 30, 
1969, Panos, July 11, 1966). 
The talents and capabilities of these individual men were greatly enhanced by the 
support they received from one another in their pursuit of the common goal of greater 
growth. Speaking of the synergy he felt when heading the Ministry of Economy while 
Samii was at the Central Bank and Asfia at the PO, Alikhani has said: we “understood 
each other. We kept each other informed of what we did and sought each other’s advice. 
Consequently, we were almost always in agreement not only about general policy but 
often also about what went on in our individual bailiwicks” (Afkhami, 2009: 323, 
Alikhani, 2001) . 
Such commonality of method and purpose was further strengthened by the corps 
of junior men newly returned from studying abroad who circulated between these 
different governmental bodies—often with stints at the World Bank or IMF in between—
applying their talents and similar training to the various economic problems of this 
swiftly developing country (CIA, 1964). Bahman Abadian, for example, a PhD 
economist and Harvard Mason fellow started out as chief of planning under Asfia at the 
Plan Organization then moved to work with Samii and Farmanfarmaian at the Central 
Bank (Eliot, August 12, 1963, Eliot and Dunn, July 13, 1964, Lambert, 2008). After a 
four year stint at the World Bank he returned to Iran again in 1969 to work for Samii at 
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the Plan Organization (Prince, June 24, 1969). Reza Moghadam, who had a PhD in 
economics from Stanford helped draft the legislation for the creation of Iran’s Central 
Bank where he worked for several years as its “brains and backbone” before leaving for a 
job with the IMF (Eliot, March 5, 1963). Like Abadian, he returned several years later to 
join Samii’s team at the Plan Organization (Farmanfarmaian, November 10, 1982, Prince, 
March 13, 1969: transcript 10). Mohammad Yeganeh, the Columbia University-trained 
economist was recruited by Alikhani from a post at the United Nations into the Ministry 
of Economy to develop a system for gathering reliable statistics on economic 
developments in Iran (Afkhami, 2009, Stave, January 27, 1964: 324). Farhang Mehr, who 
attended the London School of Economics, held posts at the national oil company before 
becoming a deputy at the Ministry of Finance and, later, deputy Prime Minister under 
Hoveyda (Eliot, May 20, 1963, Milani, 2008: 959-64). 
Throughout this period, the Shah was unfailingly open to and supportive of his 
economic team’s direction on all topics other than security and foreign affairs. Alikhani 
has written that he and his colleagues were “[b]acked by the Shah” who encouraged free 
debate, “attempted to reach consensus; [and] even in private audiences… avoided 
imposing his own views on his ministers” (Alikhani, 1991: 8). Mehdi Samii agrees that 
the monarch was willing to listen and even learn from his advisors (Milani, 2008: 765).  
The Shah was perceived by many technocrats as an enlightened leader determined to 
implement the reforms the country desperately needed despite the entrenched opposition 
of traditionalists and other vested interests. Farmanfarmaian has said that at the time “I 
felt the Shah was the greatest refuge I had. I felt the Shah was the ultimate hope. I felt the 
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Shah capable of understanding what we young reformists were saying far more than 
anybody else” (Farmanfarmaian, November 10, 1982: transcript 7).  
Understanding the Shah’s support 
As compared with the previous decade, the Shah’s support for his economic team 
in the 1960s was remarkably consistent. Whereas in earlier years, the Shah seemed eager 
to rid himself of reformist advisers and prime ministers whenever circumstances allowed, 
in the sixties, the Shah actually sought out Mansur and Hoveyda and strongly supported 
their and their technocratic team’s efforts toward the modernization of Iran’s bureaucracy 
and development of its economy. What factors are responsible for this shift? How does 
the experience of Iran generate insights into the role of expert advisors and the conditions 
under which they are likely to be entrusted with politically sensitive decisions about the 
distribution of material resources? 
Functionalist and epistemic communities explanations of technocratic power 
emphasize the way that uncertainty arising from rapid modernization or periods of 
political/economic trouble cause leaders to experience a crisis of confidence that renders 
them more open to expert advice. As compared with the tumultuous 1950s, the 1960s 
were relatively free of major political or economic crises. It is possible, however, that the 
culmination of the events of the earlier decade in addition to the balance of payments 
crisis of the early 60s may have finally elicited the Shah’s change of heart regarding 
economists and their proposed reform measures.  
Mimetic isomorphism describes the way that states lacking means of identifying 
optimal goals, structures, or practices can look to the examples of particularly successful 
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models as guides. During the 1960s, the Shah deepened his ideological bond with the 
West as he clearly chose the U.S. side in the intensifying Cold War. While his 
dependence on the U.S. provided material incentives for his promotion of economists in 
his regime, perhaps his admiration for the dominant American model also convinced him 
of the utility of expert opinion in economic policy development. 
Political Interest Group analyses highlight the way that experts mobilize political 
power to influence policy decisions. Such analyses might look for a strong political party 
or populist movement to explain Arsanjani’s success in launching land reform or 
Mansur’s reorganization of the government bureaucracy. Neither Mansur nor his 
successor Hoveyda, however, ever enjoyed the kind of broad political support that such 
analyses would predict while Arsanjani only enjoyed a measure of populist support after 
his reform programs were well underway. 
Indeed, political popularity or power often seems to have been a liability for those 
ministers or politicians with a reform agenda. The Shah was extremely jealous of his own 
power and determined to stamp out potential rivals long before they developed a reliable 
political base. Arsanjani was relieved of his duties, for example, once his ability to rally 
tens of thousands of peasants for demonstrations and conferences became apparent. The 
Shah preferred technocrats that were entirely apolitical and unlikely to protest his 
autocratic rule. Interestingly, despite their exposure to western democratic culture 
through their studies abroad as well as, quite often, their foreign wives, many of the 
economists and technocrats he recruited during this period were not apt to press for or 
even be in favor of greater political participation at home. In a revealing moment during 
his interview with Habib Ladjevardi of Harvard’s Iranian Oral History Project, Khodadad 
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Farmanfarmaian says of his and his colleagues relationship with parliament that “We had 
no patience for them….In our heart, we believed they knew nothing about economic 
development and the less they interfered with us, the better it was….Our attitude was that 
these people really do not know very much and they do not matter” (Farmanfarmaian, 
November 10, 1982: Transcript Number 14). Such disregard and, indeed, dislike for the 
country’s democratic institutions is reminiscent of Guillermo O’Donnell’s account of 
technocrats in Latin America who became so frustrated by the inability of messy 
democracies to implement effective policies that they allied themselves with the military 
in coup coalitions that overturned populist democracies in favor of  ‘bureaucratic-
authoritarian’ forms of government (O'Donnell, 1973). In the Iranian case, this class of 
individuals seemed to have allied themselves and struck a bargain with the Shah—he 
would support their economic policy preferences and they would support his hold on 
power. 
The Shah’s behavior vis-à-vis his economic advisors and their preferred policies 
might also be considered as stemming from his continued need for international 
resources. Although U.S. budgetary support diminished in the 1960s, total economic 
(non-military) aid continued to play an important role in the Iranian economy. From 1960 
to 1967 U.S. grants and loans for budgetary and development assistance, the Food for 
Peace program, and Ex-Im Bank loans totaled about $417 million (CIA, 1967). In 1964, 
furthermore, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the two countries that 
established an annual economic review in which Iranian officials were required to 
demonstrate the health, stability, and development progress of the country before U.S. 
81 
 
credits for military purchases would be approved for the following year (Rusk, July 2, 
1964).   
In addition to direct financial aid, the Shah was also extremely concerned with 
maintaining the political support of the Americans. The experience of the 1953 coup 
d’état suggested that one rules Iran at the pleasure of the Western powers, particularly the 
United States. The “Qarani Affair” in 1958 seemed to further confirm the American’s 
willingness to ‘switch horses’ and transfer its backing to another viable alternative. 
Throughout this time, therefore, the Shah was extremely sensitive to any hints that the 
American embassy might be interested in or actively pursuing relations with opposition 
groups such as the National Front. Khodadad Farmanfarmaian has related, for example, 
how upset the Shah became—“I had never seen the Shah like this; he turned white, 
completely white” (Farmanfarmaian, November 10, 1982: Transcript 7)—upon hearing 
that the State Department had merely asked a few questions about the National Front 
during his recent meetings in DC.  
U.S. interests in Iran were to keep the country “independent, pro-Western and 
stable” (Boggs, February 5, 1957). The United States was terrified of the prospect of 
another China-like communist-inspired peasant revolution that might threaten Western 
access to Iranian oil reserves and since the early fifties had pushed for land reform as a 
way to avoid such an outcome (Calhoun, 1979). Economic and political reforms were 
also seen as necessary to thwart the ideological appeal of socialism and create a middle 
class invested in the maintenance of a stable, capitalist regime. By the late fifties, 
therefore, after much interagency deliberation, the official policy of the United States 
became to “press the Shah to institute promptly, meaningful political, social and 
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economic reforms designed to increase popular support for his regime” (Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume Xii, near East Region; Iraq; Iran; 
Arabian Peninsula, Document 257: National Security Council Report, November 15, 
1958). The State Department also welcomed the ascension of Prime Minister Amini, an 
independent and strong politician who they believed understood the need for, as well as 
process by which, economic reform must proceed (Meyer, August 11, 1960). 
The Shah had no intention, however, of instituting political reforms or permitting 
the rise of a political rival that might weaken his own grip on power. Given his throne’s 
dependence upon American backing, however, he had to be sensitive to their demands. 
His strategy over the next decade appeared to be two-fold. First, in Mansur, Hoveyda, 
and the Young Turks surrounding them, the Shah identified a group of people that were 
politically weak and had no interest in pushing for political reforms but whose 
educational pedigrees, Western acculturation, and economic reform program were 
capable of inspiring the trust and even respect of the State Department. Second the Shah 
began to seriously pursue and implement land reform through his White Revolution in 
order to allay American concerns about a peasant revolution. Between land reform and 
the promotion of a new politically weak but otherwise impressive economic team, the 
Shah may have hoped to satisfy the Americans enough that their earlier pressure for 
political reforms would be greatly reduced. The record of U.S. support for the Shah over 
the next decade suggests that his gambit was successful. 
 
In sum, the promotion of a Western-educated team of technocrats and economists 
and the implementation of their economic policy plans seemed to have served multiple 
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purposes. Most importantly, these men had the ability to impress their American 
interlocutors and earn Western respect and aid dollars for the country’s economic reform 
efforts. So long as they retained their positions of power over economic policy, the U.S. 
was unlikely to push for additional political reforms. And the economic reforms—
particularly land reform—they promoted were compatible with the Shah’s domestic 
political goal of broadening his power base from the landed aristocracy to the peasants. 
The following chapter will examine how this strategy fell apart as the Shah—now 
confident in his own political power and financially strengthened by petrodollars—began 




Chapter Four: Boom and Bust (1969-1979) 
By the end of the 1960s, the Iranian economy was the envy of the developing 
world. With some of the fastest growth rates the world had ever seen
18
, Iran’s rapid 
industrial and economic expansion combined with land reform and other social 
endeavors, had transformed the nation (CIA, February, 1973). Walt Rostow, the famed 
economist and political theorist placed “Iran at that point on the development ladder 
where the ‘take off’ is just about finished…” (Saunders, June 13, 1968). William 
Scranton, in Iran as part of a tour designed to gather information about the Middle East 
for Presiden-elect Nixon, was said to be greatly impressed by the ‘bubbling prosperity’ he 
observed (Schmidt, December 9, 1968). Iranian officials at the time were, as one might 
expect, even more effusive in their praise. Prime Minister Hoveyda was known to say 
that Iran had “not only ‘taken off’ but was ‘in orbit’(Meyer, April 30, 1969). Even 
retrospective accounts, however, by impartial and less sympathetic observers have 
described the accomplishments of the 1960s as “something of an economic miracle” 
(Milani, 2008: 25). 
It wasn’t long, however, before the social and economic strains of such a hectic 
pace of development began to show. The heavy public spending, and rapidly expanding 
bank credits that fueled the decade’s phenomenal growth rates had resulted in worrisome 
pressures on prices and foreign exchange reserves. Rising cost of living estimates 
                                                 
18
 From 1965 to 1969, the average growth in GNP at constant prices was 10.5 percent See:  Meyer, Armin. 
(April 30, 1969) United States Department of State Airgram a-212: 1348: Year of the Pragmatists. 
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indicated that inflation at a rate of about 6% was beginning to affect the population 
(Prince, July 30, 1969). Years of domestic and foreign borrowing had left the country 
with a debt service ratio that threatened to diminish the country’s sterling credit rating 
and was beginning to worry commercial lenders (MacArthur, March 19, 1970, Prince, 
October 2, 1969). 
Among the Shah’s foreign-educated coterie of technocrats and economic advisors 
two distinct groups could be discerned based upon the country in which their academic 
studies were conducted and their economic policy instincts. The French-educated group 
headed by the Plan Organization Manager Safi Asfia and Minister of Economy Alinaghi 
Alikhani were apt to propose direct government controls and interventions as their 
preferred method for addressing the economy’s ills. The American and English-educated 
group headed by Central Banker Mehdi Samii and his deputy Khodadad Farmanfarmaian 
as well as the Minister of Finance Jamshid Amuzegar preferred the institution of austerity 
measures that would reduce the availability of credit, increase revenues from taxation, 
and decrease budget deficits. The American Embassy clearly preferred the Anglo group 
and seems to have been concerned about which group would prevail.  (Meyer, April 30, 
1969).  
Much to the American’s relief, for the next several years, the Samii-
Farmanfarmaian group was dominant. The Shah retired Safi Asfia through a promotion to 
the Prime Minister’s office and moved Samii over to head the Plan Organization while 
Farmanfarmaian took over as Governor of the Central Bank. Both men filled the top tiers 
of their respective organizations with like-minded technocrats many of whom they 
recruited from overseas. Reza Moghadam left his work with the IMF to return to the Plan 
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Organization as Samii’s Principle Deputy Managing Director while Bahmani Abadian 
left the World Bank to become the Deputy Director for Plans and Projects. Cyrus Samii 
was also recruited from the World Bank and returned to Iran to be Farmanfarmaian’s 
deputy at the Central Bank. From inside Iran, economists Dariush Oskui and Ali Hezareh 
were both brought to the Plan Organization. Samii’s recruiting efforts were greatly aided 
by the increased flexibility he achieved from a bureaucratic victory that freed the PO 
from the Civil Service Code’s restrictions on hiring and salaries (Meyer, March 13, 1969, 
Meyer, April 30, 1969). 
At the Central Bank, Farmanfarmaian moved quickly to institute monetary 
policies that would help slow the overheating economy and correct the foreign exchange 
problem. Reserve requirements for commercial banks were raised by 20%, the ceiling for 
interest rates was raised and the rediscount rate was raised from 5 to 7% (Meyer, March 
13, 1969, Meyer, April 30, 1969). Farmanfarmaian began negotiations for longer-term, 
less costly loans from governments and international institutions to refinance the short-
term supplier credits that heretofore had comprised much of the government’s borrowing 
and by the end of the year had arranged for $130 million to be repaid over six years 
(MacArthur, December 5, 1969). The World Bank also agreed to a $30 million credit for 
an irrigated farming project as well as a $40 million loan to the Industrial and Mining 
Development Bank of Iran (Prince, October 2, 1969). Farmanfarmaian also launched a 
public campaign to encourage Iranians to invest domestically rather than placing their 
money with foreign mutual funds that he accused of luring Iranian capital abroad (Meyer, 
April 30, 1969).  
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At the Plan Organization, Samii aided the effort to head off a foreign exchange 
crisis by reviewing and prioritizing ongoing or planned projects and eliminated or 
postponing them where possible. Indeed, aside from three major ongoing ‘core’ 
projects—a steel mill, gas pipeline, and petrochemical complex—no new projects from 
the Fourth Plan were initiated (Meyer, April 30, 1969). As a result, spending increases in 
1348 (1969-70) were less than a quarter of what they had been in preceding years 
reflecting what the U.S. Embassy called the PO’s “sharp retrenchment” program (Prince, 
February 16, 1970).  
Samii also initiated institutional changes that he believed would transform the 
Plan Organization into a more effective and efficient body. Planners and project 
executors were integrated into ten sectoral units thereby eliminating a major source of 
conflict and confusion due to the overlapping responsibilities of the two previously-
separate functions. A process of regular evaluation of projects was implemented to 
measure the physical progress being made and identify potential problems. A single 
office was also created to coordinate and oversee technical aid from and cooperation with 
international or aid institutions. And the Executive Committee of the Plan Organization 
which previously lacked sufficient technical knowledge of projects to make educated 
decisions regarding their approval was also replaced with a new committee staffed by a 
rotating group of experts more familiar with the requirements of a feasible project 
(Prince, June 24, 1969). 
The Shah’s support for his economic team started off strong. In a Persian New 
Year address given shortly after the personnel shuffle, he publicly endorsed Samii and 
Farmanfarmaian’s new monetary and fiscal policies and emphasized the importance of a 
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healthy balance of payments and foreign exchange reserves (Meyer, April 30, 1969). He 
also supported Prime Minister Hoveyda’s insistence that government ministries limit 
budget increases to a relatively small 5% (Prince, October 2, 1969). Ultimately, however, 
the Shah proved unable or unwilling to take action on the one issue with the most 
potential to relieve the balance of payments crisis—military and defense expenditures.  
The Shah and his Military 
The Shah’s insistence upon a strong military began early in his reign. Having 
witnessed the ease with which foreign troops had entered and occupied his country 
during World War II, the Shah seemed determined to purchase and build the needed arms 
and forces to prevent a reoccurrence (MacArthur, December 30, 1970). In the early years 
(the late forties and fifties) the Shah’s primary concern was his powerful and expansionist 
neighbor to the north. Given their own suspicions of and hostile relations with the USSR, 
American diplomats were apt to be somewhat sympathetic to the Shah’s concerns and 
supplied close to a billion dollars over the next decade in military aid (U.S. And Iran 
Celebrate the End of Aid Program, November 30, 1967). In those years, objections to or 
frustration regarding the Shah’s defense spending were more likely to be expressed by 
Iran’s own economic planners. Ebtehaj, for example, complained to Ambassador Loy 
Henderson that Iran “could not undertake [to] divert funds from economic and social 
development to maintain armed forces capable of resisting direct or indirect aggression” 
(Henderson, October 7, 1954). By the end of the 50’s, however, even the Americans had 
grown impatient with the Shah’s repeated badgering for military aid. In a May, 1958 
telegram to the State Department, Ambassador Selden Chapin wrote that the Shah’s 
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military ambitions “are a major irritant to our relations with Iran” and “The problem of 
how to handle these frequently unreasonable demands is, as I can testify from sad 
experience, the one most difficult problem in our relations with Iran” (Chapin, May 29, 
1958). 
By the sixties, however, the Soviet threat seemed less imminent. The Baghdad 
Pact, negotiated by the United States and including the UK, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey 
committed its members to mutual cooperation and protection. The pact was intended as a 
signal of Western commitment to preventing Soviet expansion along its southwestern 
frontier (Hangens, November 27, 1955, Welles, October 2, 1955). With the Soviet threat 
contained, the Shah became increasingly concerned about political instability and 
hostility emanating from his Arab neighbors. Egyptian President Nasser with his strident 
anti-Americanism and pan-Arabism was offering strong verbal encouragement to an 
Iraqi-based movement to ‘liberate’ Iran’s oil producing Khuzistan region. Egypt’s active 
involvement in Yemen may have increased the Shah’s concerns about Cairo’s potentially 
expansionist ambitions (Pryor, 1978). As the British began drawing down their 
involvement in the Middle East, leaving it altogether in 1971, the Shah argued that a 
further build up of forces was required not only to defend Iran but also to allow it to 
police an unstable region of the world (CIA, February, 1973: 10, Lee, November 18, 
1970, Prince, October 17, 1967). 
American diplomats did not share the Shah’s concerns in this regard. In a scathing 
and sarcastic memo to President Johnson preparing him for a meeting with the new U.S. 
Ambassador to Iran Armin Meyer, National Security Council staff member Robert 
Komer wrote that the Shah “doesn’t pay enough attention to his own economy, but loves 
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(now that we’ve stopped the Soviets for him) to worry about the piddling Arab threat” 
(Komer, April 15, 1965). The Kennedy and Johnson administrations spent a great deal of 
effort trying to discourage the Shah from superfluous arms purchases and encourage him 
to focus instead on staving off internal threats to his throne through social and economic 
programs. The Department of State sent frequent instructions to the U.S. Embassy in 
Tehran to communicate this position to the Shah and, for example, “emphasize our deep 
interest in Iran’s economic development program and its relationship to [the] 
fundamental security of his country” (Rusk, July 2, 1964). Military sales agreements 
were also structured in such a way that they were dependent upon annual American 
review and approval of economic programs and progress (Rusk, July 2, 1964). Upon the 
conclusion of an agreement for a $200 million military purchase loan, for example, 
President Johnson instructed the State Department to ensure that “each slice of this new 
program [be] submitted to him for approval only after [a] searching review of Iran’s 
economic position”. (Wriggins, May 23, 1966).  
Under President Nixon, however, both the desire and ability to dissuade the Shah 
from military spending largely evaporated. By this time, America’s economic and 
military aid program had largely ended and the U.S. had much less leverage over how the 
Shah chose to spend his own money. Indeed, embassy reports noted that “Iran would be 
expected to buy elsewhere what it could not buy from the United States”(Meyer, March 
13, 1969). Furthermore, the Nixon administration felt that a heavily armed Shah might, in 
fact, be in the national security interest of the United States. Given the burden of the Cold 
War as well as the ongoing conflict in Vietnam, Nixon informed American allies that the 
United States was no longer willing to fight their wars (Text of President Nixon's 
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Address to Nation on U.S. Policy in the War in Vietnam, November 4, 1969). Instead, 
America would play a more supportive role by arming its allies, and ‘deputizing’ 
countries to police and guard against Communist expansion in their own regions. Iran 
formally acceded to this role in 1970 when an NSC Review Group determined that given 
British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf region, the United States ought to back “Iran as 
our ‘chosen instrument’ to be keeper of stability in the Gulf”(Kissinger, October 22, 
1970). Finally, diplomats determined that the addition of hundreds of millions of dollars 
per year in exports plus substantial interest payments on credit sales was surely in 
America’s national self interest insofar as it would strengthen the U.S. balance of 
payments (Meyer, March 13, 1969). During the Nixon administration, therefore, any 
objections to military sales to Iran generally hinged on the sensitive nature of the 




The Shah and his Economic Team 
Despite his insistence upon continued defense expenditures, the Shah was in all 
other ways extremely supportive of the Samii-Farmanfarmaian economic team.  A 
combination of austerity measures as well as increased revenue from the 1971 ‘Tehran 
Agreement’ with the oil majors (more on this below) facilitated a successful recovery 
from the balance of payments and inflation crisis. By the end of 1972 after 
Farmanfarmaian had succeeded Samii at the Plan Organization, the Shah was said to be 
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 A prominent example being, of course, the controversial AWACS sale. See:  Ibid. 
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so pleased with his performance that many observers expected him to be appointed the 
next Prime Minister (Farmanfarmaian, November 10, 1982: Transcript 11, Milani, 2008: 
144). Samii, meanwhile, having tired of running a government bureaucracy, had stayed 
on as an advisor to the Prime Minister. In this capacity he continued to lead the Iranian 
team of negotiators that haggled with the State and Defense departments over the terms 
of each new military purchase agreement (Milani, 2008: 766). Samii was also charged by 
the Shah with the extremely sensitive task of exploring the creation of a new political 
party of intellectuals that would appeal to the new Iranian educated middle class (Milani, 
2011: 379). The position of Iran’s economic managers, particularly the US and UK 
educated members of this group, seemed very strong indeed.  
Within two short years, however, both men had been removed from government 
service altogether. An understanding of this abrupt change in fortunes requires 
exploration and consideration of the event that transformed the oil-exporting countries 
and highlighted the weakness of the developing world—the 1973 oil boom. 
The Oil Boom 
Even before the 1973 oil boom when prices quadrupled (World Nominal Oil Price 
Chronology: 1970-2007, 2008), Iran’s revenues from oil sales had been rising in response 
to changing supply/demand conditions, changing relations between producing nations 
and the multinational oil companies, and a restructuring of the international oil market to 
include independent companies. The post-World War II economic surge had unleashed a 
growing demand for cheap sources of energy in the developed countries while oil 
production in a number of important producers had begun to peak. The United States, for 
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example, despite producing at full capacity failed to keep up with demand during the cold 
winter of ’69-70 and soon changed from a net exporter to a net importer of oil, much of it 
from the Middle East (Akins, 1973, Yergin, 1991).  
Growing demand for oil strengthened the hand of as well as incentives for 
coordination among the producing countries which had long chafed against the terms 
dictated by the Seven Sisters
20
. Prior to the 70’s, oil producing countries had no control 
over the prices at which the companies chose—through negotiation amongst 
themselves—to sell their oil. An oil exporter’s revenue, therefore, could be expanded 
only by increasing the total amount of oil produced (Amuzegar, 2001, Yergin, 1991). 
Negotiations between Iran and the Consortium, for example, consisted almost entirely of 
haggling over Iran’s share of the supply to world markets (Hare, October 25, 1966, 
Meyer, March 14, 1968, Solomon, December 11, 1967). Incentives were such that it was 
very difficult for producing countries—all of whom were competing for a larger slice of 
that market—to coordinate their negotiations with the oil companies. Under high demand 
conditions, however, when nearly all production capacity was being utilized, the oil 
exporters could band together to begin addressing the pricing issue.  
Oil exporters were further aided by the emergence of small, independent oil 
companies—like Conoco, Amoco, and Occidental among others—that were more than 
willing to accept less generous agreements that the majors would angrily decline 
(Amuzegar, 2001, Yergin, 1991). As the oligopsony of the oil majors began to crumble 
                                                 
20
 The group of major oil companies that controlled production, distribution, and pricing in the early and 
mid 20
th
 century and included: Exxon (the old Standard Oil), Texaco, Royal Dutch/Shell, Mobil, Gulf 
Chevron, and BP (the old Anglo-Iranian Oil Company). 
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with the entrance of these independents, an oligopoly of oil exporters was solidifying and 
growing increasingly powerful in the form of OPEC—the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries.  
In early December 1970, an OPEC meeting in Caracas, Venezuela established 
55% as the minimum tax rate that member countries ought to impose upon the oil 
companies. The resolution was given teeth with a decision to threaten resistant companies 
with a shut off of oil (Amuzegar, 2001, Annual Oil Market Chronology, 2008). Despite 
weeks and months of “frantic maneuvering,...threats and ultimatums” twenty three 
international oil companies finally acquiesced to a deal negotiated by Iran’s Minister of 
Finance and representative to OPEC, Amuzegar (Tenacious Iranian Negotiator: Jamshid 
Amouzegar, February 15, 1971). In addition to increasing the oil exporters’ percentage of 
profits, the ‘Tehran Agreement’ of 1971 increased the price of oil by thirty-five cents a 
barrel and mandated additional annual increases to adjust for inflation (Amuzegar, 2001: 
30, Graham, 1980, Yergin, 1991: 564).  
Over the next two years, the posted price of oil rose two more times in response to 
OPEC demands. The real jump, however, occurred in 1973 when a combination of the 
Arab oil embargo and the unilateral announcement of a 70% posted price increase in 
October followed by a further doubling of prices in December produced panic in a new 
oil-thirsty world with zero spare capacity (Dadkhah, 1985). Prices soared, jumping from 
$2.59 in September 1973 to over $13.00 the following June (Annual Oil Market 
Chronology, 2008, World Nominal Oil Price Chronology: 1970-2007, 2008). In Iran, 
government oil revenues jumped from $2.8 billion in 1972/73 to $4.6 billion in 1973/74 
and then nearly quadrupled to $17.8 billion in 1974/75 (Razavi and Vakil, 1984: 63). 
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Planning in an Era of Plenty 1973-1974 
By 1973, Iranian economists and the state bureaucracy had almost 25 years of 
experience with preparing and implementing increasingly sophisticated development 
plans (Amuzegar and Fekrat, 1971: 41, Karshenas, 1990: 93). While the First and Second 
Development Plans consisted primarily of simple lists of investment projects that were 
often prepared by or in coordination with foreign consultants, the Third and especially the 
Fourth Plans were indigenous products that incorporated complex macro-economic 
analysis of and forecasting for the private and public sectors. By the early 70’s the state’s 
investments in agriculture, infrastructure, and industry had resulted in consistently 
impressive GNP growth rates of close to 10% (Razavi and Vakil, 1984: Chapter 2).  
The Fifth Development Plan was prepared over several years under the leadership 
of Mehdi Samii and then Khodadad Farmanfarmaian. With a targeted annual growth rate 
of 11.4 percent it was an extremely ambitious plan which at $37 billion dollars was three 
and a half times bigger than the Fourth Plan and which would push the country close to 
its absorptive capacity (Amuzegar, 2001: 69, Farland, January 10, 1973, Razavi and 
Vakil, 1984: 70).  In preparing the plan, Farmanfarmaian’s stated goals were to address 
some of the social and regional inequities that had resulted from previous plans emphases 
on growth and urban development. The Fifth Plan, therefore, quadrupled spending for 
agriculture, health, education, and welfare to 5.6 billion while increasing local allocations 
to the provinces and poorer urban areas (CIA, February, 1973: 12-13, Farland, January 
10, 1973, Farmanfarmaian, November 10, 1982: Transcript 11).  
The Fifth Plan was presented to the cabinet, Prime Minister, and Shah at a public 
conference in Shiraz (Farland, November 11, 1972). In preparation for the conference, 
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Farmanfarmaian took his PO team of top managers to Shiraz to practice their presentation 
and ready their answers to the difficult questions they were expecting. Their performance 
at the conference was so effective and convincing that rumors regarding 
Farmanfarmaian’s accession to the Prime Minister’s office were strengthened 
(Farmanfarmaian, November 10, 1982: Transcript 11).  
The following year, when the tidal wave of oil revenues landed on Persian shores, 
however, all the painstaking thought and time and effort and preparation that had gone 
into writing the Fifth Plan was swept away. By that time, Farmanfarmaian had been 
maneuvered out of government
21
 and the Shah instructed the Plan and Budget 
Organization (the name had been changed to reflect the new budgeting function allocated 
to it) to revise the Fifth Plan in light of the monumental capital inflows that were flooding 
the Central Bank (Helms, February 28, 1974, Helms, May 29, 1973). 
In July, 1974, the new PBO chief Majid Majidi and his economists presented their 
proposal to the Prime Minister and the rest of the cabinet who had also been invited to 
submit their own proposed new expenditures. The PBO’s Planning Division 
recommended a relatively modest increase of 31% in the amount of public investment 
from 1,545.8 billion rials in the original plan to 2,031.8 billion rials. The economists 
argued that insufficient port capacity and human capital represented two major 
bottlenecks that imposed severe constraints upon Iran’s absorptive capacity. They also 
used their econometric models and statistical forecasting to demonstrate that public 
                                                 
21
 Hoveyda, having become concerned that Farmanfarmaian was beginning to represent a political threat, 
ordered him to make changes in the PBO that he knew would be refused. Farmanfarmaian did indeed 
refuse and immediately resigned. See: Milani, Abbas. (2011) The Shah. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
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spending over and above Iran’s absorptive capacity would result in “inflation, distortions, 
waste, and inefficiency” (Graham, 1980: 77, Milani, 2001: 268, Razavi and Vakil, 1984: 
72). In the PBO’s view, rather than pumping any additional funds into an already-
overheating economy, the government ought to invest abroad so that the money could 
continue to grow and would be available when the country’s was capable of putting it to 
work domestically.  
Cabinet members objected strenuously. For so many years a lack of sufficient 
investment capital had hampered their hopes and plans for Iran’s development. Now that 
the funding was finally available they could not imagine sending it abroad when it was so 
desperately needed at home. Their own proposals for new projects to be incorporated into 
the revised Plan would have amounted to a tripling of the public investment envisioned 
over the Plan period. Prime Minister Hoveyda, who seemed to have been swayed by the 
PBO’s presentation suggested a compromise plan that would increase public spending by 
about 85%. (Razavi and Vakil, 1984).  
The compromise plan was formally presented to the Shah the following month at 
a conference in the Caspian Sea resort Ramsar. Various personal accounts of the 
conference proceedings suggest that the Shah was uninterested in and impatient with 
warnings about the potentially negative consequences of unbridled spending (Amini, 
2002: 139). The kings’ view was that “if manpower was short it would be imported; if 
ports could not handle the anticipated inflow of goods, then a crash program to improve 
throughput should be instituted immediately; and if inflation were to pick up, then Iran 
would deal with this crisis in an innovative fashion” (Razavi and Vakil, 1984: 74). Prime 
Minister Hoveyda offered little resistance to this directive. PBO chief Majidi has also 
98 
 
been accused of not doing enough to emphasize the risks of such a course of action 
(Graham, 1980: 78, Razavi and Vakil, 1984). The ultimate outcome was that the Fifth 
Plan was nearly doubled to $70 billion dollars—an investment program heretofore 
unmatched by any other developing country (Amuzegar, 2001: 69, Helms, November 11, 
1974).  
Hyperboom 1974-1975 
In practice, however, even the generous spending guidelines of the revised Fifth 
Plan were not adhered to. The much-delayed annual budget was finally completed the 
month after Ramsar with total disregard for the revised plan which was “laid on the shelf, 
in favor of a spending spree, a frantic search of how to spend what there was” (Razavi 
and Vakil, 1984: 80). As the New York Times reported “the Shah and his Government 
announce almost daily that they will spend more and more and more…”  (Clarity, June 3, 
1974).The Shah had set the nation on a course for a hyperboom. 
And a hyperboom it was. By June of the following year, U.S. Embassy officials 
noted that the Iranian government seemed to be spending money faster as it could make 
it. Imports were up 150% over the previous year, foreign exchange reserves had fallen 
and capital imports were predicted to be required again by as early as 1977 (Miklos, June 
11, 1975). The next month the Finance Ministry authorized foreign borrowing by 
government agencies and the month after that the New York Times noted that “Iran 
Despite Her Oil Wealth, Is Borrowing on a Grand Scale”(Pace, August 15, 1975).  By the 
end of 1975, the U.S. Embassy reported a capital account deficit of $772 million (Helms, 
November 26, 1975).  
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This dramatic rise in spending and imports quickly ran up against the physical and 
human capital bottlenecks that the Shah had refused to consider in Ramsar. Port 
infrastructure, poorly maintained, and barely able to handle pre-boom levels of imports 
was completely overwhelmed. In an almost 20 page report detailing the conditions of and 
potential for expanding Iran’s four ports, the U.S. Embassy noted that “more than 150 
ships are anchored at the head of the Persian Gulf waiting to enter the ports”  despite the 
fact that ports were running on a 24 hour basis (Marshall, July 13, 1975). Goods that 
were offloaded were done so with such little organization and management that storage 
areas “are in a state of complete chaos. There is no system for placement of cargo and 
two crates from the same shipment may be placed in widely separate locations wherever 
room can be found” (Marshall, July 13, 1975). Chaos and overloading at the ports was 
further exacerbated by the absence of a sufficient number of trucks or other forms of 
transportation to move goods from ports in the south to their final destinations in Tehran 
and other cities (CIA, July 15, 1975: Appendix: Iran's Transportation Difficulties--
Current Situation and Outlook). To compensate, the government arranged for the speedy 
purchase and delivery of thousands of trucks and trailers whose arrival did little to 
remedy the problem due to a shortage of Iranian drivers (Razavi and Vakil, 1984: 85). 
Despite attempts to train and even ‘import’ additional drivers from Korea and Pakistan, 
“in 1977 it was still possible to see rows of trucks, neatly parked at Bandar Abbas, that 
had been awaiting drivers for three years” (Graham, 1980: 88). Port offloading and 
transportation delays naturally resulted in project delays as construction sites and teams 
waited idly for needed materials to arrive many of which suffered irreparable damage as a 
result of mishandling during their chaotic transport (Graham, 1980: 88). 
100 
 
The absence of trained personnel to man the factories, hospitals, and universities 
being built at breakneck speed was another serious bottleneck (CIA, July 15, 1975, 
Clarity, October 7, 1974, Helms, November 11, 1974: page 4). Indigenous talent being in 
short supply, the government recruited foreigners at great expense. Not only were 
expatriate salaries well above those of similarly-skilled Iranians but the foreign 
consulting firms recruiting them received per-month payments as well. As foreigners 
crowded into Tehran they further exacerbated demand and pricing conditions and 
contributed to the development of a serious housing shortage by 1975 (Razavi and Vakil, 
1984: 86). 
While infrastructure and manpower bottlenecks slowed the rate at which 
increased revenues could be translated into economic growth, inflation began to eat away 
at the nation’s economic health altogether. As early as 1973, U.S. Embassy reports noted 
that “rising prices have become the nation’s most serious problem” and that inflation was 
beginning to seriously hurt the poor as essential food items had become either entirely 
unavailable or extremely expensive (Helms, November 7, 1973).  Foreign journalists 
reported that the price of “staple foods, textile goods and home appliances have been 
soaring, in some cases to 100 per cent above last year’s levels” (Clarity, October 7, 
1974). Inflation resulted not only from increased demand conditions but the 
government’s monetary policies. Essentially, the government began paying for domestic 
expenditures by printing money such that between March 1974 and March 1975, money 
supply increased by 60% (Dadkhah, 1985: 376-77, Graham, 1980: 85-86). By the end of 
1974, inflation was estimated by the U.S. Embassy as being between 20 and 25% (Helms, 
November 11, 1974).  
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Rather than addressing the root cause of inflation—uncontrolled government 
spending—the Shah and his government attempted to dampen it through the application 
of a draconian price control campaign designed to roll prices back to pre-boom levels by 
force. The government published lists of approved prices and hired university students to 
investigate compliance in the marketplace Within weeks of the July 1975 launching, the 
campaign had resulted in thousands of arrests and even attacks upon merchants, 
businesspeople, and industrialists accused of profiteering (Graham, 1980, Katouzian, 
1981:334, Razavi and Vakil, 1984). While the price control campaign was marginally 
successful in slowing inflation, it also introduced new distortions into the economy and 
chilled the business atmosphere (Helms, November 24, 1975). Writing from the northern 
city of Tabriz, U.S. consulate officials reported that while basic commodities had become 
less expensive, they were also more difficult to find. Numerous shopkeepers, meanwhile 
had gone out of business while factory managers were cutting down on raw material 
imports given uncertainty regarding the profitability of permitted prices (Neumann, 
September 30, 1975). Indeed, given uncertainties regarding the prices they would be 
allowed to charge, for some industrialists it became cheaper to simply leave their imports 
unclaimed, thereby adding to the port chaos discussed above (Graham, 1980: 97).   
Eventually, however, a combination of lower-than-anticipated oil revenues 
combined with budget and balance of payments deficits forced the Shah and his 
government to confront the problems created by the free-spending approach encouraged 
at Ramsar (Helms, November 24, 1975). With much of the West in recession, demand for 
oil along with the associated revenues had dropped well below earlier projections 
resulting in multi-billion dollar deficits (Pace, June 11, 1976, Shah Says His Nation Has 
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$4-Billion Deficit, July 27, 1975). By February 1976, Iran was struggling to pay 
contractors and financiers and was reduced to pleading with Western nations and their 
multinational oil companies to increase their purchases of oil (Graham, 1980: 98, 
Kilborn, February 5, 1976, Talks with Western Companies Set to Open Tomorrow, 
March 2, 1976). The spending prescribed by the Fifth Development Plan clearly had to be 
curtailed. The government briefly explored barter agreements as an alternative method of 
payment (Pace, May 10, 1976). Ultimately, however, scores of projects including a $2 
billion naval base, turbo-train rail, three oil refineries, and a nitrogen fertilizer complex 
on the Caspian Sea were ‘shelved’ or indefinitely delayed due to a lack of funding 
(Graham, 1980: 101, Pace, February 16, 1976).  
The King is Displeased 
Publicly, the Shah and his government continued trying to project a sense of 
confidence. In a March, 1976 interview with Newsweek, the Shah was described as still 
being “as bullish on Iran as ever” (Benjamin and Came, March 1, 1976). The Shah 
boasted: “We are even further ahead than what we planned…We will have a 17 per cent 
growth rate this year. Is this bad?” (Benjamin and Came, March 1, 1976). Prime Minister 
Hoveyda even claimed “We overspent with open eyes. We took the occasion of more 
income at one time to make a jump, and I don’t shed any tears about a miserable couple 
of billions of dollars’ deficit” (Benjamin and Came, March 1, 1976). 
By the following October, however, all public pretense of confidence and 
foresight and had been retired as the Shah took to lecturing his citizens that the nation’s 
development requires hard work and sacrifice and that they should not expect to always 
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be covered in “soft wool. Incredibly, the Shah who just two years earlier had personally 
approved and even encouraged a spending spree now began blaming the “vultures” who 
“gather from everywhere and tell us to do this or that with our money while we do not 
have enough cement, enough bricks, enough port capacity, enough roads, and enough 
power of absorption” (Graham, 1980:20 & 103)]. In another move presumably intended 
to deflect blame, in November, the Shah launched an Imperial Commission charged with 
investigating waste, corruption, and the reasons for the Government’s inability to meet 
production schedules set out in the Fifth Plan. The proceedings of the Commission were 
broadcast live and Iranians watched as cabinet ministers were subjected to court-like 
hearings meant, perhaps, to demonstrate accountability and transparency (Afkhami, 2009: 
438-39, Razavi and Vakil, 1984: 93). At the same time, the government began accusing 
and pursuing foreign companies over allegations of corruption. In one high profile case, 
the government sued and won a $24 million settlement from Grumman as recompense for 
the company having paid large commissions to agents involved in the sale of F-14 planes 
(Pace, October 1, 1976, Witkin, December 16, 1977). 
The ultimate scapegoat, however, was Prime Minister Hoveyda. Himself once a 
champion of economic reform and even political liberalization, the longest serving Prime 
Minister in Iran’s history had after twelve years become the weary defender of the status 
quo. Hoveyda’s close association with the Fifth Development Plan allowed the Shah to 
signal his displeasure with the aftermath of the oil boom through Hoveyda’s dismissal. 
Hoveyda was replaced by the Cornell-educated technocrat Jamshid Amuzegar who 
speedily launched an austerity program that cooled the overheated economy bringing 
growth rates down to just 2.8% (Ibrahim, February 4, 1979, Jamshid Amouzegar Is 
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Named to Head Iran's Government, August 8, 1977, Milani, 2001: 283). The new Prime 
Minister was given free reign by the Shah to slash expenditures, budgets and deficits and 
get the country on track for a slower but steadier pace of development with GDP growth 
rates down to 2-3% (Afkhami, 2009: 441-42, CIA, June 1979: 126, Ibrahim, February 4, 
1979).  Before the outcome of this new economic program could be evaluated, however, 
demonstrations and protests—some of them resulting from the austerity program itself—
marked the beginnings of the revolution. Just a year after taking office, Amuzegar 
resigned as the Shah in a desperate bid to hold on his throne began furiously replacing 
Prime Ministers every few months before ultimately leaving the country himself in 
January 1979. 
Understanding the Shah’s relations with his Economic Team 
In the 1960s the Shah’s support for his economic team was remarkably consistent. 
Throughout the decade, the monarch actively sought out foreign-educated technocrats to 
craft and guide the country’s economic policies. At the beginning of the 1970s, this 
support seemed to strengthen in favor of US and UK educated economists like Mehdi 
Samii and Khodadad Farmanfarmaian who worked together to address some of the ill 
effects of the previous decade’s speedy growth. Within just a few short years, however, 
these men had left government service altogether and their remaining colleagues were 
being subjected to the Shah’s utter contempt for their pessimistic analyses of Iran’s 
absorptive capacity and the potentially catastrophic consequences of increasing public 
expenditures to match the massive incoming revenues. This complete disregard for the 
advice of economists and technocrats was short-lived, however, as by 1977 the Shah 
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disavowed responsibility for the hyperboom and allowed his new Prime Minister 
Amuzegar to implement an austerity program.  
What factors contributed to these about-faces on the part of the Shah? What 
insights can a review of Iran’s experiences generate into the role of expert advisors and 
the conditions under which they are likely to be empowered to guide the country’s 
economic policy process?  
Epistemic Communities or Functionalist approaches to answering these questions 
might look for evidence that the Shah, shaken by economic or political crisis would have 
been open to new cause-and-effect interpretations of events from an established 
community of credible economists or other experts. Such an approach is not very useful 
for interpreting or understanding the Shah’s reasons for turning away from his economic 
advisors in the midst of the oil boom. It is perhaps more useful, however, for generating 
understanding into why the Shah returned to his economists prescriptions for an austerity 
program so swiftly after the boom turned to bust. The painful experience of having so 
clearly been wrong to encourage immediate spending of the oil revenues may have begot 
a crisis of confidence that led to a new appreciation for his economists’ wisdom. While 
the arrival of the revolution in 1979 makes it impossible to evaluate the sincerity and 
longevity of the Shah’s commitment to this new path, it is possible that this would have 
been the Shah’s final about-face and that a Pahlavi Iran would have continued to be 
guided by economists and technocrats for many years. On the other hand, the Shah’s 
willingness to sacrifice Jamshid Amuzegar in response to political pressure just one year 
after he was sworn into office casts doubt on such a thesis. 
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Originating from scholarship on organizational sociology, mimetic isomorphism 
describes the way that states lacking means of identifying optimal goals, structures, or 
practices can look to the examples of particularly successful models as guides. 
Observing, for example, the way that the advice of economists is incorporated into 
economic policymaking in the United States might have inspired the Shah to have done 
the same during the sixties and early seventies. The oil boom, however, and the hubris it 
perhaps engendered, may plausibly have inhibited such mimetic tendencies insofar as the 
Shah may have felt that the newfound wealth of his country obviated any further need to 
continue replicating the practices of other models. 
Political Interest Group analyses of the role of economists look to their ability to 
capture and retain political support from masses, elites, or other interests in much the 
same way that any other interest group or political organization might. Given the absolute 
lack of political savvy in or following for men like Samii and Farmanfarmaian, such 
explanations offer little leverage in understanding when and under what circumstances 
they were entrusted with the nation’s economic policymaking. They also have little to say 
about why these men suddenly seem to have lost the Shah’s ear and confidence in the 
midst of the oil boom. In the case of Amuzegar, however, while he himself was famously 
uncharismatic and apolitical, his appointment might be interpreted as an entirely political 
move by the Shah intended to placate his people’s discontent with the handling of the oil 
boom by suggesting that new and more capable hands were now at the helm. 
Countries have also been noted to adopt behaviors expected or demanded of them 
by the stronger states on which they depend for various international resources. In the 
case of Iran, such theories provide a useful analytic framework for understanding the 
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relative power of economists and technocrats as a function of the extent to which Iran 
was materially dependent upon the United States. In the early 70s, when Iran was still in 
need of loans from the United States, World Bank and commercial investors, the Shah 
needed to retain and promote the services of men that would inspire the confidence of 
these creditors. During the boom years, Iran was flooded with more capital than it could 
use and itself became a creditor. The money and good opinions of outsiders became 
expendable and the Shah felt no qualms about treating his economists and their policy 
prescriptions as he saw fit. As the boom turned to bust and the country’s newfound 
wealth seemed to disappear overnight, the Shah once again sought to ensure that his 
policy advisers were capable of winning and retaining the United States’ good graces. An 
anecdote by William Sullivan, the last American Ambassador to Iran provides support for 
this view. In the summer of 1977, Ambassador Sullivan had a meeting with the Shah in 
which he expressed serious reservations about Iran’s economic direction and its 
industrialization program. Although the Shah was visibly irritated by this line of 
questioning, it was shortly after this interview that Hoveyda’s resignation and 
Amuzegar’s Premiership were announced along with a host of additional measures 
including crackdowns on corruption and bribery. In his memoirs Sullivan writes: “I did 
not know exactly what cause and effect there was between my conversations with the 
Shah and the actions that he subsequently took to revise his economic programs. I frankly 




On January 16, 1979, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, left Tehran on a 
flight to Egypt. Two weeks later, Ruhollah Khomeini arrived and was welcomed by an 
ecstatic crowd of millions and by March, 1979, the country was declared the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. Many of the government’s economists in the Plan and Budget 
Organization and Ministry of Finance welcomed this changed with great hopes and plans 
for how their expertise could be used to build a new nation free of dictatorial intervention 
(Razavi and Vakil, 1984: 103-04). The following chapters assess the extent to which 




Chapter Five: Revolution, War, and Economists (1979-1989) 
Initial optimism is crushed  
When the Shah left Iran in January 1979, many Iranian economists and 
technocrats were not particularly sorry to see him go. The monarch’s utter disregard for 
warnings about the perils of an overheating economy and the resulting disaster of the oil 
boom and bust had alienated many of the educated classes (Anonymous, February 18, 
2009). Indeed, in the run up to the revolution, the Plan and Budget Organization became 
something of an epicenter of bureaucratic revolt as one of its managers, Ali Akbar 
Moinfar, a Japanese-trained seismologist, became the national strike coordinator for 
government workers (Razavi and Vakil, 1984).  
The individuals comprising the Provisional Government (PG), which was 
constituted shortly after the Shah’s departure, further inspired the optimism and hopes of 
the country’s technocrats and economists. The PG was headed by the French-educated 
engineer Mehdi Bazargan who was a known supporter of free market economic policies 
(Sahabi and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003). Shortly following his appointment, Bazargan’s 
Foreign Minister Karim Sanjabi declared that “private investments and enterprise should 
be protected”(Ibrahim, February 14, 1979). Cabinet members were “engineers, lawyers, 
educators, doctors, and former civil servants, men drawn from the professional middle 
class and the broad center of Iranian politics” (Bakhash, 1990: 54, Ibrahim, February 14, 
1979).  Although few of these men had any formal economics education, they all valued 
expertise and were expected to be open to the guidance offered by their better trained 
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staff. Most importantly, clerics and radical Leftists were conspicuous primarily in their 
absence. 
Within six months, however, such optimism dimmed. Although the provisional 
government was the nominal executive power in the country, the Revolutionary Council 
(RC) which had been created by Khomeini to oversee the revolution and transition 
period, and which was comprised primarily of left-leaning clerics, continued to operate 
behind the scenes as the supreme decision making authority (Bakhash, 1990). Whether in 
response to pressure from the RC or just general incompetence, the Provisional 
Government itself seemed to be doing a poor job of getting the economy back on track. 
By the summer of 1979 a wave of nationalizations and expropriations took place
22
 over 
Bazargan’s objections that not only rattled the private sector’s already-shaky confidence 
but also resulted in additional government debt and obligation given the bankrupt 
position of many of the banks, insurance companies, and factories that were being taken 
over (Ibrahim, July 6, 1979, Iran Takes over Insurers, June 26, 1979, Iran to Seize Some 
Industries, June 21, 1979, Sahabi and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003:31). Moinfar, now 
promoted to head the PBO, began to lose his staff’s confidence when he insisted on 
slashing the year’s budget expenditures (Iran Slashes Budget Level, July 16, 1979). His 
admirable commitment to responsible government spending and elimination of waste 
betrayed a lack of understanding of basic economic principles such as the need for 
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 Speaking of this to reporters, Moinfar said “I don’t want to use the word nationalization. I would rather 
say popular ownership and the transformation of industries into enterprises working for the interests of 
the people”. See:  Farmanfarmaian, Khodadad in an interview recorded by Habib Ladjevardi. (November 




government stimulus during times of crisis. The result, predictably, was that “the Plan 
and Budget Organization ended up imposing significant financial constraints on an 
economy that had started rolling just a few weeks earlier” (Razavi and Vakil, 1984: 107-
08).  
By the end of the summer, even Moinfar had lost influence over the country’s 
economic policy direction. In August 1979, he presented the cabinet with a new Five-
Year Development Plan intended to reflect the spirit of the new era by setting as its 
primary goal the achievement of a minimum standard of living for all Iranians within five 
years time. The plan was presented over several days and, despite being criticized by the 
Minister of Labor Dariush Forouhar for not being pro-worker enough, it was finally 
endorsed by the cabinet as a whole
23
. The Revolutionary Council, however, refused to 
approve it and the whole project was ultimately abandoned as political instability, the 
American hostage crisis in November, and Bazargan’s resulting resignation forced policy 
makers’ attentions elsewhere (Sahabi and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003). 
When Bazargan resigned, the Revolutionary Council began ruling the country 
directly while it prepared for presidential elections. By this time, the uncertainties 
inspired by the revolution, the absence of a clear economic policy agenda, economic 
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 Sahabi speaks very highly of this plan saying that it was “more balanced and more professional” than any 
of the development plans he has seen since. See: Iran to Seize Some Industries. June 21, 1979 New York 
Times. Some of my interview subjects were less complimentary. One economist who was closely 
involved in the writing of the First and Second Development Plans under Musavi and Rafsanjani said “In 
those early days anyone who thought they knew something would come and give their ideas and call it a 
plan. These plans were basically just a list of material welfare goals that the writers thought would be 
good to have. The plans read like poetry about the need for everyone to have a house and everyone to 
have a job, etc” Sahabi, Ezzatollah, and interviewed by Bahman Ahmadi-Amooee. (2003) Eghtesad-E 
Siyasi-E Jomhuri-E Islami. Tehran, Iran: Gam-e No. 
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mismanagement, and the souring of relations with the West had begun to have a severe 
and noticeable effect. Laborers and workers, perhaps empowered by the victory of the 
revolution seemed to have a developed a taste for strikes and demonstrations and often 
refused to return to the comparative banality of the assembly lines even when most of 
their demands were met
24
 (Ahvaz Steel Worker's Strike, 1980, Kifner, March 22, 1979, 
Sahabi and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 16-18). Alarmed by the government’s inability to get 
the country back to work as well as the anti-capitalist sentiments that had resulted in 
extensive nationalizations, the private sector—when not fleeing or in hiding—refused to 
make new investments or maintain old ones. The government’s unimaginative and 
increasingly predictable response to the turmoil was to seize control over more and more 
of the economy thereby increasing its own fiscal burden. By November 1979, it became 
clear that Iran’s leaders would have to renege on earlier expressed intentions to ‘eliminate 
wasteful spending’ by limiting oil exports (Iran's Exports: Hard to Limit, November 19, 
1979, Iran to Halve Its Oil Output, March 9, 1979). Iran’s economic problems were 
further intensified when President Carter retaliated against the hostage seizure by 
freezing Iranian assets in U.S. banks thereby pushing the country into default on a $500 
million loan (Bennett, November 22, 1979). By the end of the year, Iran’s economy was 
estimated to have shrunk by 12% with the falloff in manufacturing estimated at between 
40 to 70 percent (Cowan, December 17, 1979). 
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 The revolution’s leaders were not exempt from such battles with laborers. Sahabbi relates a story of how 
workers physically threatened the manager of a factory that had been built in 1963 by a religious group of 
investors that included people like Rafsanjani, Bahonar, Raja’i and Bazargan. See: Anonymous, Formerly 




The PBO was now being run by Ezzatollah Sahabi
25
, a mechanical engineer with, 
by his own admission, little formal economics training but a good deal of interest in 
economic policy issues (Sahabi and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 11). It was perhaps a sign of 
the times and the lack of trained economists in the Revolutionary Council’s inner circle 
that his layperson’s interest was enough to make Sahabi not only the PBO chief but also 
the head of the RC’s Commission for Economics and Finance as well as the head of the 
Economics Committee of the Basij revolutionary people’s militia (Sahabi and Ahmadi-
Amooee, 2003: 21). Indeed, for the next five months of direct RC rule, Sahabi has 
claimed that he enjoyed near total control over the country’s economic policy as other RC 
members “were so busy with political problems that they had no time or attention to 
spend on economic issues. As a result, whatever I would suggest would be quickly 
accepted” (Sahabi and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 30).  
Despite Sahabi’s impeccable revolutionary credentials and close relationship with 
the movement’s spiritual leader Khomeini, Sahabi’s ten-month tenure at the PBO was 
marked by increasing resentment toward and suspicion of the institution. Having ousted 
the Shah who had been perceived as living large and hoarding money abroad, many of 
the new ministers were eager to distribute the fruits of the revolution to ‘The People’ 
through countless new projects. These ministers found it hard to believe that money 
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wasn’t readily available and they often resented the PBO’s refusal to automatically 
disburse funds (Razavi and Vakil, 1984: 110, Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-Amooee, 
2003: 159, Sahabi and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 57). Despite its early role in organizing 
bureaucratic opposition to the Shah’s government, the PBO found itself on the receiving 
end of accusations of treason from a number of different groups. Communist and Leftist 
groups like the Soviet-supported Tudeh felt that its policies were too pro-capitalist while 
Islamist groups denounced it as a creation of the corrupt United States and complained 
about bare-headed female employees who continued to work without headscarves. While 
Sahabi conceded the presence of and even decided to fire a handful of monarchists 
among his employees, he has vigorously defended the majority of PBO employees as 
being patriotic professionals from whom he learned a great deal and who spent long 
hours applying their knowledge to the solution of the new government’s economic ills 
(Sahabi and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 55-57). 
In early 1980, Banisadr with 75% of the vote became the first elected president of 
the Islamic Republic and by June, Sahabi left the PBO to serve in parliament (Official 
Final Results of the Election in Iran, January 29, 1980: 22, Sahabi and Ahmadi-Amooee, 
2003). His replacement, Musa Khayyer had much less respect for and confidence in the 
expertise and loyalties of the PBO staff. His mistrust of PBO experts was intensified by 
the mood of the country which had darkened as rivalries between formerly allied political 
parties exploded into violence. Under the ensuing ‘reign of terror’ Khayyer’s response 
was to be ever more suspicious and watchful of his staff. It was during this time that 
many PBO employees began packing their bags to leave the country or go underground 
while those that remained learned to censor their increasingly unwelcome opinions. 
115 
 
Despite multiple purges, Khayyer ultimately decided that the only way to entirely weed 
out non-loyal elements was to order the doors of the PBO closed and shut it down 
altogether (Anonymous, September 3, 2006, Mashayekhi and Taheri, February 1, 2009, 
Najafi and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003, Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 147) .   
This time period has been referred to as a ‘most bitter experience’ for economists 
in Iran, many of whom feared that there was no place for members of their profession 
within the new Islamic Republic (Najafi and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 364). Few 
economists at that time would have guessed that within ten years, the reconstituted PBO 
would play a powerful role in convincing regime leaders to halt the disastrous war with 
Iraq and launch a controversial population control program. Or that economists in the 
PBO, Ministry of Finance, and Central Bank would work together to launch a World 
Bank-style reform program comprised of privatization, exchange rate unification, and the 
repeal of subsidies that would guide the country’s economic policymaking process for the 
following 16 years. 
Before describing the chain of events that led to this unexpected result, the 
following section considers the new philosophies and motivations underlying the 
economic policy direction of the Islamic Republic in the early years after its birth. 
Islamic Economics 
Of the various groups involved in the revolution, the Islamic Republican Party 
that ultimately consolidated its power was probably the one with the least well-defined 
ideas regarding how they wished to run the economy after the overthrow of the Shah. 
Whereas Marxists, Liberals, and other intellectual groups had a rich tradition of 
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scholarship on questions such as property rights, the role of the state in running the 
economy, and the optimal approach to planning, the clerics had very little guidance in 
this regard. What few books were available on the subject of Islamic Economics—
including the Qur’an itself—tended to be extremely idealistic about its virtues and 
laudable outcomes but woefully lacking in details of its implementation (Anonymous, 
July 14, 2006, Bakhash, 1990:167-75, Behdad, 1995, Najafi and Ahmadi-Amooee, 
2003:358, Razavi and Vakil, 1984: 110-13). Furthermore, while Marxists and Liberals 
had real-world examples of socialism and capitalism in action that might serve as sources 
of emulation or learning, Iran’s clerics could avail themselves of no relevant examples of 
an economy run on Shiite Islamic principles and were, in fact, creating something 
entirely new from scratch.  
Given the paucity of clear guidance regarding the structure of an Islamic 
economy, the ruling clerics reverted to more basic principles when making decisions 
about economic policies or choosing economic policymakers. The first of these was a 
complete and utter rejection of anything associated with the Shah, the West, and the 
United States which resulted in a general suspicion of the capitalist economic policies 
they promoted (Najafi and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 366). As Razavi-Zadeh, a later head 
of the Plan and Budget Organization has described in an interview with journalist 
Bahman Ahmadi Amouee
26
, “problems like inequality, poverty, and unemployment 
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[under the Shah] were all seen as stemming from the economic policies that America or 
those educated under America’s influence…instituted in the country” (Roghani-Zanjani 
and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 142). As such, the cure for these ills was believed to lie in 
reversal and dismantling of the capitalist system promoted by the U.S. and the Shah. The 
rejection of anything associated with the previous regime was so strong and automatic 
that it has been suggested that, had the Shah been a socialist, the new regime would have 
likely pursued more capitalist policies (Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 
145). This rejection is also what made it extremely difficult for economists and other 
technocrats working for the previous regime to continue to advise the country’s new 
leaders. As Mas’oud Nili, a PBO employee who worked closely with Roghani-Zanjani 
said in another interview with Ahmadi-Amooee, “since the spirit of that [immediate post-
revolutionary] time was in opposition to a capitalist economic structure, capitalist ideas 
and people who may have approved of them were perceived as gheyrekhodi [not one of 
us, alien]” (Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 250-51). 
The second principle guiding the new regime’s clerical leaders was loyalty to 
Islam, the revolution and its leader Khomeini. Such loyalty was considered to be the 
primary qualification for any position of authority as it demonstrated a closeness to the 
divine whose favor and guidance would assure success (Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-
Amooee, 2003: 148). Actual experience or education were believed to be of secondary 
importance. This attitude could be observed early on and preceded even the consolidation 
of power by the RC. An aide to Prime Minister Bazargan defended his appointment of 
Hassan Nazih, a former lawyer, judge, and human rights activist to be the chairman and 
managing director of the National Iranian Oil Company by saying “Every revolution has 
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to go through the business of the men of trust versus the men of expertise. Nazih may not 
know a thing about oil, but he is our man” (Ibrahim, March 13, 1979)
27
. As the clerics 
around Khomeini began eliminating their rivals and the ruling elite represented an 
increasingly narrow segment of the population, the required loyalties became more and 
more refined. Nazih himself, for example, eventually left the NIOC and fled the country 
under accusations of treason due to his refusal to purge supposedly monarchist elements 
at the NIOC (Iran Ousts Oil Chief; Hints Treason Trial: Nazih Accused of Blocking 
Purge against 'Non-Islamic' Figures, September 29, 1979, Stork, 1980). Frustrations 
about this revolving door of managers who were continually replaced by supposedly 
more loyal figures was well expressed by economists and former PBO employees 
Hossein Razavi and Firouz Vakil when they wrote: “Every few months a new groups was 
formed to design the planning system. By the time that this group could get a feel for the 
real problems, a change in the political environment would lead to the removal of that 
group and emergence of a new one. The new group would now be considered to be more 
Islamic but after a while not Islamic enough” (Razavi and Vakil, 1984: 114). In this 
manner, it was not long before most of the country’s economic policymaking institutions 
were headed and staffed by individuals with a great deal of revolutionary zeal but little 
expertise (Mashayekhi and Taheri, February 1, 2009). 
The final principle guiding the clerical elite was competition with and elimination 
of political support for rival organizations. The most prominent of these rivals were a 
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number of Leftist groups who varied primarily on the extent to which they were 
associated with or directed by outside Communist parties. All of the groups shared, 
however, a message about the delivery of material welfare to the poorer classes that 
resonated strongly among a large portion of the Iranian population. To the extent that it 
wished to win the support of this portion of the population, therefore, the clerics faced 
strong incentives to pursue anti-capitalist policies like expropriation, nationalization, and 
redistribution (Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 244, Nourbakhsh and Ahmadi-Amooee, 
2003). The end result was that these incentives combined with concerns about loyalty as 
well as the rejection of pre-revolutionary policies resulted in an economic policy that was 
somewhat Leftist-inspired but basically lacking a coherent theoretical framework; and 
that was implemented by individuals with little expertise or experience but a great deal of 
faith in the intention and ability of God to ensure the success of his chosen revolution. 
The First Development Plan is Defeated 
The summer of 1981 was a tumultuous one for the new Islamic republic. In early 
June, Banisadr was stripped of all power and impeached by parliament (Bani-Sadr Is 
Dismissed by Khomeini as Chief of Iran Armed Forces, June 11, 1981, Kifner, June 22, 
1981). While he and his allies went into hiding or escaped to exile, a wave of violence 
resulted in the assassination of dozens of IRP leaders. On June 28, a bomb planted in the 
headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party killed Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, the 
head of the party and Chief Justice, along with some seventy others (Khomeini Appointes 
New Chief Justice; Bombing Toll Is 72, June 30, 1981). Just a few weeks later in August, 
the new President and Prime Minister of the country, Mohammad Ali Rajai and 
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Mohammad Javad Bahonar were killed in yet another explosion (Kihss, August 31, 
1981). These convulsions were followed, however, by the ascension of Mir Hussein 
Musavi
28
 to the office of the Prime Minister—a position which he held for the next eight 
years and which marked a new era of stability in which the Islamic Republican Party, 
having successfully eliminated its chief rivals, began attending to the business of 
governing.  
As the IRP consolidated power, earlier biases against technocrats and expertise 
seemed to diminish a bit. Given that all nonloyal elements had been purged, what 
economists and experts remained could be expected to put their knowledge in service of 
the Islamic Republic. Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, Khomeini’s expected successor 
went so far as to say publicly that “Important jobs should be entrusted to qualified people 
who know their job…Saying midnight prayer—despite its importance and value—is not 
sufficient”(Iran's Leaders Open Campaign against Corruption in Government, November 
12, 1984). Mohsen Nourbakhsh, a PhD economist trained at University of California in 
Davis took over the top position at the Central Bank of Iran. His primary task for the next 
few years was to help the government deal with its serious lack of funding due to the war, 
damaged oil production capabilities, and the continued freeze on Iranian assets in the 
United States (Nourbakhsh and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 77). The Plan and Budget 
Organization was also reopened in response to a recognized need for a more careful 
budgeting process and a longer-term guide to expected revenues and expenditures. 
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Muhammad Taghi Banki, a U.S.-trained engineer was the new PBO chief tasked with re-
staffing the organization and preparing another Five-Year Development Plan.  
In writing the Development Plan, Banki was aided by Alinaghi Mashayekhi who 
had a PhD in management from M.I.T. and Mohammad Tabibian, a Duke University 
trained economist both of whom moved to Tehran from Isfahan where they had been co-
workers first at Isfahan University and later, after the universities were closed, at Saderat 
bank. Mashayekhi and Tabibian’s approach was to involve as many people as possible in 
the planning process. Every government ministry was asked to create a working group of 
people that would liaison with and inform the PBO’s planning efforts. Every province 
and small town was also asked to create a similar group to inform the PBO of their 
particular needs, concerns and views regarding the five-year plan. The planners, 
furthermore, spent a great deal of time in Qom, the center of clerical scholarship, working 
to understand theological concerns and ensure that the plan did not abrogate Islamic 
requirements or offend clerical sensitivities. In this way, according to Mashayekhi, over 
6,000 people were involved in advising, guiding, and even writing the Five-Year 
Development Plan that resulted (Mashayekhi and Taheri, February 1, 2009 , Roghani-
Zanjani and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 154).  
It did not take long, however, for the technocrats and economists to find 
themselves on the receiving end of criticism from individuals with whom their 
differences had once been obscured by a common enmity toward Bani-Sadr and other 
rivals to the IRP. Two distinct groups could soon be observed in opposition to the 
activities of individuals like Nourbakhsh, Banki, Tabibian, and Mashayekhi. The first 
group consisted of traditional leftists who had little use for a private sector and were 
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skeptical of any defenders of capitalism or limits on government. This group included 
Prime Minister Musavi, his Minister of Finance, the Austrian trained PhD economist 
Hossein Namazi, and Behzad Nabavi, an Iranian-trained engineer who oversaw the 
country’s coupon rationing scheme and later became Musavi’s Minister for Heavy 
Industries
29
. This group often enjoyed the special affection and protection of Khomeini 
himself. The second group consisted of traditionalist clerics and bazaar merchants who 
lacked an overarching economic philosophy but were motivated by concerns that the 
regime’s policies be consonant with the mandates of the Qur’an as well as self-interest in 
protecting their import and resale businesses. This group included individuals such as 
Commerce Minister Asadollah Asgharowladi, Labor Minister Ahmad Tavvakoli, and the 
members of the Guardians Council of clerics, the body charged with approving or vetoing 
all legislation based on its adherence to Islamic law. 
Despite their purposefully participatory approach, the plan, planners, and planning 
process of the PBO soon faced numerous criticisms and obstacles from these two groups. 
To begin with, many traditionalists argued that a nation guided by God’s own hand has 
no need for a five-year plan and that attempts to prepare one merely reflected a lack of 
sufficient faith in divine providence (Najafi and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 362, Nili and 
Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 242). Indeed, despite the closing of the PBO and the purging of 
non-loyal elements, traditionalists continued to view it and the planning process as a 
basically American entity and enterprise. Another challenge faced by the planners was 
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the difficulty of balancing leftist and traditionalist concerns about the private sector. On 
the one hand, the anti-West spirit of the revolution made it extremely difficult and, 
indeed, sometimes dangerous to voice pro-capitalist positions. On the other hand, when 
the plan was finally introduced to the majlis, many complained that if the cover and 
Islamic references were removed, it would read like a copy of an Eastern-bloc communist 
plan. (Mashayekhi and Taheri, February 1, 2009).  
In August 1983, despite strenuous opposition from a number of cabinet members, 
the draft plan was accepted by the Musavi government and submitted to the Majlis where 
after a great deal of debate and criticism it was ultimately rejected (Anonymous, 
September 3, 2006, Chronology July 16, 1983--October 15, 1983, 1983). In addition to 
the above-described attacks from the left and right, the plan was criticized for being too 
optimistic and promising to accomplish too much  (Mashayekhi and Taheri, February 1, 
2009, Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 154). Indeed, as the war with Iraq 
grinded on and oil revenues continued to drop due to production problems as well as a 
worldwide oil glut, such criticisms were not entirely without merit. Banki, however, had 
tired of the attacks upon his work, co-workers, and character and resigned from his 
position with the PBO the following year (Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 
156). He was replaced at the PBO by Mas’oud Roghani-Zanjani a relatively young and 
inexperienced Iranian-trained economist who had been an advisor to Musavi for the 
previous year. Given his junior position and dependence upon Musavi’s political 
patronage, Roghani-Zanjani was expected to faithfully and consistently reflect the Prime 
Minister’s Leftist positions on economic policy.  
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It was not long before Nourbakhsh also left government. His misstep had been to 
run afoul of the Bank’s Islamic Council, an informal committee with counterparts in most 
government ministries whose self-appointed task was to monitor behavior and activities 
to ensure accordance with Islam. Nourbakhsh’s refusal to reserve managerial positions 
for individuals belonging to or approved by the Islamic Council resulted in a great deal of 
friction. Unluckily for Nourbakhsh, one of the leaders of the Bank’s Islamic Council, 
Muhammad Javad Iravani, was in 1985 chosen to be the new Minister of Finance and 
after a good deal of tension managed to maneuver the ouster of Nourbakhsh in favor of 
the leftist Majeed Ghassemi (Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 261-63, Nourbakhsh and 
Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 79, 83). Once again, Iran’s economists and technocrats seemed 
to have been sidelined. 
Economists, Population Growth, and War 
By the mid-80’s the war with Iraq was draining the country of resources and 
morale. Given its diplomatic isolation, Iran had to pay a premium for any and all military 
equipment. The financial burden of the war was made all the more difficult by the 
fluctuating price of oil which fell by more than half from $35.75 a barrel in 1981 to just 
$14.44 in 1986 leading to a drop in Iran’s oil income from over $20 billion in 1983 to 
under $6 billion in 1986-7 (Bakhash, 1990: 245, Matthews, April 1, 1985, Middleton, 
June 12, 1984, Povey, June 12, 1984). In keeping with Musavi’s Leftist orientation as 
well as the exigencies of war, the government’s hold on the economy had increased over 
time. In addition to running the vast numbers of companies it had taken over in the 
aftermath of the revolution, the government was now strictly rationing essential goods 
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and foreign exchange, and had instituted controls on imports, wages and prices 
(Amuzegar, 1993: 46).  
Given the absence of resources available for public investment, Roghani-Zanjani 
soon determined that development planning as such was irrelevant to the country’s needs. 
His goal at the PBO, therefore, was to simply keep the ‘planning machinery’ alive by 
directing its economists toward the preparation of a number of econometric forecasts and 
short-term plans for a variety of possible future scenarios; many of these were not even 
published or distributed outside of the PBO (Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-Amooee, 
2003: 160). The PBO was involved, however, in two important public planning efforts 
during this time. The first was the “Plan for New Conditions” which was developed in 
late 1986 and was designed to be a two year guide for resource distribution that would 
ensure adequate funding for the war effort as well as the provision of essential needs to 
the population. The second “Plan for a Crisis Situation” was a top-secret plan for how the 
country might be managed should the United States decide to join the war on Iraq’s side 
and attack Iran directly (Anonymous, August 9 and August 16, 2006, Nili and Ahmadi-
Amooee, 2003: 254-56, Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003:160-61). In 
addition to these activities, PBO economists sought to exert influence through their 
responsibility for preparing the agendas for regular meetings of the country’s Supreme 
Economic Council. Mas’oud Nili, the Iranian and English-educated PBO economist 
tasked with this job has said that his intent at the time was to use his power over the 
agenda to push the country’s leaders to consider longer-term economic goals and the 
impact that short-term decisions (like additional borrowing from the Central Bank) would 
have on them. During this time, the PBO also wrote several public reports taking a 
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position against price and exchange rate controls proposed by the government. These 
reports were, for the most part, entirely ignored and the PBO, made cautious by years of 
vitriolic criticism, was not prepared to push its views any further (Nili and Ahmadi-
Amooee, 2003:242, 57-59). 
Privately, however, Roghani-Zanjani was becoming alarmed by the increasingly 
dire conditions of the country as revealed to him by the steady stream of PBO reporting. 
By the end of 1986, Roghani-Zanjani concluded and tried to demonstrate to Prime 
Minister Musavi that continuing the war could result in the fall the government or even 
the country. Musavi was not particularly impressed or convinced. An artist and architect 
by training, Musavi had little faith in the utility of economic analyses as a guide and was 
known to advise economists that in order to understand the country’s situation, they 
ought to spend less time looking at cold statistics and more time reading the poetry of 
Rumi and Hafez. As regarded continuation of the war, Musavi felt that the PBO’s metrics 
were incapable of accounting for the determination of the Iranian people to win the war 
as well as their willingness to suffer losses toward that goal  (Roghani-Zanjani and 
Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003:179-80).  As Roghani-Zanjani’s tenure at the PBO continued, he 
became increasingly alienated by this perspective and more closely aligned with the 
positions of the economists he had been sent to control (Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 
265, Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 164).   
Roghani-Zanjani’s concerns were intensified by the results of a PBO analysis of 
population trends. In 1986, the Iranian government conducted a census which revealed 
that population growth had reached 3.9% and that 45% of Iran’s 50 million citizens were 
under 14 years of age (Hoodfar and Assadpour, 2000: 22). Using this data, the PBO 
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created a number of different forecasts based upon varying assumptions about future 
fertility levels, outcomes at the battlefront, oil revenues, public investments, etc 
(Anonymous, August 9 and August 16, 2006, Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 260, 
Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 189). The results of the status quo 
forecasts were extremely distressing. If funding the war effort continued to preclude 
serious investments in the country’s economic development and health / educational 
infrastructure, the explosive population growth would soon introduce unmanageable 
strains. Short of divine intervention, the country and regime could only be saved by an 
end to the war, a quick reversal of population trends, or, preferably, both. 
This time PBO economists managed to capture the attention of government 
leaders who were already aware that the war effort was not going well. Unable to 
purchase spare parts, Iran’s air force had been grounded and ceded the skies to the Iraqi 
forces (Mohr, September 22, 1986). Even on land, Iran seemed to have lost the edge its 
once-abundant but now dwindling martyrs brigades had afforded it as demonstrated by its 
forced withdrawal from the Fao peninsula (Gowers, April 19, 1988). American attacks on 
oil platforms in retaliation for damage inflicted on U.S. ships by Iranian mines as well as 
the USS Vincennes mistaken attack on a civilian Iran Air flight led many to expect a 
more aggressive American support for the Iraqi side which would make an Iranian 
victory even less likely (Allen et al., July 4, 1988, Anonymous, August 18, 2006). 
Under these dire conditions, Prime Minister Musavi invited Roghani-Zanjani to 
write a letter to Imam Khomeini outlining his concerns. With the help of Nili, Tabibian, 
and Mashayekhi, Roghani-Zanjani prepared and presented the PBO’s conclusions 
regarding likely future scenarios. Emphasizing that his duty and capabilities were limited 
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to providing accurate technical information but that it was up to the religious leadership 
to determine the proper course of action for the Islamic nation, Roghani-Zanjani argued 
that there were two paths forward: either follow the path of Imam Hussein and sacrifice 
everything in the path of a war effort that is unlikely to be successful, or end the war and 
attempt to address the looming population crisis (Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 280-
81, Nourbakhsh and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 92-93, Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-
Amooee, 2003: 182). It was not long after receiving Roghani-Zanjani’s letter that Imam 
Khomeini appeared before the nation to tearfully proclaim that he had drunk the ‘cup of 
poison’ and agreed to a formal ceasefire (Mortimer, August 16, 1988).  
The regime also displayed remarkable flexibility as regards population policies. 
Until this time, the government had generally pursued pro-natal policies and viewed the 
birth control programs of the previous regime with suspicion. Some religious leaders 
went so far as to suggest that birth control was part of a Jewish plot to reduce the 
numbers of Muslims and that in an Islamic Republic families ought to be encouraged to 
have as many children as possible so as to thwart this plot and increase the numbers of 
God’s chosen people (Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003:188-89). In 1988, 
with the approval of Prime Minister Musavi and Imam Khomeini, the PBO worked with 
the Ministry of Health to organize a national conference on the issue that highlighted the 
way that a rapidly growing population would impact various aspects of the economy and 
society. Shortly thereafter, Imam Khomeini issued a fatwa that silenced clerical 
objections by approving all methods of birth control. With the Imam’s approval, a 
national family planning program was designed and launched in December 1989 to 
encourage women to space their pregnancies, limit family size to no more than three 
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children, and limit a woman’s childbearing years to between 18 and 35 (Aghajanian and 
Merhyar, 1999, Hoodfar and Assadpour, 2000, Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-Amooee, 
2003: 192). 
The First Development Plan and a New Team 
With the end of the war, the government was in need of a new plan for spending 
and distributing funds freed from the battlefront. Having all along been engaged in 
various planning exercises, the PBO was well prepared for the task and managed to 
submit a first draft of its proposed Five-Year Development Plan within three months of 
the ceasefire (Anonymous, August 9 and August 16, 2006, Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 
2003). The PBO plan envisioned a distinctly different post-war era in which the 
government would cede control over the economy to an enhanced private sector buoyed 
by trade and foreign investment liberalization and the elimination of price controls or 
subsidies .  
Prime Minister Musavi was dismayed. He accused the planners of basing their 
work on World-Bank-inspired principles that struck at the heart of the socialist principles 
he held dear (Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 278-79, Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-
Amooee, 2003: 166). In earlier years, such accusations might have been enough to scuttle 
the plan entirely and send PBO officials, tails hanging, back to their offices or even 
homes. Times appeared to have changed however as Roghani-Zanjani and his like-
minded allies were able to find a new political patron in Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani who shared their worldview and was powerful enough to promote it. 
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Rafsanjani, speaker of parliament for the prior eight years and head of the armed 
services during the final years of the war with Iraq, was a powerful and politically astute 
politician (Johns, June 8, 1988). As Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolution’s spiritual and 
political leader, took to his sick bed, Rafsanjani and his then-ally Ali Khamene’i were 
closely involved in the effort to revise the Constitution to eliminate the position of Prime 
Minister in favor of a strong President (Daneshkhu, May 4, 1989, Fazel, April 20, 1989, 
Milani, 1993). Although he was careful not to take unpopular public positions, Rafsanjani 
was, from the early post-revolutionary days, relatively sympathetic to the needs of the 
private sector, perhaps as a result of his early exposure to it through his family’s pistachio 
business (Daneshkhu, July 29, 1989: 164-5, Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-Amooee, 
2003). As men like Roghani-Zanjani and Nourbakhsh began to feel alienated by 
Musavi’s socialist economic vision, they were heartened to find that Rafsanjani shared 
many of their views particularly as regarded the post-war plan for reconstruction.  
Despite his reservations, Musavi, did not block or oppose the plan outright
30
. PBO 
planners, intent to ensure the plan’s passage through the majles, began reaching out to 
lawmakers to involve them in the process, address their concerns early on, and engender 
a sense of ownership in the final product. With Rafsanjani’s guidance, a committee of 
lawmakers was formed to work with the government to review the PBO’s proposed draft 
(Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 167). PBO planners have noted with some 
pride that their many meetings with this committee served not only to smooth passage of 
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 He and sympathetic members of his cabinet did, however, slow the Plan’s progress down so as to ensure 
that its implementation would not begin until well after their term in office had ended. See:  Sahabi, and 
Ahmadi-Amooee. Eghtesad-E Siyasi-E Jomhuri-E Islami. 
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the five-year plan but also provided an opportunity to educate more of the country’s elite 
as to the fundamentals of market economics (Anonymous, August 9 and August 16, 
2006, Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003:268).  
1989 was another watershed year for the Islamic Republic. The revolution’s 
spiritual and political leader Ruhollah Khomeini died in June of a heart attack. Shortly 
thereafter, Ali Khamene’i, the decidedly uncharismatic president with questionable 
religious qualifications was named the new Supreme Leader (Mallet, June 5, 1989). 
Following the dictates of the revised constitution, Musavi left office as Iran’s last Prime 
Minister and Rafsanjani was elected in an expedited election to the newly strengthened 
presidency with 94.5% of the vote (Gowers, July 31, 1989).  
In his inaugural address to the nation, Mr. Rafsanjani publicly declared that 
rebuilding the economy was his top priority and that some revolutionary ideals might 
have to be de-emphasized toward this end as “dams cannot be built by slogans” (Tyler, 
August 18, 1989). He also served notice that hardline Leftists would be expected to drop 
their opposition to his reform measures given that the landslide results of the election 
gave him a broad mandate to carry forward with his proposed economic plans. “If the 
people wanted something other than this, they would not have voted for me” (Tyler, 
August 18, 1989). Further indications of Rafsanjani’s new direction could be seen in his 
cabinet choices. Dr. Mohsen Nourbakhsh replaced his nemesis at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs where he declared his goals to be the review of Iran’s multiple exchange rate 
system as well as the boosting of Iran’s non-oil exports (Daneshkhu and Gowers, August 
31, 1989, Nourbakhsh and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003). Dr. Mohammad Hossein Adeli, who 
has a double PhD in Economics and Business Administration from the University of 
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California was chosen to head the Central Bank (Adeli and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003). 
With the retention of Roghani-Zanjani at the PBO, all three major organs of economic 
policymaking were now under the management of economists committed to reducing 
government controls over the economy, encouraging private and even foreign investment, 
and supporting employment and export-generating private sector activities.  
The next two chapters discuss the successes and failures of this team’s reform 
program over the following sixteen years. Before doing so, however, the following 
section considers and explores how and why a group of pro-market, Western-oriented 
economists who had once been viewed with such suspicion were able to convince the 
leaders of the Islamic Republic to end a war, launch a population control program, and 
initiate a Five-Year Development Plan designed to reverse many of the economic policy 
decisions made since the revolution. 
Economists in the Islamic Republic: Why the turnaround? 
When Musa Khayyer closed down the Plan and Budget Organization and sent its 
economists and technocrats home, he demonstrated that the Islamic Republic had little 
value for the type of expertise they might bring to policy matters. Less than a decade 
later, however, economists were informing and guiding policy decisions on a broad range 
of matters some of which went beyond their traditional purview. How did this change 
occur and how does it inform political scientists’ understanding of when and where 
policy experts are likely to have influence? 
The most striking and obvious feature of the early post-revolutionary period was 
the wholesale rejection of any and all things associated with the former regime or with 
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models of governance perceived to be Western in origin. Whereas the Iran of the 50s, 
60s, and 70s had, as might be predicted by scholars of mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983), actively sought to model itself on powerful Western nations in which 
economists and technocrats held prominent policy advising roles, the Islamic Republic, 
lacking any models of Shiite Islamic governance to follow, was struggling to forge an 
entirely new approach to governance. Many questions—long resolved in the West—had 
to be grappled with. To what extent, for example, should imperfect humans attempt to 
plan for tomorrow (often the economists’ ultimate purpose) in a nation that is supposed to 
be guided by God himself?  To what extent are economists capable of presenting 
dispassionate ‘truth’ versus a pale version of it colored by ideology, belief, and perhaps 
ulterior motives? To what extent should economic growth be a goal of policy in the 
Islamic Republic? The Iranian case highlights an important factor that is not addressed by 
many studies of mimetic isomorphism. Specifically, the importance of perceived cultural 
similarity as a mediating variable between the example set by successful states and their 
emulation by developing countries. The United States’ position as the most economically 
and militarily successful state in the system was not changed by the Iranian revolution. 
Instead, Iranian perceptions of the extent to which the U.S. and the West represented a 
model worthy of emulation had changed. As a result, post-revolutionary Iran’s 
relationship with its economists changed drastically as well. 
Functionalist accounts of technocratic power emphasize the way that uncertainty 
arising from modernization causes leaders to turn to experts to help them interpret an 
increasingly complex world. Given the long-term and uni-directional view of such 
accounts, they are not particularly useful in understanding why Iranian economists would 
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have lost their positions of power so suddenly only to regain them in a few years time. 
Closely related Epistemic Communities approaches are perhaps more useful. Scholars of 
epistemic communities examine the way that scientists or experts with shared causal 
beliefs and normative values work toward common policy goals by informing the 
interests and beliefs of the state they serve. Such experts are expected to be more likely to 
gain the attention and/or trust of government leaders when a crisis or other unexpected 
shock to the system renders them more open to new interpretations of what caused the 
crisis, what the state’s interests are or should be, what policy options are available, and 
what new institutions might be necessary to carry them forward (Haas, 1992: 14). 
Political leaders are expected to be particularly amenable to expert influence in those 
areas for which they have few preconceived ideas or when the advice they receive is a 
good fit with core beliefs they already hold (Haas, 1992: 29). 
The revolution and the war with Iraq drained Iran of both resources and morale. 
1987 and 1988 were extremely difficult years in which the gap between revenues and 
urgent expenditures was often met by printing additional currency resulting in inflation of 
close to 30% despite government price controls (Amuzegar, 1993: 91-92, Daneshkhu, 
May 13, 1988: 173, Gowers, July 13, 1988, Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-Amooee, 
2003, World Bank Development Indicators, 2012). In interviews and articles a number of 
economists have suggested that conditions were so bad that government leaders were 
more open to considering pro-capitalist and pro-market policies that were once 
stigmatized by their association with the former regime (Anonymous, August 9 and 
August 16, 2006, Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 273-77, Roghani-Zanjani and 
Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 205). Given Rafsanjani’s prior direct experiences in the private 
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sector, he may have been particularly inclined to blame the Leftist and interventionist 
policies of the revolution’s first decade for the economic difficulties the country was 
facing. As such, pro-market economists were well-placed to promote new interpretation 
of the reasons for the economic crisis as well as policy prescriptions for how conditions 
might be improved. 
Indeed, the epistemic community of pro-market economists in Iran was not a 
passive actor in the contest for new interpretations of the economic crisis. Accounts of 
these economists and technocrats in interviews and articles highlight their active and 
concerted efforts to educate and influence their leaders. Economists at the PBO for 
example gained a reputation for being so persuasive that the economic views of whoever 
was selected to head the organization were basically irrelevant as the new chief would 
sooner or later gravitate toward position of the individuals he was sent to manage (Nili 
and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 265). As described earlier in this chapter, economists also 
actively sought to influence the dialogue and views of political leaders by, among other 
things, controlling the agenda of meetings of the Economic Council, and holding 
countless meetings with majles leaders, clerics from Qom, and other cabinet members.  
Political Interest Group analyses highlight the way that experts mobilize political 
power to influence policy decisions. Such analyses might look, for example, for a strong 
political party or popular movement to explain the sudden re-emergence or prominence 
of economists. In the case of post-revolutionary Iran, economists were very closely 
associated with Rafsanjani’s economic plans which may indeed have contributed to his 
popularity with Iranians desperate for improved conditions. Another example of overt 
political activity can be found in the case of Dr. Nourbakhsh who after being dismissed 
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from the Central Bank in 1985, along with a few like-minded friends, run successfully for 
parliament and sought to influence economic policy-making from its Planning and 
Economics committees (Nourbakhsh and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003:89-90).  
The need for international resources has been noted to render a country desperate 
for grants or loans more likely to recruit and promote those economists or experts capable 
of inspiring the confidence of the often-similarly-educated men and women controlling 
the purse strings of the international financial and donor insitutions. Within this analytic 
framework, Iran’s expulsion of foreign-educated economists from the PBO might be seen 
as related to its rejection of financial ties to the international community. Whereas the 
Shah was generally happy to take on additional debt to fund his military or development 
projects, IRI leaders initially shunned international loans as the gateway to a dependent 
economy anathema to the self-sufficiency they were striving for. Despite the hardships of 
the revolution and war, Iran’s new leaders were determined to pay off the country’s debts 
as quickly as possible and by 1989 Iran owed only $500 million worth of long-term debt. 
During this time period when loans were not desired but despised, economists may have 
had less to offer. 
Rafsanjani, however, clearly made the case that desperately needed investments in 
oil wells and other aspects of Iran’s revenue-generating industry could not be made 
without foreign investment as domestic sources of funding were lacking. Having obtained 
parliamentary approval for foreign loans proposed in the successfully passed 
Development Plan, Rafsanjani assembled a team that could help him achieve his goals. 
The choice of Dr. Adeli and Dr. Nourbakhsh, both University of California-educated 
economists, to head the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance might very well have 
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resulted from calculations regarding their ability to develop relationships with the 
international investors and financial institutions to which Iran would now turn for 
funding. Indeed, in discussing the reasons for Adeli’s appointment despite his relative 
inexperience, Nourbakhsh has explicitly noted Adeli’s ability to develop and maintain 
friendly relationships with foreign investors that would help them feel more comfortable 
about investing in and offering favorable loan terms to Iran (Nourbakhsh and Ahmadi-
Amooee, 2003: 105-06). Theories of coercive and mimetic isomorphism seem, therefore, 
to be relevant to understanding the experiences of Iranian economists and technocrats in 
both the pre and post –revolutionary periods. 
In sum, during this period, a number of variables affected the extent to which 
economist’s views gained influence over economic policy. In the immediate post-
revolutionary environment, rejection of the Shah’s Western model of governance resulted 
in a general distrust of economists capabilities and intentions. The severing of financial 
ties with international investors and financial institutions further reduced valuations of 
economists’ utility. As the Iraq war and economic mismanagement began to bite, 
however, the country’s leaders become more open to re-evaluating the Leftist policies 
that they had heretofore been following. During this time, economists themselves worked 
actively to reassert their dominance over the policymaking process by promoting their 
views with popular politicians and entering politics directly by running for seats in the 
legislature. The literature on mimetic and coercive isomorphism, functionalism, epistemic 
communities, and political interest groups are all very useful, therefore in understanding 
the variable power of economists during this time period.  
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Chapter Six: The Rafsanjani Years (1989-1997) 
The ascension of Hashemi Rafsanjani to the presidency marked a new era for the 
Islamic Republic. The death of Khomeini was expected to moderate the country’s 
ideological zeal and allow for better diplomatic and economic relations with other 
countries. The end of the Iraq war would free up resources for investment and 
development. And the constitutional changes that eliminated the post of Prime Minister 
had removed Mir Hussein Musavi and his Leftist supporters from power. With the 
breakup of the Soviet Union providing further confirmation of the superiority of free 
market methods, the way seemed to be clear for the economists and technocrats 
surrounding Rafsanjani to implement a structural adjustment program that would 
eliminate distortions in the markets for goods and foreign exchange, increase capital and 
infrastructure investments, and raise growth rates to improve standards of living and 
reduce unemployment. 
Rafsanjani and his team were in a hurry. In separate interviews, the new cabinet’s 
Minister of Finance Mohsen Nourbakhsh, PBO head Mas’oud Roghani-Zanjani and 
Central Bank President Hussein Adeli have all spoken of the immense pressure they felt 
to speedily deliver the peace dividend demanded by a population long weary of the 
sacrifices required during the war years (Adeli and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 448, 
Nourbakhsh and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 103, Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-Amooee, 





 and were eager to make good on Rafsanjani’s campaign promises to 
rebuild the nation. Rafsanjani further intensified the pressure by pushing to move forward 
with investments and reforms as speedily as possible. While the five year plan 
anticipated, for example, that 70% of factory capacity utilization would be achieved in 
five years, Rafsanjani upon taking office pushed for the goal to be 100% factory capacity 
utilization within just one year (Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 310)!  
The First Five Year Plan 
Expected to coordinate their activities in this regard was the new regime’s first 
Five Year Development Plan (Supplement: Translation of the Five Year Development 
Plan, 1990). Written and approved by the cabinet before Rafsanjani took office, the 
plan’s pro-market orientation had so dismayed Prime Minister Musavi that he delayed its 
introduction to parliament so as to avoid any responsibility for implementation (Nili and 
Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 277, Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 166). The 
overall goal of the plan was to achieve high rates of economic growth through investment 
in the country’s industrial and energy sectors designed to rehabilitate damaged factories, 
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 Roghani Zanjani has said that “any educated or intellectual Iranian,  any businessperson or student that 
went to one of these countries was saddened and upset by the extent to which they had progressed ahead 
of Iran. Before the revolutions, the Turks and the Arab’s were all behind us [in terms of economic 
development]” See: Nili, Mas'oud, and interviewed by Bahman Ahmadi-Amooee. (2003) Eghtesad-E 
Siaysi-E Jomhuri-E Islami. Tehran, Iran: Gam-e No, Nourbakhsh, Mohsen, and interviewed by Bahman 
Ahmadi-Amooee. (2003) Eghtesad-E Siyasi-E Jomhuri-E Islami. Tehran, Iran: Gam-e No. 
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 For an analysis of changes in Iran’s pre and post revolutionary GDP per capita as compared with that of 
comparably-sized economies Korea and Turkey, see Hassan Hakimian and Massoud Karshenas, 
“Dilemmas and Prospects for Economic Reform and Reconstruction in Iran,” in The Economy of Iran: 
Dilemmas of an Islamic State edited by Parvin Alizadeh, I.B. Tauris, 2000. 
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maximize utilization of existing capacity and increase oil production. The plan 
represented a significant departure from earlier policies in a number of ways including:  
Shift in emphasis away from agriculture and toward industry / manufacturing. 
One of the chief criticisms of the Shah’s economic policies was that they neglected rural 
needs and interests and favored large mechanized agro-industrial concerns over those of 
small and medium-sized farmers. During the first post-revolutionary decade, government 
officials sought to rectify this by dismantling the large agro-businesses and introducing a 
variety of programs and subsidies designed to support the activities of the smaller 
farmers
33
. The result was an annual increase in total farm output of  5-6% between 1981 
and 1990 and an increase in agricultural value-added of 55% from 1980 to 1988 
(Alizadeh, 2000: 3, Amuzegar, 1992: 418-19, WorldBank, 1991: 41, WorldBank, 1991: 
7).  
The new five year plan represented a reversal of these policies.  Priority was 
placed on investments in industry and manufacturing to repair and restart factories and oil 
production facilities left idle by war damage and/or lack of parts and materials. As a 
result of these investments, the Five Year Plan projected annual growth rates of 8.1% for 
agriculture compared with 15% for Manufacturing and Mining over the 1989-93 period 
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 The costs of fertilizers and agricultural machinery, for example, were greatly subsidized, while 
guaranteed prices were established for farm crops. Banks were instructed to prioritize agriculture projects 
for loans. For additional information on government support activities in the 1980s see page 112 in 
Roghani-Zanjani, Masood, and interviewed by Bahman Ahmadi-Amooee. (2003) Eghtesad-E Siyasi-E 
Jomhuri-E Islami. Tehran, Iran: Gam-e No.  And chapter 4 in Amuzegar, Jahangir. (1993) Iran's 
Economy under the Islamic Republic. New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. 
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so that the share of agriculture in GDP was expected to decrease while that of 
manufacturing would increase (Amuzegar, 1993: 130, WorldBank, 1991: 25-26). 
Shrinking the government budget and public sector. The first decade after the 
revolution saw the speedy expansion of government and proliferation of subsidies and 
price controls that greatly augmented the fiscal burden. The new Five Year Plan aimed to 
reduce this burden and shrink government. Market distorting subsidies and price controls 
were slated for elimination and user fees for utilities were to be increased. A new tax 
system was designed to simplify the tax code, eliminate overly-generous tax exemptions, 
increase taxes, and improve collection so that revenues would grow from 3.3% of GDP in 
1988 to 8.8% in 1993. Some activities and services (education and training, for example) 
were to be shifted to the private sector. State-owned enterprises were to be made more 
efficient and the number of government employees was to be reduced. In this manner, 
budgetary expenditures relative to GDP were projected to fall to 17.3% (Amuzegar, 
1993: 130, 35, Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 292 - 93, Supplement: Translation of the 
Five Year Development Plan, 1990: 11, WorldBank, 1991).  
Foreign Investment. Given the Islamic Republic’s anti-Western orientation as 
well as its obsession with maintaining independence, foreign loans and/or investments 
were so taboo that they were not considered an option even during the most difficult 
years of war. As a result, Iran was in 1991 found by the World Bank to have “an 
exceptionally low level of external debt relative to its income and exports” (WorldBank, 
1991: Executive Summary). After a great deal of debate and discussion, PBO analysts 
succeeded in convincing cabinet members and majlis deputies that in the absence of 
domestic resources, accepting foreign monies was the only way to make desperately 
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needed growth-generating investments (Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 273). 
Ultimately, allowance for foreign financing of up to $27.4  billion ($10 billion for joint 
ventures; $17 billion for borrowing) was included in the plan (Amuzegar, 1993: 129, 
Supplement: Translation of the Five Year Development Plan, 1990: page 4). 
Beyond the Plan 
Despite the Plan’s provisions for these and other liberalization measures, when 
Rafsanjani took office, the general consensus among his economic policy advisors was 
that it did not go far enough (Anonymous, July 31, 2006)
34
. The new team set about 
making revisions and/or promoting new interpretations of the text that would allow for 
the additional reforms they had in mind. Two significant initiatives in this regard were 
the privatization of state owned enterprises and the revaluation and unification of the 
exchange rate. 
Privatization. 
The post-revolutionary Iranian government was somewhat unique in the extent to 
which it owned and controlled the country’s means of production without explicitly 
espousing or aligning itself with Communist or even Socialist philosophies. In the 
aftermath of the revolution, the country’s banks, insurance companies, and large 
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 Some have claimed that the primary impetus behind the decision to push for additional reforms came 
from the IMF and World Bank whose conditions for loans included exchange rate reform and divestment 
of SOE’s (Farzin, 1995, Amirahmadi, 1996). Most of the individuals, however, that were actively 
involved in crafting Iran’s economic policy at the time deny that the international financial institutions 




manufacturing enterprises were nationalized outright while smaller operations fell into 
government hands through bankruptcies or abandonment by owners and managers fleeing 
the country (Alizadeh, 2000, Anonymous, August 3, 2006, Ibrahim, July 6, 1979: 3-4). 
Most of these companies did not do particularly well under government management and 
privatization was believed to be a way to increase efficiency and profitability, reduce the 
drain on the budget, and contribute to Rafsanjani’s goals regarding economic growth 
(Matthews, February 8, 1993, Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 299, Roghani-Zanjani 
and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 222). 
A framework for the process of privatization was developed at the Plan and 
Budget Organization where a team was assembled to study the relevant experiences of 
other countries and use them to develop a list of criteria by which the suitability for sale 
of a given company might be determined. Using these criteria in combination with 
consultations with relevant ministers, managers, and other stakeholders, a list of state 
owned companies slated for sale was created. Divestiture was to occur through one of 
three different approaches. The first and preferred method was the sale of shares through 
the Tehran Stock Exchange. A large number of companies were not eligible for this 
method, however, due to the TSE’s strict reporting and profitability requirements. For 
such cases, sale by way of auction or—in the absence of multiple offers—direct 
negotiation was permitted (Anonymous, August 3, 2006, Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 
2003: 298-301, Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 221-24). 
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Exchange Rate Policy 
Shortly after the revolution, exchange rate controls were introduced in the Islamic 
Republic as part of an effort to stem capital flight associated with the exodus of well-
heeled individuals leaving the country. As the government refused to adjust the 70 rial/$ 
rate
35
 to reflect new demand conditions, a black market in currency was swiftly born with 
rates that rapidly diverged to, by 1988, nearly 20 times below the official rate (IMF, 
2008, WorldBank, 1991: iii). During the 80s a variety of additional exchange rates were 
introduced ostensibly to promote, protect, or provide benefits to various sectors of the 
economy (exporters, military) and/or population (poor). By the time the Rafsanjani team 
took over, 7-12 different currency rates were in operation while the bulk of transactions 
still took place at the official rate of close to 70 rials per dollar (Amuzegar, 1993, IMF, 
2008: 164, WorldBank, 1991). 
The reasons for government insistence on maintaining an overvalued exchange 
rate for so long are not entirely clear and have been vigorously debated. Some have 
argued that resistance to devaluation was spearheaded by powerful bazaar merchants that 
enjoyed close ties to the ruling elite and reaped handsome profits from their access to 
preferential exchange rate (Lautenschlager, 1986). Others have countered that the 
government’s policy stemmed primarily from concerns about the potentially deleterious 
impact of exchange rate unification upon industry (Behdad, 1988). Still others have said 
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 For political and symbolic reasons, in 1981, the Iranian government began announcing rial rates relative 
to the IMF’s SDRs rather than dollars. Translated to dollars, however, throughout the 80’s,the official 
exchange rate varied between 70 and 91 rials per dollar.  
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that the primary reason for this position was the new regime’s misguided concerns about 
and commitment to defending the rial’s value as an end in itself (Nili and Ahmadi-
Amooee, 2003: 244). Whatever the reasons, Prime Minister Musavi was unwilling to 
even discuss the possibility of exchange rate devaluation or unification (Nili and Ahmadi-
Amooee, 2003: 293). The authors of the plan, therefore, well aware of Rafsanjani’s 
sympathies as well as his practically-guaranteed ascension to the presidency, included 
language stating that foreign exchange policy would be up to the president and the 
executive branch to determine. Upon taking office, Rafsanjani instructed the Central bank 
to draw up plans for implementation of exchange rate adjustment. 
Implementing the Plan—Initial Success 
In keeping with their sense of urgency, Rafsanjani’s team began implementing 
parts of the First Five Year Plan before it was even formally approved by Parliament and 
the Council of Guardians in January 1990 (WorldBank, 1991: iii). On the exchange rate, 
for example, in October 1989 the government took a step toward devaluation by 
announcing a new ‘competitive’ rate of 1,000 rials to the dollar (compared to the official 
rate of 70 rials and a free market rate of 1,150 rials per dollar) at which unrestricted 
access to dollars would be made available to the public sector (Fazel, October 11, 1989, 
Fazel, December 5, 1989). By mid-1991, four of the seven available exchange rates were 
eliminated. The three remaining were the ‘official’ rate of 70 rials per dollar, the 
competitive rate now 600 rials per dollar and the floating rate of 1350-1400 rials per 
dollar. At the same time, over 100 items previously eligible for import at the ‘official’ 
rate were shifted to the competitive rate so that only 32 items (including, for example: 
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basic foods, fertilizers, education supplies, and national development project inputs) 
remained available for import at the official rate; 247 items (primarily industrial raw 
materials) were eligible for import at the competitive rate; while all other goods were 
imported at the floating rate. Exporters, furthermore, were no longer required to exchange 
foreign currency earnings at the ‘official’ rate but could retain or exchange whatever 
portion of earnings they preferred at the floating rate (Adeli and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 
482-3, Daneshkhu, January 21, 1991, WorldBank, 1991).  In the spring of 1993, the 
exchange rate was unified, devalued, and made fully convertible at a rate of 1538 rials 
per dollar (Farzin, 1995, Najafi and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 401, Reuters, April 15, 
1993). Additional measures to mitigate price distortions during this time included the 
elimination of price controls from all but 22 items (as compared with 296 items 
previously controlled), disbanding of price control courts, simplification and 
rationalization of government procurement and guaranteed prices for agricultural 
products, and significant increases in rates charged for public utilities (Field, April 10, 
1992, WorldBank, 1991). 
Privatization also proceeded speedily. By mid-1991, a total of 700 public 
companies were being considered for sale, 250 of which had already been approved by 
the cabinet. By early 1992 at least seventy companies had shares sold on the 
reinvigorated Tehran Stock Exchange. Proceeds from such sales were used by divesting 
Ministries to complete projects or invest in other state owned enterprises they managed 




Plans to seek foreign financing through loans and investments also moved 
forward. Domestically, the Rafsanjani team worked with the parliament and Guardians 
Council to negotiate a series of increases in the ownership stake allowed for foreign joint 
venture partners (Daneshkhu, May 8, 1992, Daneshkhu, March 7, 1991). Rafsanjani 
worked to tap into the wealth and skills of Diaspora Iranians and even encourage them to 
return (Chronology April 16, 1991-July 15, 1991, 1991, Daneshkhu, May 3, 1990, 
Mallet, November 17, 1989). Through a series of conferences and other international 
business events, Iranian officials sought to present Iran as an attractive investment 
opportunity available to all outsiders including those from the United States, and 
excepting on Israel and apartheid South Africa (Chronology April 16, 1991-July 15, 
1991, 1991, Daneshkhu, March 15, 1991, Hargreaves, May 28, 1991). While Iranian 
officials were perhaps disappointed that a flood of new deals did not ensue, a number of 
joint projects were initiated, among them an automobile production venture with French 
car maker Renault, an aluminum smelter project conducted with the International 
Development Corporation of Dubai, and several energy projects with oil companies Elf 
Aquitaine, Total, and Agip (Dawkins, November 24, 1990, Field, March 26, 1992, 
Hargreaves, May 30, 1991). Iranian officials were also successful in negotiating and 
meeting strict conditions for the first post-revolutionary World Bank loan of 250 million 
dollars for earthquake relief (Adeli and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 459, Barber, March 16, 
1991, Dunne, October 3, 1990). 
In addition to these major efforts, the Rafsanjani team designed and implemented 
a new income and value added tax system, initiated investments in a number of 
infrastructure and energy projects and simplified and liberalized the country’s foreign 
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trade regulations. Before long the fruits of these combined efforts were reflected in a 
number of the country’s economic indicators. Non-oil exports doubled; growth rates 
recovered rapidly from -6.3% in 1988 to 6.2% in 1989, and 13.7% in 1990; and inflation 
dropped from 29% in 1988 to 10% in 1990 (IMF, 2008).  
Complementing and supporting these economic reform activities were political 
trends and events in the domestic and international arenas that strengthened Rafsanjani’s 
hand vis-à-vis his Leftist political opponents and eased Iran’s reintegration into the world 
economy. In the 1990 elections for the powerful Assembly of Experts
36
, candidate 
eligibility rules were altered in ways that prevented a number of well-known Leftists and 
Radicals from participating and resulted in an Assembly much more sympathetic to the 
economic reform program (Daneshkhu, November 20, 1990, Daneshkhu, October 9, 
1990). Rafsanjani opponents were further sidelined after the 1992 Parliamentary election 
in which the President’s allies did extremely well, succeeding in controlling about three-
quarters of the body’s seats (Barraclough, May 12, 1992, Walker and Fazel, May 11, 
1992). 
In the international arena, Rafsanjani treaded carefully, hopeful that financial 
markets would respond favorably to demonstrations of stability and peaceful intent. The 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait provided a gift-wrapped opportunity to demonstrate that Iran 
was also a victim and not the aggressor during its 8-year war with Iraq. Iran’s tacit 
                                                 
36
 The Assembly of Experts is an 83-man assembly that is elected every eight years. Its two primary 
functions are to interpret the constitution and select and review the performance of the Supreme Leader. 
See: WorldBank. (1991) Iran: Reconstruction and Economic Growth Volume Two. edited by Country 
Department III; Europe Country Operations Division, Middle East and North Africa Region. Washington, 
DC: The World Bank.. 
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approval of the U.S. led coalition to free Kuwait created further opportunities to improve 
relations with Gulf countries, the West, and even the United States (Daneshkhu, 
September 11, 1990, Daneshkhu, May 1, 1991, Daneshkhu, December 27, 1990). 
Improved diplomatic relations were followed by increased economic activity in the form 
of credit facilities, trade, and in the case of the United States and France, resolution of 
outstanding obligations (Amuzegar, 1993: 115, Barraclough, May 12, 1992, Daneshkhu, 
November 1, 1990). Iran, like other oil exporters, also benefitted from the spike in oil 
prices resulting from the war which provided much-needed foreign exchange with which 
to finance planned investment projects. 
As the paragraphs above describe, by late 1992 and early 1993, Rafsanjani’s team 
had taken a number of bold steps in implementing an ambitious structural reform 
program that, it was hoped, would continue to transform the country from a government 
controlled, import-substituting and oil dependent economy into a quickly growing, 
market driven export-promoting one. As described in the following section, however, 
domestic and international political pressures combined with the Rafsanjani team’s 
serous mishandling of aspects of the reforms, resulting in a sharp halt and temporary 
reversal of the liberalization program. 
Iran Stumbles  
Given its low levels of debt and stellar credit repayment record even during the 
difficult post-revolutionary and war years, Iran’s economic planners assumed that the 
only barriers to obtaining long-term low-interest loans would be domestic objections to 
indebtedness to the West (Matthews, February 8, 1993). This assumption was shared and 
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reinforced by a 1991 World Bank mission and report that encouraged Iran’s return to 
international credit markets (Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003, WorldBank, 1991). The 
reality, however, was that those countries and institutions capable of large, long-term 
loans were not eager to commit funds to a government they knew little about and had few 
positive associations with. Hussein Adeli, the Central Bank chief charged with 
negotiating such loans rapidly realized that a great deal of time would be required to 
build necessary relationships and educate relevant decision-makers regarding Iran’s new 
reform program and prospects for growth (Adeli and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 460-61, 
Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 203-4).  
Time was not, however, an available luxury. As discussed above, Rafsanjani’s 
team felt a great deal of pressure to get factories and other projects up and running as 
quickly as possible in order to deliver the benefits of increased growth to an impatient 
population and president. The president was extremely frustrated by Adeli’s inability to 
obtain the loans that were expected  and in the meantime gave tacit approval for ministers 
and SOE managers to take advantage of newly relaxed financing rules to take on readily 
available short-term loans or “usance” for their projects (Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-
Amooee, 2003:210-12). Eager to prove their abilities and win favor, the ministers 
responded with great enthusiasm and began an importing spree using such short-term 
loans to obtain necessary parts and raw materials (Amuzegar, 1993: 353, Najafi and 
Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003:400, Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 302). 
As short-term debts were accumulating in this manner, lower than expected 
revenues from oil sales were also becoming a problem. Iran had steadily invested 
significant sums of money to increase oil production from 2.25 million barrels per day in 
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1988 to 3.59 million barrels per day in 1993 (Iran Country Analysis Brief, 2012). Given 
weakening oil prices, however ($16.75 per barrel in 1993), the country was not 
generating the revenues it had expected from these investments. 
As the long-term loans and oil revenues failed to be realized, and as debts were 
coming due, Iran’s economic managers realized with a start that they didn’t have a 
thorough accounting of how much money was owed! As part of its trade liberalization 
program, the Central Bank had dismantled the old system for tracking future foreign 
exchange obligations through import registration requirements when it started allowing 
banks to open unlimited letters of credit for importers. It had neglected, however, to 
create a new system to take its place
37
 (Amuzegar, 1993: 113 & 353, Anonymous, 
August 18, 2006, Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 213-15). By the time 
officials managed to compile accurate data, debts had mushroomed to the point that the 
international financial community had become well aware of the problem and was 
become extremely wary of any further lending. In February 1993, the Financial Times 
wrote “…the alarm bells are ringing in all the leading export credit guarantee agencies of 
the inustrialised world. What had been nervousness six months ago has now developed 
into deep concern and the strong possibility exists that one of the biggest agencies could 
soon remove cover for Iran” (Matthews, February 8, 1993). By 1993/4, the country’s 
debts peaked at $23 billion (Amuzegar, 1993: 349, Hakimian and Karshenas, 2000: 50, 
                                                 
37
 A minister in the Rafsanjani cabinet shared a story of his embarrassment when prior to a meeting with his 
counter part in Turkey, the Central Bank indicated that it did not know how much Iran owed Turkey and 
asked the minister to ask his counterpart for this information instead! Daneshkhu, Scheherazade. October 
9, 1990 Rafsanjani Supporters Force out Radical Opponents. Financial Times. 
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IMF, 1998, Matthews, April 20, 1994). Strictly speaking, this was not an unmanageable 
amount of debt—Iran was not even to be found among a list of the top twenty highest 
indebted countries in 1993 (Anonymous, September 3, 2006, Hakimian and Karshenas, 
2000: 51). The problem was that 75% of Iran’s debt was short-term and the United States 
was determined to block or slow debt rescheduling that might have given Iran some 
breathing room (Adeli and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 467, Anonymous, August 9 and 
August 16, 2006, IMF, 2008, Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 314). Ultimately, the 
Rafsanjani team was forced to slam the brakes on its investment program and reestablish 
import controls and austerity measures that undermined liberalization efforts. It also 
engaged in a flurry of ultimately successful negotiations to reschedule debts which were 
steadily repaid over the following years (Daneshkhu, October 5, 1994, IMF, 1998).  
In addition to disrupting the country’s investment program, the debt crisis 
undermined the effort to unify and devalue the exchange rate. While Rafsanjani and his 
team were committed to eliminating the price distortions and corruption associated with 
an overvalued and multiple exchange rate, they were also extremely concerned about the 
impact of a rapid devaluation on the fortunes of public and private sector businesses that 
would be forced to import raw materials at higher prices. They were determined, 
therefore to maintain the rial’s value close to the level introduced in the March/April 
1993 devaluation. As the extent of the debt crisis became clear, however, speculators and 
currency traders concluded that the government would soon run out of foreign exchange 
and be forced to either abandon the exchange rate it was trying to defend or stop selling 
dollars. As such, they began purchasing as many dollars as possible in an effort to get 
their share before the window was closed (Adeli and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 490, 
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Anonymous, August 14, 2006, Hakimian and Karshenas, 2000, Najafi and Ahmadi-
Amooee, 2003: 401).  
Under speculative attack and needing to preserve its dollars to repay debt, the 
government—as predicted—began backpedaling. By December 1993, unlimited foreign 
currency sales were terminated. In May 1994, a multi-tier exchange rate was reintroduced 
when Adeli announced that state banks would offer dollars for about 2,650 rials for 
certain imports alongside the official selling rate of 1,750 (Reuters, May 5, 1994). The 
following year, as the rial continued to slide, the Central Bank imposed a fixed 
commercial trade rate of 3,000 rials per dollar alongside the official rate and reinstated 
exports surrender and repatriation requirements (IMF, 1998). Rafsanjani vowed to “crack 
down on speculators and profiteers who…were collaborating with the US and Israel to 
undermine the country’s rial currency” and authorities began arresting illegal sidewalk 
money changers(Anonymous, August 14, 2006) (Amuzegar, 1993, Corzine and 
Daneshkhu, May 24, 1995, Reuters, May 10, 1995).   
The privatization program also foundered. Given the small size of the private 
sector, finding buyers was a serious challenge. Attempts to encourage foreign investors or 
potential purchasers within the Iranian Diaspora yielded little interest (Roghani-Zanjani 
and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 208-9). Many of the companies approved for sale were not 
eligible to be introduced on the stock market due to the TSE’s accounting and 
profitability requirements. Given the vague guidelines for privatization, ministers had a 
great deal of leeway to proceed through other sales methods. Some ministers sought to 
sell to the company’s managers and /or employees and tried to bring prices down to 
levels affordable to them (Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 223). Other 
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ministers began responding to expressions of interest from successful businesspeople or 
acquaintances that they felt could guide the companies to profitability. Outsiders and 
political opponents, however, raised concerns about possibly corrupt sales to friends and 
acquaintances at sweetheart prices (Anonymous, July 24, 2006, Nili and Ahmadi-
Amooee, 2003: 298, Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 223). Made timid by 
fears of such accusations as well as possible legal ramifications, ministers stopped trying 
to sell SOEs altogether and the privatization program came to an abrupt halt 
(Anonymous, August 3, 2006, Anonymous, August 2, 2006, Daneshkhu and Tett, 
February 28, 1995, Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003).  
The Rafsanjani team began to experience sustained political pressure to reverse or 
repeal many of their reforms. Contrary to expectations, the routing of traditional Leftists 
in Parliamentary and Experts Assembly elections did not result in a docile legislative and 
political body. The bazaar merchants who had originally supported Rafsanjani and his 
pro-private sector policies began objecting when his reforms threatened rents and other 
privileges of the distorted economy (Adeli and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 492, 
Anonymous, September 3, 2006, Tabibian and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2007: 82). The 
Supreme Leader Khamenei, perhaps sensing an opportunity to assert his own authority, 
encouraged these groups and began criticizing aspects of the reform program in his 
public speeches (Chronology April 16, 1992-July 15, 1992, 1992, Matthews, February 8, 
1993). In June 1993, Rafsanjani was elected to a second term as president with a much 
lower 63.2 percent of the vote—compared with 94.5 percent in the 1989 election 
(Reuters, June 14, 1993). In a display of its ire over the reform program, the parliament 
refused to approve the re-appointment of Mohsen Nourbasksh—one of the chief 
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architects of the reform program—to the Finance Ministry (Mosteshar, August 17, 1993). 
It also, over Rafsanjani’s objections, decided to delay implementation of the new Second 
Development Plan for a year in order to evaluate the successes and failures of the First 
Plan (Amirahmadi, 1996, Amuzegar, 1993: 351, Amuzegar, 2001, Daneshkhu, January 
26, 1994, Reuters, August 9, 1994).  
The Second Development Plan 
All things considered, the First Plan was no small accomplishment. By the end of 
the plan period, economic growth had improved dramatically as investments in 
infrastructure and capital began to pay off and the country was well on the path toward 
recovery from the damages incurred by the revolution and war. Unfortunately, however, 
major portions of the structural adjustment program intended to mitigate the 
government’s suffocating presence in the economy failed when the exchange rate reform 
and privatization programs were abandoned. Even worse, the debt crisis and other 
problems caused some to question the wisdom of the reform program altogether 
(Amuzegar, 1993: 352, Anonymous, August 9 and August 16, 2006, Najafi and Ahmadi-
Amooee, 2003: 400 & 03).  
The Second Development Plan was written by Muhammad Tabibian who had 
been persuaded to return to the PBO after a year-long fellowship at Stanford 
(Anonymous, September 3, 2006, Tabibian and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2007). The Second 
Plan was somewhat more modest and realistic in its growth goals (5.1% average annual 
growth) than the First Plan (8.2%) (IMF, 1998: 49, WorldBank, 1991: 26). Otherwise, 
however, the intent was to continue the structural reforms initiated during the First Plan 
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period. Major goals included: unification and convertibility of a managed floating 
exchange rate system; reduction of the size of government through mergers of 
overlapping bureaucracies, privatization, and the transfer of services to municipalities or 
private groups; increases in market efficiency through reduction of price distortions, 
increased competition and elimination of monopolies; deregulation of trade; decreases in 
unemployment and inflation; and continued support for family planning programs 
designed to slow population growth (Amuzegar, 2001:30-31, IMF, 1998: Appendix I, 
Law for the Second Plan for Economic, Social, and Cultural Development in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 1998).  
Much of the enthusiasm for the most dramatic reforms had been lost, however. 
Having been burned by the backlash he experienced during his first term in office, 
Rafsanjani decided to focus his efforts on safer activities such as increasing overall 
investment and GDP growth without regard to structural reforms that would remove 
market distortions along with associated rents and adjust the relative sizes of the public 
and private sectors (Anonymous, August 9 and August 16, 2006, Najafi and Ahmadi-
Amooee, 2003: 205, Roghani-Zanjani and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 229). Several of his 
most vocal and controversial pro-reform advisors and ministers were let go including 
Hussein Adeli, the American-trained economist and architect of the Central Bank’s failed 
exchange rate unification program, and Mohammad Tabibian and Masoud Roghani-
Zanjani, both economists at the Plan and Budget Organization  (Anonymous, February 
22, 2009).  
Instead, Rafsanjani turned his attention to building a political coalition that, once 
strengthened, might be able to implement the types of economic reforms that the country 
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needed. In January 1996, the formation of a new political group, the Servants of 
Construction or Kargozaran-e Sazandegi, was announced. Although Rafsanjani was not 
formally associated with the group, its sixteen founding members included ten cabinet 
ministers, four vice presidents, the mayor of Tehran Gholamhussein Karbaschi, and the 
governor of the central bank. The group announced its support for Rafsanjani’s policies 
of reform and reconstruction and was generally seen as a technocratic alternative to 
extant political parties that were dominated by the clergy (Anonymous, August 19, 2006). 
In the parliamentary elections held later that year, Kargozaran candidates did surprisingly 
well, gaining 80 seats out of the 270-seat body including a seat for the president’s 
daughter Faezeh Hashemi to represent Tehran (Allen, April 23, 1996, Allen, March 11, 
1996, Fairbanks, 1998). 
Rafsanjani also continued his earlier efforts to engage international interest in 
doing business in Iran. Over the following years, a multitude of trade and economic 
cooperation agreements were signed with various countries and Iran applied to join the 
World Trade Organization (Allen, October 31, 1996, IMF, 1998). Free-trade zones were 
established on Kish Island, Qeshm Island, and the Chahbahar area where foreigners were 
free to travel without visas and invest without restrictions (Reuters, March 18, 1994). 
Restrictions on foreign investment were further relaxed to allow more than 50% foreign 
ownership of joint venture companies and provide additional tax incentives and operating 
rights (Norman, January 30, 1995). In order to circumvent constitutional and political 
constraints barring foreign involvement in developing oil projects through traditional 
production sharing agreements, a ‘buy-back’ mechanism was developed whereby 
companies might make a return through exports from the field they have invested in. 
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Using this formulation, Iran’s first major oil deal was brokered with the American oil 
company Conoco in March 1995 (Salpukas, March 7, 1995).  
Rafsanjani’s efforts in this regard were, however, often frustrated by Iran’s 
continued diplomatic isolation. The Conoco deal was opposed and ultimately blocked by 
the Clinton Administration which issued an executive order in May 1995 imposing 
economic sanctions on Iran and prohibiting U.S. companies from engaging in trade, trade 
financing, or the provision of loans to Iran (Purdum, May 1, 1995, Reuters, May 10, 
1995). The executive order was followed the following year by the Iran Libya Sanctions 
Act (ILSA) designed to punish non-U.S. companies—like, for example, the French 
energy company Total who had benefitted from the dissolution of the Conoco-Iran deal—
for further investments in Iran (Dunne and Corzine, July 25, 1996). While European 
countries cried foul over the extra-territorial nature of ILSA, they also resorted to 
sanctions to register their own displeasure over Iran’s refusal to lift the death sentence 
issued against Salman Rushdie as well as the implication of top Iranian officials in the 
murder of four Kurdish opposition figures in Berlin (Barber, April 30, 1997, Fossli, 
February 1, 1995, Studemann and Barber, April 11, 1997).  
A serious effort toward structural adjustment and economic reform would not be 
initiated again until after the election of President Muhammad Khatami. The surprising 
story of Khatami’s conversion from a Leftist politician to a champion of Washington-
consensus reforms will be told in the following chapter. In the section below, however, 
the experience of economists during the Rafsanjani era is considered and analyzed for 
insights into the conditions under which economists are able to influence the economic 
policy decisions of the governments that they serve. 
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Economists and Rafsanjani 
The role and experiences of economists under Rafsanjani was clearly improved as 
compared with that of the first post-revolutionary decade. No longer were economists 
routinely characterized as treasonous lackeys of the capitalist West or insufficiently 
devout doubters that lacked sufficient faith in God’s will for the nation. Even after a 
reform program they had encouraged resulted in the debt crisis, the right of economists to 
a seat at the policymaking table was not challenged. The extent to which economists were 
able to translate their presence in policymaking circles into actual policy decisions that 
they favored did, however, fluctuate over the time period under consideration. 
Economists had a much freer hand in defining the economic agenda during Rafsanjani’s 
first term than in subsequent years.  
What factors contributed to the different experiences of economists during 
Rafsanjani’s presidency? What insights can a review of these experiences generate into 
the role of expert advisers and the conditions under which they are likely to be called to 
guide the country’s economic policy process? 
Functionalist and Epistemic Communities approaches generally attribute changes 
in expert influence to crises and other unexpected shocks that render political leaders 
more open to new interpretations of the reasons for the crisis, the policy options 
available, and the institutions necessary to carry them forward. (Haas, 1992) As discussed 
in the previous chapter, the 80’s were an extremely difficult decade in which the euphoria 
of a successful revolution was slowly worn away by the grind of war and economic 
hardship. Given the generally Leftist economic policies associated with that decade, 
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political leaders seem to have become more open to considering pro-capitalist and pro-
market policies that were once stigmatized by their association with the Pahlavi regime. 
For the first few years of Rafsanjani’s first term, therefore, economists were given 
a great deal of leeway to design and implement the reforms they believed would deliver 
growth, employment, and other benefits to the population. The balance of payments 
crisis, however, undermined economists’ position as their prescriptions for reform were 
seen as being responsible for the nation’s unmanageable debts and associated austerity 
program. While Rafsanjani himself does not seem to have lost faith in the reform 
program, enough of the competing centers of power and population had that the program 
stalled. While economists were not entirely dismissed from the policymaking process as 
they had been in the 80s, their ability to promote their favored policies was undermined 
as competing interpretations of the causes and remedies for Iran’s economic stagnation 
gained ground. 
Theories of mimetic isomorphism suggest that economists and other experts are 
promoted to positions of power as part of a government’s conscious or unconscious 
attempt to model itself after especially prominent and/or successful countries. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, Iran’s post-revolutionary identity was based upon 
outright rejection of the Western political, social, and economic model. To the extent that 
this model incorporates the guidance of economists and other expert advisors, such 
individuals, particularly those educated in the United States, were seen as suspect and 
potentially treasonous. During the Rafsanjani years, such views of economists seem to 
have been tempered. Continued rejection of the overall Western model, however, meant 
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that economists, technocrats, and other experts still had to be careful in their policy 
prescriptions to avoid accusations of a pro-Western agenda from opposition groups. 
Political interest group analyses study economists as one of many competing 
interest groups wrestling for power over the economic policy agenda. Among other 
things, these analyses consider the way that economists: form or support political parties 
(Schneider, 1998: 80-82); tacitly endorse nondemocratic governance methods that 
weaken or eliminate political opponents (O'Donnell, 1973); and are used or allow 
themselves to be used to promote a given party or politician (Bailey, 2001). In the case of 
Iran, for example, economists actively promoted both of Rafsanjani’s candidacies for 
president. While economists themselves did not comprise a particularly powerful group, 
Rafsanjani explicitly used their endorsement as well as their reform program to garner 
political support. Economists were also willing to look the other way when Rafsanjani 
and his political allies engaged in activities designed to marginalize Leftist opponents of 
the reform by disqualifying them for elections to the Experts Assembly and Parliament. 
Finally, economists and technocrats were involved in the Kargozaran political group 
which was created explicitly to support Rafsanjani and his economic reform and 
reconstruction activities. 
In some ways, however, economists’ explicit association with and political 
support for Rafsanjani may have hurt them. When competing centers of power began to 
feel threatened by Rafsanjani’s growing political power and began cooperating to clip his 
wings, the reform program he had sponsored also came under attack (Anonymous, July 
31, 2006). Economists had nurtured few ties to other political groups that might have 
otherwise competed for power without disrupting the reform program.  
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The need for international resources also seems to have played a role in 
determining the experience of economists in Iran during Rafsanjani’s two-term 
presidency. As discussed above, Rafsanjani was intent upon securing international loans 
and investments to facilitate desperately needed reconstruction and rehabilitation of 
Iran’s capital infrastructure. He was also quite cognizant of the ability of American and 
Western–educated economists to ease fears and concerns of representatives from 
international financial institutions. As such, it was perhaps not surprising that he might 
seek out and promote such individuals to positions where they would be managing Iran’s 
relations with the international financial world.  
The following chapter examines the surprisingly strong role of economists in the 
administration of President Khatami despite his general lack of engagement with 






Chapter Seven: Khatami (1997-2005) 
On May 23, 1997, the dark-horse candidate Muhammad Khatami won Iran’s 
presidential election by a landslide. The new president had campaigned on themes of 
tolerance, the rule of law, women’s rights, and openness to the outside world. Economic 
issues were rarely discussed or even addressed in the months preceding the election 
(Anonymous, August 9 and August 16, 2006, Anonymous, August 19, 2006).  
Khatami was, however, closely associated with the Leftist group led by 
individuals such as former speaker of Parliament Mehdi Karrubi and former Prime 
Minister Mir-Hussein Musavi who had overseen the state’s expanding control over the 
economy during the early post-revolutionary and war years. The Leftists had fiercely 
opposed Rafsanjani’s development plans and had been maneuvered out of power in the 
1992 parliamentary elections, in part, to clear the way for implementation of economic 
reforms. Given this political background, a Khatami win might have reasonably been 
expected to portend a return to earlier statist policies that favored equality over growth 
and state control over means of production. 
Instead, the Khatami years were characterized by a robust economic reform 
program that built upon and even exceeded the gains of the Rafsanjani period. Among 
other things, Khatami oversaw the successful unification of the exchange rate, trade 
liberalization, creation of an oil stabilization fund, and creation of the institutional and 
legal frameworks necessary for privatization and foreign investment. This chapter 
reviews the events and accomplishments of Khatami’s two presidential terms in an effort 
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to understand why and how Khatami came to embrace and intensify an economic 
program that he and his allies had vehemently rejected just a few years earlier. 
The Cabinet 
The members comprising Khatami’s first economic policy team could not have 
been more disparate in their conflicting interpretations of and preferred solutions for the 
country’s economic ills (Amuzegar, 2006: 73, Anonymous, February 22, 2009, 
Anonymous, August 9 and August 16, 2006). University of California-educated 
economist Dr. Mohsen Nourbakhsh was a holdover from Rafsanjani’s administration 
where he had served as Minister of Finance and, later, Central Bank chief.  Nourbakhsh 
was a strong supporter of the economic adjustment programs delineated in the First and 
Second Development Plans and favored reforms that would encourage private sector and 
foreign investment. He was particularly eager to see the country weaned off its multiple 
exchange rate regime. Dr. Nourbakhsh was also politically active having served for 
several years as Tehran’s representative in parliament and playing an instrumental role in 
the creation of the Kargozaran political group of technocrats in support of Rafsanjani. 
Under Khatami, Dr. Nourbakhsh carried on as the Central Bank Governor (Nourbakhsh 
and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003). 
On the opposite end of the spectrum sat Dr. Hossein Namazi an Austrian-
educated economist with a strong commitment to socialist economic policies and 
government controls designed to promote equity over growth. Dr. Namazi had previously 
served as Minister of Finance under Prime Minister Mir-Hussein Musavi and was asked 
to do the same for Khatami (Anonymous, February 22, 2009, Anonymous, August 9 and 
166 
 
August 16, 2006). In his inaugural speech to parliament after his confirmation, Dr. 
Namazi publicly affirmed his continued support for state intervention in the economy 
saying, among other things that  “our country’s conditions have empirically shown that 
we cannot leave the exchange rate to be set by the free market and the supply and 
demand mechanism” (Timmerman, September 8, 1997). 
Off the spectrum altogether was Mohammad Ali Najafi. Mr. Najafi was a 
mathematician who had been in the midst of completing a PhD at M.I.T. when the 
revolution took place and he abandoned his studies to return to Iran. Najafi had held a 
number of posts in the new Islamic Republic but never anything related to economics or 
economic policy. He was, however, a very close and trusted friend of the new president 
who wished to have a neutral and loyal person heading the Plan and Budget Organization 
and, perhaps, helping to mediate expected differences between the Central Bank and the 
Ministry of Finance (Anonymous, February 22, 2009, Najafi and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 
412-14).  
There are different opinions about Khatami’s reasons for choosing such 
ideologically conflicting personalities for the country’s most important economic policy 
posts. Some have said that positions were distributed as spoils to the various political 
groups and parties
38
 that supported Khatami’s election (Anonymous, August 19, 2006). 
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 While Khatami was the Leftist’s clear choice he also had a political debt to the Kargozaran political 
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its own candidate or support the Supreme Leader’s preferred choice Nateq-Nouri. It has also been 
rumored that Kargozaran and, more specifically, Rafsanjani himself prevented the hard-line establishment 




Others have interpreted the appointments as indicative of Khatami’s lack of interest in 
and understanding of economic policy (Anonymous, August 9 and August 16, 2006). 
Still others have said Khatami was determined to include and hear from all sides of an 
issue so that decisions might be made by consensus (Najafi and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 
423).  
Choosing an economic policy direction 
Whatever the reason for Khatami’s cabinet choices, they were a perfect recipe for 
gridlock. The three men and the institutions they led clashed on all the major economic 
policy issues of the day such as budget deficits, taxation policies, exchange rates, interest 
rates, etc (Anonymous, February 22, 2009, Anonymous, August 9 and August 16, 2006, 
Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 324). As Khatami’s first year in office went on, the 
need for a cohesive policy became all the more urgent given the precipitous fall in 
government revenues resulting from the drop in demand for oil associated with the Asian 
financial crisis (Anonymous, July 24, 2006, Mead, July 24, 1998). Despite his lack of 
interest in, understanding of, and prioritization of economic issues, Khatami was forced 
to engage with them as it became clear that presidential leadership was necessary to 
clarify the economic policy direction that the CBI, PBO, and Ministry of Finance would 
be expected to support. 
A conference was called at which all interested parties were invited to share their 
opinions and positions regarding Iran’s economic problems and proposed solutions. 
                                                                                                                                                 
committing electoral fraud.  Anonymous, Former Minister. (August 18, 2006) Personal Interview. 
Tehran, Iran..  
168 
 
Prominent pro-marketers included: Dr. Nourbakhsh from the CBI; Dr. Masoud Nili who 
had written the First Development Plan and had recently been recruited back to the PBO 
to write the Third Development Plan after having in the meantime completed his PhD in 
economics at University of Manchester; George Washington University-trained 
economist Dr. Mohammad Nahavandian who headed Iran’s Chamber of Commerce; and 
Dr. Najafi who had slowly but surely been persuaded of the need to roll back government 
control and ownership by his staff at the PBO. Arguing against their position were the 
Leftists, chief among them: Finance Minister Dr. Hossein Namazi; former Prime Minister 
Mir Hussein Musavi; former minister of heavy industries and architect of the war-time 
rationing system Behzad Nabavi; and Majeed Ghassemi, the CBI chief under Prime 
Minister Musavi (Anonymous, March 7, 2009, Anonymous, August 9 and August 16, 
2006). 
The pro-market side was ready. In preparation for writing the Third Development 
Plan, Dr. Nili had earlier instructed PBO economists to generate data about and models of 
expected trends under a range of different conditions. Using this information, Dr. Nili and 
his allies were able to quickly prepare presentations and a detailed report supporting their 
views regarding the most important economic problems facing the nation as well as 
potential solutions. The group’s main argument in favor of private and foreign investment 
was based on population data that indicated a need for 700,000 to 800,000 new jobs to be 
created annually in order to keep the unemployment situation from further deteriorating. 
These levels of job creation, furthermore, required at least 6% annual economic growth. 
Given depressed oil prices, the government was in no position to make the investments 
necessary to produce these levels of growth. As such, the group argued, the only option 
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was to free up and encourage investments by the private and foreign sectors. 
(Anonymous, August 9 and August 16, 2006, Najafi and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 424). 
Perhaps having had less time to prepare for the conference, the Leftists did not 
have a strong counter argument. They had no alternate data or models to present as a 
challenge to the PBO’s statistical forecasts regarding the numbers of new jobs needed or 
the investments required to create them. And their preference for continued state control 
over and ownership of the economy were simply unsustainable given the continuing 
record-low oil prices and drought that had resulted in a major budget crisis (Nili and 
Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 328). Indeed, several prominent economists who attended the 
meetings, said later that the budget crisis was extremely helpful in that it “forced rational 
thinking” among all the participants and highlighted the strengths of the pro-marketer’s 
approach (Anonymous, March 7, 2009, Anonymous, August 9 and August 16, 2006, Nili 
and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 333-34). Ultimately, the Leftists proposals were basically 
ignored as the free marketers managed to convince President Khatami—despite his 
instinctual mistrust of capitalism and previous political attachments—that only a free 
market approach could deliver the jobs and other benefits desperately needed by the 
Iranian population (Najafi and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 424). 
The Third Development Plan—Preparation and Approval 
Having won Khatami’s initial approval of their approach, the free marketers, led 
by Mas’oud Nili and the PBO, turned their energies toward preparing and finalizing the 
details of the Third Development Plan. Nili, having recently returned from completing his 
PhD at Manchester University was determined to transform the country’s Development 
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Plans from an exercise in resource allocation into a framework for ushering the country 
through deep structural reforms (Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 335-8). On the surface, 
the Third Plan seemed very similar to the First and Second Plans that preceded it 
(Anonymous, August 19, 2006, IMF, 2000). Other than provisions for creation of an Oil 
Stabilization Fund in which proceeds from oil boom years might be deposited for use 
during downswings, the major elements of the Plan—privatization, exchange rate 
unification, tax reform, trade liberalization, foreign investment, strengthening the private 
sector—had all been initiated with varying degrees of success during the Rafsanjani 
years. Overall and sector-specific growth goals were also very similar. The Third Plan 
called for 6% annual GDP growth based on 7% increase in annual capital investments in 
order to increase employment by 760,000 jobs per year and reduce unemployment to 11.5 
percent by 2005 (Amuzegar, 2005: 46-48, Amuzegar, 1999: 539, IMF, 2000: 51-56). 
There was, however, an important difference. During earlier iterations, planners—
perhaps wishing to avoid opposition—had been much less explicit about the contents and 
implications of the policy actions required to achieve the goals of the First and Second 
Plan. Privatization and exchange rate unification, for example, which were two main 
pillars of the Rafsanjani reforms were never clearly discussed in the First Development 
Plan. In contrast, the Third Plan included detailed proposals for how specific objectives 
of the Plan would be attained. 
Perhaps as a result of their more forthcoming approach, Dr. Nili and others at the 
PBO understood that they would have to work hard to win the support and cooperation of 
various political groups as well as the bureaucracy and clerical leadership of Supreme 
Leader Ali Khamene’i (Anonymous, August 9 and August 16, 2006: 335-38, 
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Anonymous, August 2, 2006, Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003). Over the next year, as 
the plan was being written with the help of 1,000 ‘experts’ in 21 different committees, 
Nili and other PBO economists fanned through the various centers of power explaining 
and justifying the details of its reform program (Amuzegar, 2005, Anonymous, July 24, 
2006: 46). Despite his initial approval, even Khatami’s support was lukewarm and 
required continual massaging. According to Nili, Khatami simply didn’t understand the 
basics of economics enough to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the Third Plan as 
compared with the First and Second Plans. He also had trouble understanding and being 
convinced that the 1993 debt crisis had resulted from avoidable mistakes and continued 
to express anxiety that the proposed structural reform program would lead to another 
similar crisis (Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003:323, 32-33, 53). In a series of 50 cabinet 
meetings devoted to discussion of the Third Development Plan, Nili and other PBO and 
CBI officials sought to reassure Khatami as well as skeptical cabinet members that the 
Plan’s proposed reforms could be implemented in a gradual and careful manner so as to 
minimize economic disruptions. Some participants have said that these cabinet meetings 
often had the flavor of an Econ 101 class in which the President and other cabinet 
ministers were educated on the basics of supply, demand, exchange rate, and interest rate 
theories (Anonymous, August 14, 2006, Anonymous, August 9 and August 16, 2006, 
Anonymous, August 19, 2006, Nili and Ahmadi-Amooee, 2003: 346). In the end, and 
despite last-minute efforts by the Leftists to derail it
39
, the President and cabinet approved 
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the Third Development Plan without major changes. On September 16, 1999, President 
Khatami introduced the plan to Parliament calling it “a total restructuring of our economy 
aimed at guaranteeing Iran’s needs and resources for the future”(Iran President's 5-Year 
Plan Would Privatize Major Industries, September 16, 1999). 
Once the Plan was sent to the Majlis, economists from the PBO and Central Bank 
began focusing their efforts on members of the parliamentary committees charged with 
considering and approving development plans. Using the same approach they had used 
with Khatami and his cabinet, the economists held a series of ‘classes’ to teach basic 
economic principles and try to explain why proposals included in the Third Plan 
represented the best way to address Iran’s economic ills (Anonymous, August 14, 2006, 
Anonymous, August 9 and August 16, 2006). Initially, the economists and free-marketers 
were somewhat concerned that political rivalries—such as the awkward fact that the 
powerful Speaker of Parliament, Nateq-Nouri had just lost the presidential election to 
Khatami—might result in majlis obstructionism. For the most part, however, the Third 
Plan survived unscathed with a few important exceptions. Legislators rejected proposals 
to end the tax-exempt status of the revolutionary foundations or bonyads that had 
originally been created to hold and administer assets abandoned by the fleeing Pahlavis 
but which had since expanded into large and largely unaccountable economic actors in 
                                                                                                                                                 
received a letter from a prominent Leftist associate depicting the Plan as a scheme to achieve growth 
through the sacrifice of the poor. The letter seemed to rattle Khatami who called for a meeting to discuss 
it. Ultimately, the President approved the Plan for submission to the majles without any further changes. 
This and other subsequent actions by the Leftists, however, seemed to lead to frequent presidential crises 
of confidence that the pro-marketers would have to work hard to assuage. See: Anonymous, Journalist. 
(August 19, 2006) Personal Interview. Tehran, Iran. 
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their own right. The majlis—perhaps unwilling to subject constituents to a price shock 
that might affect upcoming parliamentary elections—also refused to eliminate energy 
subsidies or allow state-owned enterprises to raise their product prices by more than ten 
percent (Anonymous, August 9 and August 16, 2006, Iran: Speaker Comments on Recent 
Developments at News Conference, January 28, 2000). After receiving final approval 
from the Guardian’s Council (which vets all legislation to ensure conformity with the 
constitution) the majlis finally ratified the Third Plan bill on April 5
th
 2000 (Amuzegar, 
2005: 47, Iran: New Five-Year Plan Officially Conveyed to Plan and Budget 
Organization, April 25, 2000, Khajehpour, 2000, Law for the Third Plan for Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Development in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2002). 
Implementing the Plan 
With the approval of the majles, implementation of the Third Development Plan 
could begin. Over the years 2000-2005, officials worked with varying levels of success 
to: unify the exchange rate, liberalize trade; liberalize financial markets; re-engage with 
the international financial community; institute fiscal management reforms; and reduce 
the size of government and increase efficiency through divestment and privatization of 
state-owned enterprises. Below, each of these reforms is discussed in greater detail. 
Exchange Rate Unification 
In contrast to the earlier 1993 attempt under Rafsanjani, the exchange rate 
unification program of the Third Plan proceeded extremely smoothly and was universally 
regarded as a great success. The program was managed and implemented by Central 
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Bank chief Dr. Mohsen Nourbakhsh who as one of the architects of the Rafsanjani 
reforms had perhaps learned a great deal from the failures of earlier efforts.  
The Central Bank began preparing for unification shortly after Khatami’s 
ascension to the presidency. It began in July 1997 by amending export surrender 
requirements so that instead of being forced to hand over dollar profits at the overvalued 
‘export’ rate of 3,000 rials per dollar, exporters could obtain a certificate entitling the 
holder to import up to the amount of their dollar profits at any future date. These 
certificates could then be traded freely on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) where 
demand was initially controlled by requirements that a valid import license be acquired 
before purchases could be made. Over the next few years, the numbers of individuals, 
companies, sectors, and state owned enterprises allowed and then required to obtain 
foreign exchange on the TSE increased. Simultaneously, the CBI oversaw a step-wise 
depreciation that brought the TSE rate extremely close to the black market floating 
exchange rate of around 8,000 rials per dollar. 
By the end of 2001, the ‘export’ rate had been eliminated and only a small list of 
essential and price controlled items such as fertilizers and basic foodstuffs were still 
qualified for import at the ‘official’ rate of 1,750 rials per dollar. On March 21, 2002 the 
multiple exchange rate was entirely eliminated, a new unified interbank foreign exchange 
market was created to replace the TSE market, and a managed floating exchange rate 
regime was initiated in which the Central Bank aimed to smooth fluctuations in the 
exchange rate while allowing for depreciation resulting from inflation differentials. 
Significantly, the exchange rate unification had little inflationary impact. It did, however, 
have a considerable fiscal impact on the 2002/2003 budget which was adjusted to reflect 
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the true cost of imports and also included some temporary subsidies for, among other 
things, SOEs that had to make payments for purchases contracted before March. Luckily, 
by this time oil prices had rebounded strongly and the costs of exchange rate unification 
could be more comfortably borne (Alizadeh, 2003, Amuzegar, 2005, Amuzegar, 2006, 
Anonymous, August 14, 2006, Anonymous, August 9 and August 16, 2006, Anonymous, 
August 19, 2006, Anonymous, August 2, 2006, Dinmore, December 24, 2001, IMF, 
2002, Karshenas and Hakimian, 2005: 77, Trade and Foreign Exchange Policies in Iran: 
Reform Agenda, Economic Implications and Impact on the Poor, 2001). 
Trade Liberalization 
Another area in which there were significant positive steps taken was trade 
liberalization. By the mid-1990s import and export regulations combined with the 
multiple exchange rate regime to create significant non-tariff barriers to trade. Traders 
were restricted to published lists of goods that were authorized for import or export and 
for which licenses issued by one or more ministries were usually required. Importers 
were obligated to apply to the Central Bank for foreign exchange at the applicable rate 
after which a nonrefundable deposit of varying amount was required before letters of 
credit could be opened. Exporters were obligated to repatriate and surrender all receipts 
within 8 months of export at the highly appreciated ‘export’ rate of 3,000 rials per dollar 
(Amuzegar, 1993, IMF, 2000: 47-48). 
As was the case for exchange rate unification, preparations for the Third Plan’s 
proposed trade reforms got underway well before the Plan was officially commenced. In 
1997, the list of allowable exports was expanded and then replaced with a negative list of 
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prohibited exports. From 1999 to 2001, licensing requirements were gradually eased and 
eventually abolished for exports other than antiques, subsidized goods, etc. The easing of 
export surrender requirements as well as creation the TSE market for foreign exchange 
served to significantly alleviate currency barriers to trade (IMF, 2000, Trade and Foreign 
Exchange Policies in Iran: Reform Agenda, Economic Implications and Impact on the 
Poor, 2001). 
In 2000, with the commencement of the Third Development Plan, additional trade 
liberalizing reforms were initiated. Import licensing requirements were eliminated for 
hundreds of goods and replaced by import taxes to compensate affected domestic 
producers (thereby converting non-tariff trade barriers to internationally-accepted tariffs). 
Customs procedures for both imports and exports were simplified and expedited. And the 
list of allowable imports was eliminated and replaced with a much smaller negative list of 
imports prohibited for non-economic reasons (IMF, 2002). 
Trade liberalizing reforms continued in following years.  Unification of the 
exchange rate in March 2002 significantly reduced the government’s role in foreign 
exchange allocations among various traders. Customs duty rates and other import fees 
were consolidated into a single 4% rate while exemptions from customs duties were 
eliminated. All import quotas were eliminated by 2004 and other non-tariff trade barriers 
continued to be converted to tariffs while the overall average tariff rate dropped from 
greater than 30% before the commencement of the Third Plan to under 23% in 2005. 
Underscoring its commitment to further trade liberalization, additional legislation was 
passed to support Iran’s application to join the World Trade Organization and in May 
2005, a Working Party was established at the WTO to begin accession negotiations with 
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Iran (Alizadeh, 2003: 277, Amuzegar, 2005: 52, Anonymous, July 14, 2006, Dinmore 
and Dombey, May 27, 2005, IMF, 2002: paragraph 13, IMF, 2003: paragraphs 13 and 29, 
IMF, 2004: paragraph 12, IMF, 2006: paragraph 29, MacKinnon, 2001, Marossi, 2006). 
Financial Market Liberalization 
Given Islamic injunctions against usury as well as the revolutionaries’ socialist 
leanings, it was perhaps no surprise that banks were among the first businesses to be 
nationalized in the early days of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Barred from offering 
interest to depositors or making interest-based profits from borrowers, the ten state-
owned banks found creative ways to do business. Borrowers were charged ‘fees’ while 
depositors were given shares of the bank’s profits
40
 (Allen, March 26, 1999, Ibrahim, 
July 6, 1979, IMF, 2000: paragraph 41).  
By the late nineties it was clear, however, that the success and strengthening of 
the private sector required greater access to credit than the state-owned banks were 
capable of providing. Despite continued sensitivities regarding the capitalist nature of 
private banking, the pro-market reformers managed to get approval for inclusion in the 
Third Plan of financial market liberalization that would pave the way for private banks 
(IMF, 2000: paragraph 41). 
Before the Third Plan was passed, however, the Central Bank began by issuing 
licenses for ‘non-bank credit institutions’ (NBCI) that would be allowed to engage in all 
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 Given that all of the state-owned banks were perpetually losing money, even more creative accounting 
was required to ensure that depositors were partners in the banks’ (nonexistent gains but were not harmed 
by its losses. 
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banking activities except for check-writing and some other counter services
41
. The 
Central Bank received applications from 200 private sector businesses and groups 
seeking to launch an NBCI and approved four (Allen, March 26, 1999, IMF, 2000). Once 
the Third Plan was ratified by parliament, Karafarin Bank—which had already operated 
for two years as an NBCI—became the first private bank operating in Iran since the 
revolution. Its managing director Parviz Aghili proudly proclaimed that “the government 
did not hold even a single share” (Bozorgmehr, January 3, 2002, Dinmore, September 5, 
2001). In quick succession three additional private banks as well as two private insurance 
companies were licensed and Tehran’s commuters were soon being wooed by billboards 
advertising competing rates of return and other banking services (IMF, 2003: Box 1 and 
Paragraph 14, IMF, 2004:Paragraph 1). Even foreign banks were soon being licensed and 
setting up shop in Iran’s free trade zones (McSheehy, July 23, 2004). 
With the licensing of private banking, the Central Bank had to prepare for a 
function that had heretofore been unnecessary—banking supervision. The Bank began 
with an audit and review of bank accounting and disclosure practices and took measures 
to bring them in line with international accepted standards. It also reorganized and further 
developed its own supervisory capacity to be in conformance with IMF-recommended 
‘risk-based’ regulatory mechanisms. Bank capitalization requirements were also raised to 
international accepted levels (IMF, 2004: Box 1, IMF, 2006: paragraph 12, IMF, 2000: 
paragraphs 61-2). 
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 In doing so, the Central Bank relied upon a 1992 ruling by the Guardians Council that ‘banking’ referred 
to counter services such as check-writing. All other banking activity (making loans, etc.) was defined as 
financial services.  
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Additional financial market reforms included the introduction of ‘participation 
papers’ issued by the Central Bank as a more market-based approach to decreasing 
liquidity and influencing interest rates. Direct controls over lending and borrowing rates 
as well as the sectoral allocation of credit were also eased (IMF, 2003: Boxes 1 and 2). 
Disappointingly, however, and despite the amendment of Article 44 of the Constitution to 
allow for it, long-running plans to restructure and privatize state-owned banks were never 
realized (IMF, 2003: paragraph 31, IMF, 2004: paragraph 13, IMF, 2006: paragraphs 13 
and 25). Indeed, by 2004 the financial market liberalization program seemed to have lost 
a bit of steam with no additional major reforms implemented or private banks licensed 
during the rest of Khatami’s presidential term. 
Reengaging with the International Financial Community 
During the Third Plan period, Iran also took a number of steps designed to 
improve its relations with the international financial community. With the 1993 debt 
crisis still fresh on their minds, the Third Plan’s authors sought to ensure a cautious 
approach to international borrowing by placing limits on both debt structure (length of 
time and rates) and total borrowing. The net present value of the country’s total foreign 
debt was not to rise above $25 billion and total payments were not to exceed $3.6 billion 
(IMF, 2000: Appendix I, paragraph 15, Law for the Third Plan for Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Development in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2002). In 2002, Iran issued two 
five-year Eurobonds for 625 and 375 million Euros each. The primary purpose of the 
loan was to establish benchmarks for Iranian corporate borrowing rather than to support 
the budget or balance of payments. The move was successful in this regard insofar as 
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Fitch Ratings upgraded Iran’s sovereign rating to B+ and the bond issue was 
oversubscribed (Amuzegar, 2005: 52, IMF, 2002: paragraph 2 including footnote, IMF, 
2003, State Borrowing, December 2002).  
Planners were more wholeheartedly enthusiastic about encouraging foreign direct 
investment (FDI). In 2002, an important step in this direction was achieved when the 
Expediency Council broke the deadlock between the Parliament and the Guardian’s 
Council and pushed through the passage of the Law for Encouragement and Protection of 
Foreign Investment (LEPFI) which replaced the 1950’s law regulating foreign 
investment. LEPFI and its subsequently approved bylaws clarified the restrictions on and 
protections for foreign investment while providing some additional incentives to 
encourage such investments. Among other things, the law: allowed foreign investment in 
all sectors available to domestic investors; allowed for repatriation of profits; guaranteed 
fair compensation in case of nationalization; and required investment applications to be 
processed within a maximum 45 day period (Dinmore, June 5, 2000, Foreign Investment: 
A Political or Economic Challenge?, April 2002, Iran's Revised Foreign Investment Law, 
June 2002). Despite these legal and regulatory advances, however, domestic and 
international political instability as well as continued macroeconomic problems like 
inflation ultimately put a damper on inward FDI in non-oil sectors which, over the life of 
the plan has been estimated as having reached no more than $1 billion (Amuzegar, 2005: 
58). 
Iran was more successful in its efforts to upgrade its relationships with and gain 
eligibility for loans and investments from international financial institutions. Overriding 
U.S. opposition, the World Bank resumed lending to Iran in May 2000 with a $146 
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million loan for a sewage project in Tehran and an $87 million loan for healthcare 
(Fidler, May 19, 2000, Fidler, May 18, 2000). Additional loans for environmental 
management, earthquake emergency, water sanitation, urban development, and housing 
reform projects were approved in following years. By the end of 2005, the World Bank 
portfolio consisted of nine loans and a total amount of $1,355 million (IMF, 2006: 
Appendix II). Iran also sought closer cooperation with the IMF. Having eliminated its 
multiple exchange rate regime, in 2004 Iran was able to accept the IMF’s Article VIII 
obligations regarding currency restrictions (Amuzegar, 2005: 52, IMF, 2003: paragraphs 
28 and 45). In September 2002, the International Financial Corporation took on a 20% 
share of an Iranian leasing company while lending the company an additional $3 million 
(IMF, 2003: Appendix II, World Bank, September 2002). And in December 2003, Iran 
became a full member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency which indicated 
a willingness to provide risk insurance for Iran projects, thereby making FDI terms more 
attractive (IMF, 2004: Appendix II).  
Reforming Fiscal Management 
When writing early drafts of the Third Development Plan, Dr. Nili and other 
economists at the PBO were particularly concerned with finding ways to create or alter 
Iran’s institutions so as to increase and even force fiscal discipline. Although Iran had a 
fairly strong tradition of fiscal and deficit discretion so as to avoid international debt, the 
yearly budget was extremely vulnerable to oil price shocks. When oil revenues were 
strong, the government increased spending. When they were weak, the government 
slashed budgets and financed remaining deficits by borrowing from the Central Bank 
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(IMF, 2000: paragraphs 28-30 and Table 3). PBO planners sought a way to de-couple the 
government budget from fluctuations in international oil markets by reducing 
expenditures, increasing non-oil revenues, and banking surplus revenues to be used 
during downturns. 
On the expenditure side, the Third Plan’s proposal to slash explicit and implicit 
subsidies was supported by Khatami and the cabinet but was opposed and successfully 
watered down by the majlis. The prices of goods produced by state-owned enterprises or 
government agencies were allowed to increase slightly, but by no more than 10% 
(Amuzegar, 2005: 47, IMF, 2000: Appendix I, paragraph 6). As such, a number of basic 
goods—including, most importantly, domestic energy—were kept at prices well below 
those available internationally. The explicit and implicit subsidies required to support 
such prices constituted a colossal and (as oil prices began to skyrocket) growing drain on 
the yearly budget. The pro-marketers were able, however, to score somewhat of a victory, 
in amending budget procedures to increase transparency by explicitly including the costs 
of subsidies. 
On the revenue side, the Third Plan set out an ambitious agenda to reform the tax 
code and strengthen collection procedures. Historically, taxes had comprised a very small 
part of government revenues and planners sought to remedy this through a combination 
of tax cuts, elimination of exemptions, and enforcement of compliance. In 2001, a 
National Tax Organization (NTO) was established with a specialized taxpayer unit. Over 
the following years, technical assistance teams from the IMF worked with NTO officials 
to develop streamlined procedures for collection and push for additional legislative 
changes to the tax code. In 2002, personal and corporate tax rates were reduced 
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significantly and made less discretionary. The following year, a number of separate taxes 
and fees were collapsed into one single sales tax on all goods and services while import 
taxes and other charges were similarly rationalized into a unified customs duty. The 
parliament also began deliberations on the introduction of a value-added tax to replace 
the straight sales tax while the NTO began preparations for its administration (Amuzegar, 
2005: 52-3, IMF, 2002: paragraph 13, IMF, 2003: box 1, Taxation Changes Approved, 
March 2002). 
Perhaps the most important initiative to reduce the sensitivity of government 
budgets to annual oil revenue fluctuations was the creation of the Oil Stabilization Fund 
(OSF) into which surplus revenues were supposed to be stored for use during times of 
low oil prices. The concept of some sort of a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) had been 
around since before the revolution and was inspired by, among others, the examples of 
Norway’s Government Pension Fund and the Kuwait Investment Authority. The Central 
Bank and PBO planners spent a great deal of time studying and learning about other 
countries’ experiences with SWF’s and discussing best practices with the World Bank. 
Ultimately, the decision was made to house the OSF as an account within the Central 
Bank
42
 into which all oil revenues over and above a pre-set amount would be deposited. 
The 60
th
 article of the Third Plan law included a great deal of detailed language designed 
to specify the extremely strict conditions under which money could be taken out of the 
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 The alternative—to create a separately administered fund—was opposed strenuously by CBI chief Dr. 
Nourbakhsh who was convinced that only the strength of the CBI institution as well as his own charisma 
could protect OSF monies from misuse, mismanagement, or outright theft. Sadly, Nourbakhsh’s 
unexpected early death in 2003 at the age of 55 from a heart attack prevented him from being able to 
protect said monies for long. 
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fund to support the budget (Anonymous, August 14, 2006, Anonymous, February 22, 
2009, Anonymous, August 19, 2006, Anonymous, August 2, 2006, IMF, 2003, Law for 
the Third Plan for Economic, Social, and Cultural Development in the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, 2002). 
Unfortunately, and despite the best efforts of the CBI and PBO, fiscal restraint 
turned out to be extremely difficult to achieve especially during a time when oil revenues 
began to increase dramatically. The 2000/2001 budget was balanced on the assumption of 
oil prices of $14.50 per barrel. As prices shot up to close to $30 per barrel, money began 
pouring into the OSF and it did not take long before parliament set to work amending the 
freshly passed Third Plan’s restrictions on OSF usage so that 50% of it would be 
available for private sector loans (Anonymous, February 22, 2009, Dinmore, October 11, 
2000, Surplus Oil Income Law Amended, October 2000). In following years, 
expenditures continued to grow, tax revenues did not generate as much income as 
expected (the ratio of taxes to GDP actually declined from 6.7% to 5.8%), government 
budgets became increasingly dependent upon oil revenues (the treasury’s dependence 
upon oil revenues blew past the restriction of 46% to grow to more than 64%), and the 
OSF was raided time and again (Amuzegar, 2005). In their yearly consultations with 
Iranian authorities, IMF staff became increasingly frustrated with their counterparts’ 
unwillingness or inability to adhere to the fiscal best practices they had originally 
committed to and expressed great concern over potential inflationary and exchange rate 
consequences (IMF, 2002, IMF, 2003, IMF, 2004). By the end of the Third Plan, a total 
of $30.1 billion was estimated to have been deposited in the OSF and $22.6 billion 




Perhaps the part of the plan for which there was the highest hopes and the greatest 
disappointment was in the area of privatization. Rafsanjani-era attempts in this regard 
generated meager SOE sales but resulted in a torrent of criticism and charges of 
corruption that made executives and Ministers hesitant to try again. The pro-marketers 
were, however, convinced of the urgent need to shrink the public sector in order to 
increase economic efficiency and eliminate the budgetary pressures caused by loss-
making state-owned enterprises
43
. To this end, Dr. Nili at the PBO and Dr. Nourbakhsh at 
the CBI assembled a team of experts from within and outside of government and tasked 
them with investigating earlier privatization efforts, researching international best 
practices, and defining a program for how to proceed (Anonymous, August 9 and August 
16, 2006, Anonymous, August 2, 2006).  
Under Rafsanjani, the sale of SOEs had been driven by and conducted according 
to each individual minister’s inclinations regarding the companies under his purview. 
Given, however, the loss of prestige associated with losing control over the largest 
companies, the difficulties involved in accurately pricing assets, and the strong possibility 
that political opponents  might capitalize on public skepticism about privatization by 
leveling reputation-ruining accusations of corruption, ministers faced very few incentives 
to actually engage in SOE sales. The Third Plan sought to alleviate these problems by 
creating entirely new institutions tasked with and incentivized to accomplish the 
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 By 2001, state companies’ share of government budget has been estimated as being as high as 66%! See: 
Nili, and Ahmadi-Amooee. Eghtesad-E Siaysi-E Jomhuri-E Islami. 
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identification, preparation, and sale of government–owned companies. Fifty-three 
holding companies (the biggest of which were the National Iranian Industries 
Organization (NIIO) with 130 subsidiaries and the Industrial Development and 
Renovation Organization (IDRO) with 140 subsidiaries) were created to consolidate 
ownership of related companies and restructure them as needed to increase efficiency and 
prepare for sale. The High Council on Privatization and the Privatization Organization 
were created to centralize the process for selecting, valuating, and marketing companies 
slated to be sold through share offerings or direct sales resulting from an open auction
44
. 
Revenues from sales were to be split with half the proceeds going to the treasury while 
the other half was to be used to aid in the restructuring and preparation of additional 
companies for sale. In order to address any disputes or concerns that might arise 
surrounding the privatization of any given company, a mediation procedure was designed 
and prepared so complaints could be lodged  and investigated (Amuzegar, 2006: 63, 
Anonymous, August 3, 2006, Anonymous, August 2, 2006, Anonymous, July 24, 2006, 
Economic Reform and the Approaches to Management and Privatisation in Iran, May 
2003, IMF, 2000: page 52, Khajehpour, 2000, Privatisation Plans, September 2001).  
The free marketers also worked to alleviate the legal restrictions on private 
ownership set out in Article 44 of the Iranian constitution which reads: “The state sector 
is to include all large-scale and mother industries, foreign trade, major minerals, banking, 
insurance, power generation, dams and large-scale irrigation networks, radio and 
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 The direct negotiation method of privatization which was susceptible to abuse and had resulted in 
allegations of corruption was eliminated altogether. 
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television, post, telegraph and telephone services, aviation, shipping, roads, railroads and 
the like”. They began by tasking a committee to identify which state-owned companies 
could legally be sold without violating constitutional proscriptions. In April 1999, this 
committee determined that out of 724 state-owned companies, all but 128 were eligible 
for sale (Khajehpour, 2000: 581 & 90). The next step was to work with and lobby the 
Guardians Council (GC) to push for a lenient interpretation of and amendments to Article 
44. Surprisingly, the GC was relatively flexible in this regard and legal barriers to 
privatization of banks, insurance companies, post and telegraph services among other 
things were soon removed (Alizadeh, 2003: 278, Anonymous, August 9 and August 16, 
2006, IMF, 2002: paragraph 13, Prospects for Privatisation in the Third Five-Year Plan, 
December 1999).  
Having created such a robust institutional framework for privatization and having 
eliminated most of the legal and regulatory barriers to SOE sales, hopes were high that 
privatization would proceed rapidly. Economist and analyst Dr. Mohammad Behkish 
expressed the hopes of many when he called the Third Plan’s privatization proposals “a 
revolution!” (Prospects for Privatisation in the Third Five-Year Plan, December 1999). 
Actual SOE sales to the private sector were, however, extremely disheartening. While 
foot-dragging among SOE workers, managers, and relevant ministers surely contributed 
to this disappointing outcome, demand side factors were perhaps more important. The 
private sector was simply too small and lacked the capacity to absorb large state assets. 
Prospective purchasers also lacked the confidence that relevant government regulations 
on things such as labor relations, subsidies, and sales prices would become or remain 
favorable and stable enough to allow for necessary restructuring and business forecasting. 
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Even basic property rights could not be assured. As a result, the Privatization 
Organization (PO) was primarily limited to facilitating two types of sales. First, the sale 
on the Tehran Stock Exchange of non-majority equity shares in SOEs. And second, sales 
of SOEs to large semi-public pension funds or charitable organizations, often in lieu of 
debts already owed by the government to these organizations (Alizadeh, 2003: 278, 
Amuzegar, 2005: 54, Anonymous, August 3, 2006, Anonymous, August 2, 2006, 
Economic Reform and the Approaches to Management and Privatisation in Iran, May 
2003, IMF, 2003: Paragraph 15). It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that in their 
Article IV consultations with Iranian authorities, visiting IMF staff became increasingly 
frustrated by the lack of progress on privatization (IMF, 2002, IMF, 2003, IMF, 2004). 
Economists and Khatami 
All in all, and despite some disappointments, President Khatami oversaw a 
number of important economic reforms especially during his first term in office. Indeed, 
given his political affiliation with Iran’s Leftists, it is somewhat surprising to note the 
extent and depth of his reforms particularly as compared with those of his more publicly 
pro-market predecessor Rafsanjani. In unifying the exchange rate, liberalizing trade and 
financial markets, creating the oil stabilization fund, and even in the area of privatization, 
Khatami and his economic team went far beyond the reforms that he and his political 
allies had opposed so vocally in the mid-1990s. How and why did this Leftist president 
come to embrace an economic reform program he had previously been skeptical of? 
What can Khatami’s shift tell us about the conditions under which economists are likely 
to gain influence over political leaders and see their economic agendas implemented? 
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Functionalist and Epistemic Communities approaches to understanding the role of 
expert advisers point to the role of crises or other salient shocks that shatter political 
leader’s confidence in earlier interpretations of cause and effect relations and render them 
more open to new counsel (Adler and Haas, 1992, Haas, 1968, Haas, 1992). In the case of 
Iran under Khatami, it is difficult to argue that an actual crisis occurred. It is true that 
1998 was a particularly difficult year with oil prices as low as $10 per barrel and a 
drought to boot (Anonymous, July 24, 2006, Corzine, January 29, 1999). But prices 
recovered relatively quickly and in following years rose to historic highs. 
It can be argued, however, that the pro-market economists seeking to influence 
Khatami’s decision-making manufactured a crisis
45
. Using what turned out to be grossly 
pessimistic assumptions for oil-prices, Dr. Nili and his allies generated a number of grim 
scenarios for Iran’s future and argued that deep structural reforms were the only way to 
avoid catastrophic levels of unemployment and inflation. To be fair, there was no way 
they could have known that oil prices would quintuple in just a few short years. 
Nonetheless, it can be argued that the concerted effort by pro-market economists to scare 
Khatami and other political leaders into signing on to their reform program contradicts 
Functionalist and epistemic communities depictions of experts as neutral and 
disinterested providers of information and analysis. 
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 Some opponents of the reform program accused the pro-marketers of doing exactly this and exaggerating 
the likelihood of negative outcomes in order to sway political leaders. See page 334 in Economic Reform 
and the Approaches to Management and Privatisation in Iran. (May 2003) Iran Focus 16, Amuzegar, 
Jahangir. (2005) Iran's Third Development Plan: An Appraisal. Middle East Policy 12:46-63. 
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These efforts were particularly effective insofar as they were extended to all 
major political groups and centers of power rather than being limited to just the 
President’s office or cabinet. In marked contrast to the approach taken under Rafsanjani, 
when additional reforms were tacked on to the Second Plan with little or no input from 
outside the cabinet, this time the reformers sought to build a consensus by spending a 
great deal of time explaining the details and implications of each major aspect of the 
Third Plan’s reforms to all the competing centers of power including the parliament, the 
Guardian’s Council, and the Supreme Leader’s office. The approach seems to have been 
successful insofar as so much was accomplished despite the deep political divisions and 
sometimes violent strife between different groups that characterized the Khatami years. 
The example of Iran’s pro-market economists during this time period sheds light on the 
ways that epistemic communities of experts might seek to influence policymakers by 
manufacturing a crisis, seeking to educate political elites about it, and then building 
consensus among opposing political groups about how to address it. 
Theories of mimetic isomorphism suggest that politicians, lacking perfect 
information about the optimal structures or practices of economic policy, seek to reduce 
uncertainty by observing and mimicking other successful models in the international 
system (Westney, 1987). The Shah, for example, consciously modeled himself on the 
United States and the West and perhaps solicited the advice and involvement of 
professional economists because that is what he observed his counterparts doing in those 
countries. 
For the groups and individuals that took power after the 1979 Islamic revolution, 
however, success was not defined by economic growth or wealth. The United States and 
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the West were bluntly rejected as being inappropriate models for a country determined to 
rule itself according to God’s will. Slowly, over the following decades, however, this 
determination diminished and under Khatami an effort was made to repair relations with 
much of the Western world. Within months of his election, in a historic interview with 
Christiane Ammanpour, Khatami spoke of his respect for the American people and 
civilization (Editorial, January 8, 1998). Khatami was the first Iranian president to go on 
state visits to European countries like Italy, France and Germany. For a time it even 
appeared as if a rapprochement between Iran and the United States was in the offing as 
when Secretary of State Madeleine Albright publicly apologized for the American role in 
the 1953 coup against Mossadegh and called for developing a road map toward 
normalization of relations between the two countries (Khalaf and Wolffe, March 18, 
2000).  
It is doubtful that this brief warming of relations resulted in a rush to imitate 
American or Western economic policies. However, the lessening of tensions plausibly 
contributed to a greater tolerance for western-education economists and a greater 
willingness to consider reform programs that in the past might have been rejected 
outright as part of the Great Satan’s master plan for domination, particularly among 
Khatami’s Leftist allies. 
Pluralist and political interest group analyses tend to view experts as just another 
political group actively seeking to influence power. The traditional methods by which 
experts have been observed pursuing such influence has been through forming or 
supporting political parties (Schneider, 1998: 80-82), endorsing non-democratic methods 
that further their reform programs (O'Donnell, 1973), or by allowing or encouraging 
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parties to use their expertise as a way of selling their brand to the public (Bailey, 2001). 
Under Rafsanjani, for example, economists and technocrats came together to form the 
Kargozaran political party, they tacitly support Rafsanjani’s nondemocratic moves to 
eliminate or reduce the influence of Leftists, and they encouraged or at least permitted 
Rafsanjani to run his campaigns based on the theme of economic reform. During the 
Khatami years, there is little evidence of economists explicitly participating in the 
political process. As described in the previous section, however, economists were quite 
aware of political divisions and sought to prevent them from becoming a source of 
opposition to the reform program by ensuring that all political groups had a stake in its 
success. 
Theories of coercive isomorphism or resource dependency suggest that 
economists, particularly western-educated economists, are used primarily as window 
dressing to signal to international investors and financial institutions that the country’s 
economy is in the capable hands of individuals that share their values and educational 
backgrounds (Babb, 2001). Therefore, political leaders are most likely to promote and 
heed the advice of economists when the country’s they lead are most in need of 
international resources that depend upon the trust and confidence of the international 
financial community. When such a need passes, however, economists are likely to 
become more vulnerable in their positions.  
Insofar as Khatami was convinced of the need to access foreign capital markets, 
he might have recognized that retaining and promoting men such as Dr. Nourbakhsh and 
Dr. Nili would strengthen his hand. It is also worth noting that the reform movement 
bogged down just as oil prices started rising and revenues flooding the treasury obviated 
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the need for recourse to international loans. As discussed above, the most successful of 
the reforms initiated under Khatami were in fact those that were launched immediately 
after or even slightly before the Third Plan began when oil prices were still low. By way 
of contrast, longer-term efforts such as privatization, for example, accomplished little 
perhaps due to the fact that by the time the necessary legal and regulatory environment 
had been created, oil prices had already risen and there was much less urgency felt 
regarding proposed reforms. 
In sum, several variables seem to have contributed to the ability of Iranian pro-
market economists to influence the preparation and implementation of Iran’s economic 
policy reforms in the early Khatami years. Most importantly, the pro-marketers 
consciously and actively promoted their reform program by ‘manufacturing’ a coming 
crisis to shake political leaders up and make them more open to new policy prescriptions. 
Furthermore the thaw in relations with the Western world may have made policymakers 
more willing to consider ‘Western’ reforms at the same time that the reforms and the 
economists promoting them became necessary to facilitate the international loans and 
investment sought during a time of low revenues.  
The end of the reform movement? 
As alluded to above, the reform program stalled in the later Khatami years (2003-
2005). In 2004, parliamentary elections were held in which a new political group 
comprising xenophobic, religiously conservative tendencies along with an emphasis on 
social justice took power. This world view was shared by the previously unknown 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who ascended to the presidency in 2005. The following chapter 
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details the experience of economists during this time period when populist politics and 
revolutionary fervor seemed to turn the clock back to the early days of the Islamic 





Chapter Eight: Ahmadinejad and the Abadgaran (2004-
2012) 
The 2004 parliamentary elections saw the introduction of a brand new political 
group, the Abadgaran, to national politics. Relatively young and hailing from the poorer 
classes, these Iranian-educated doctors and engineers were particularly close to the 
regime’s security services in which many of them had served during the Iran-Iraq war. 
They were socially and politically conservative, fiercely loyal to the Supreme Leader
46
, 
and just as fiercely opposed to President Khatami and the Second of Khordad reformist 
movement surrounding him. Concerned that many of the regime’s leaders had abandoned 
the poor in pursuit of their own gain, Abadgaran candidates emphasized social justice 
issues and pledged to use their elected offices to renew the regime’s commitment to the 
lower classes. Such messages had already helped them make political gains at the local 
level where they had come to dominate many of the municipal councils in 2003. Their 
concern with economic justice seemed to resonate in 2004 as well and Abadgaran did 
extremely well, gaining some 200 out of 290 parliamentary seats
47
 (Daragahi, February 
25, 2004, Dempsey and Smyth, February 24, 2004, EIU, May 2004, Siamdoust, March 5, 
2004) .  
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Given their relative youth and inexperience, initial assumptions were that 
Abadgaran members would follow the lead of lifetime politicians among more traditional 
and better-known conservative groups. Looking to the academic and professional 
backgrounds of many Abadgaran members, some analysts predicted that they might even 
join forces with the pro-market Kargozaran group to strengthen and support economic 
reform efforts during the final year of Khatami’s presidency (Amuzegar, April 2004). 
Unfortunately for the technocrats and pro-market economists laboring in cabinet 
ministries and other economic policymaking bodies, such predictions couldn’t have been 
more wrong. 
The first opportunity to observe Abadgaran action on economic issues came 
almost immediately upon their taking office. The Fourth Development Plan had been 
introduced to and approved by the previous parliament six months earlier and had slowly 
been winding its way through the additional bodies involved in approving legislation. 
Based in great part on the Third Plan—including nearly 80 articles replicated verbatim—
the Fourth Plan included few major innovations but sought to build on and accelerate 
reforms initiated under the first three development plans to achieve an average annual 
GDP growth rate of 8 percent  (Amuzegar, 2010, IMF, 2004, Law of the Fourth 
Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan of the Islamic Republic of Iran 2005-
2009, 2005). After its review by the Guardian’s and Expediency Councils
48
, the Fourth 
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Plan was kicked back to the new parliament for what was assumed would be a relatively 
swift final approval with a few small changes required to ensure constitutional 
compliance (Has the Five-Year Plan Been Fatally Undermined?, September 2004).  
Instead, Abadgaran members began levying criticisms and raising fundamental 
concerns about the Fourth Plan that indicated an entirely different economic vision from 
the one that had guided policymaking for the past 15 years and around which a relatively 
robust consensus had grown. The Abadgaran group was, for example, extremely skeptical 
of the Fourth Plan’s proposals to pursue foreign investment, seeing it as a method by 
which rapacious or hostile foreigners might gain control of the domestic economy. They 
were also concerned about provisions for accelerating privatization that, they feared, 
might result in mass layoffs for employees as well as illegitimate riches for the new 
owners. Abadgaran members opposed the reduction or elimination of price subsidies that 
their constituents depended upon. And they were suspicious of any attempts to streamline 
or restructure executive bodies in ways that might make them more independent of 
parliamentary review. Contrary to most expectations, the Abadgaran turned out to have a 
distinctly populist, xenophobic, ideological voice that did not shy away from 
disagreement with even the most established conservatives in pursuit of its efforts to 
distribute wealth to their constituents and protect them from the job and income losses 
believed to be inherent in IMF-style reforms like those proposed in the Fourth Plan. 
After a great deal of debate and discussion, the Fourth Plan was ultimately passed 
with only a few changes. The Abadgaran group’s arguments that  Article 44 of the 
constitution, for example, precluded privatization on the scale and in the sectors proposed 
in the plan were ultimately rejected by the Guardians and Expediency Councils (Is Iran's 
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Privatisation Plan in Jeopardy?, October 2004). Abadgaran’s greatest success was 
perhaps in excising a section of the plan calling for the restructuring of the National 
Iranian Oil Company’s (NIOC) financial relations with the Ministry of Petroleum to 
create additional incentives for transparency and efficiency. Even this proposal, however 
was later passed as an attachment to the following year’s budget (Mec Approves Crucial 
Energy Budget Clause, February 2005). Abadgaran’s opposition served notice, however, 
that the new group had an economic vision of their own that they intended to pursue with 
vigor. It also served as a sober warning to cabinet ministers and bureaucrats that there 
was no longer clear consensus behind the reform movement and that they ought to 
proceed with caution. 
Abadgaran’s early pursuit of its economic policy preferences did not stop with 
opposition to the Fourth Plan and was not even entirely confined to legislative and 
constitutional means. One of their most successful efforts was to eliminate foreign 
participation in areas of the economy they felt were sensitive for reasons of size or 
security. The most notorious example was, perhaps, the Imam Khomeini Airport which 
was thirty years and nearly $350 million (AFP, April 30, 2005) in the making when it 
finally opened in early May 2004 only to be abruptly shut down by members of Iran’s 
Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) that literally commandeered the airport to prevent its 
operation by the Turkish and Austrian consortium TAV that had won an international 
tender to do so (New Imam Khomeini Airport Closed after First Flight, May 2004, New 
Tehran Airport Shut by Army, May 9, 2004, Tehran's Showpiece Airport to Reopen 
Saturday after Shutdown, April 30, 2005). The IRGC argued that TAV had dealings with 
Israel and that its involvement in running Iran’s largest international airport constituted 
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an unacceptable security risk. Given Abadgaran’s close association with Iran’s security 
services, it was perhaps no surprise that its members openly lauded the IRGC’s extralegal 
move and launched investigations into the process by which TAV had been selected. In 
short order, legislation was passed to nullify the TAV contract as well as an additional $3 
billion deal with a Turkish cellphone company to set up Iran’s first private mobile phone 
network. Abadgaran sought, unsuccessfully, to pass additional legislation that would 
require the government to obtain legislative approval for any contract in which a foreign 
company would be awarded more than a 49% stake (Asgari and Smyth, September 24, 
2004, Is Iran's Privatisation Plan in Jeopardy?, October 2004). It was more successful, 
however, in its drive to impeach Transportation Minister Ahmad Khorram for his role in 
awarding the airport deal to TAV (Conservative Majlis Deputies Continue to Show Their 
Teeth: Impeachment Initiatives, September 2004, Iranian Transportation Minister 
Impeached in Blow to Khatami, October 4, 2004).  
The end result was that Abadgaran not only scuttled the cellphone and airport 
deals but also introduced a significant element of instability and insecurity into the 
Iranian market and economic policymaking circles. Potential investors began to worry 
about whether contracts would be honored and cabinet ministers, deputies, and other 
bureaucrats could not be certain that they wouldn’t lose their jobs—or even, perhaps, 
their freedom—for pursuing policies mandated by legislation (Fathi, October 10, 2004, 
Macroeconomic Stability Falls Victim to Factionalism, November 2004). These concerns 
were only intensified when another little-known Abadgaran member, Mahmoud 




President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad cleans house 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Islamic Republic’s first non-clerical president, 
shared many characteristics typical of Abadgaran members. One of a blacksmith’s seven 
children, he rose from humble roots to attain a PhD in civil engineering from Tehran’s 
Science and Technology University. During Iran’s eight-year war with Iraq, 
Ahmadinejad was an active volunteer in the paramilitary Baseej forces and at 48 years 
old represented a new generation of leadership (Amuzegar, 2007, Dareini, June 25, 2005, 
Fathi, June 26, 2005, Official Biography of H.E. Dr. Ahmadinejad, Honourable President 
of Islamic Republic of Iran, Recknagel, June 26, 2005). Religiously conservative and a 
believer in the Islamic Revolution, Ahmadinejad was troubled by the continued poverty 
of the lower classes which he attributed to their having been abandoned by corrupted 
leaders who had sacrificed Islamic principles for material and political gain. His first 
order of business after taking office, therefore, was to ‘clean house,’ rid the executive 
bureaucracy of individuals whose motives he suspected, and replace them with people he 
knew and trusted.  
Ahmadinejad’s intent in this regard could be seen in his cabinet appointments. 
While previous transitions in the Islamic Republic were smoothed by the retention of 
numerous ministers from preceding administrations, Ahmadinejad only kept the Minister 
of roads and transportation, Mohammad Rahmati. Remaining positions (with the 
exception of those which the Supreme Leader himself was involved in filling) were 
distributed among relatively young, obscure individuals who had little high-level 
managerial or sector-specific expertise but who had previously worked with and therefore 
enjoyed the trust of the new president. This unprecedented move greatly offended the 
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older generation of former ministers that had been recycled in and out of cabinet 
appointments for years. It also created a good deal of insecurity and even paralysis 
among second and third-tier deputy ministers who, uncertain of their own job security 
now had even more trouble than usual making decisions and plans (Amin, August 17, 
2005, Anonymous, February 22, 2009, Anonymous, August 18, 2006, Fathi, August 22, 
2005, Have Elections Paralysed the State?, October, 2005, Sepehri, August, 2005, The 
Vetting of Ahmadinejad's Cabinet and Its Aftermath, September 2005).  
Ahmadinejad was particularly intent on rooting out perceived corruption in the 
Petroleum Ministry and state-owned companies (National Iran Oil Company, National 
Iran Gas Company, National Iran Petrochemical Company, etc.) under its purview. Much 
to the consternation of industry insiders, throughout his campaign he had made frequent 
references to an ‘oil mafia’ or ‘political gang’ that he accused of diverting oil revenues 
into their own pockets leaving the bulk of the population to struggle in poverty(Iranian 
Oil Ministry Slams Presidential Candidate, June 23, 2005). Having vowed to “cut the 
hands off the mafias” and “deliver oil to the dinner table of the people” Ahmadinejad 
sought to install a loyal ally as Minister of Petroleum that could be trusted to implement 
his anti-corruption campaign (Tait, June 26, 2005). His top choice for the position was 
Ali Saeedloo, his former deputy in the Tehran mayor’s office (Some of Iran's New Top 
Cabinet Ministers, August 14, 2005).  
It was no surprise, perhaps, that Petroleum Ministry insiders and bureaucrats were 
displeased by Saeedlou’s nomination. What was astonishing, however, was the fierce 
opposition of the Abadgaran-dominated majlis that had been expected to work hand-in-
glove with the new president. Citing his lack of experience in the oil industry or in 
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running a big bureaucracy like the Petroleum Ministry, the majlis rejected Saeedlou as 
well as, to Ahmadinejad’s great embarrassment, the president’s two subsequent 
nominees
49
. Finally in December, nearly six months after Ahmadinejad’s ascension to the 
presidency, a compromise candidate was found in Kazem Vaziri-Hamaneh, a Petroleum 
Ministry insider who had been caretaker of the Ministry since August (Anonymous, 
August 18, 2006, Bozorgmehr, August 25, 2005, Bozorgmehr, December 12, 2005, Fathi, 
December 5, 2005, Iran: Ahmadi-Nejad's Tumultuous Presidency, 2007, Samii, 
November 23, 2005). 
Undaunted, Ahmadinejad looked for other ways to gain more control and 
oversight over the Petroleum ministry and its associated companies. Within just a few 
months of his inauguration, investigations had been launched into the activities of the 
Oriental Oil Kish Company and the Oil Industries Engineering and Construction 
Company that resulted in the arrest of their top directors (Oriental, Oiec Anti-Corruption 
Targets, October, 2005). Mehdi Hashemi, son of the Ahmadinejad rival and former 
president Hashemi Rafsanjani,  reportedly preemptively resigned from the Iran Energy 
Efficiency Organization in order to avoid being targeted by similar investigations (Mehdi 
Hashemi Resigns as Ieeo Md, September, 2005). Ahmadinejad also put a great deal of 
pressure on Vaziri-Hamaneh to influence his personnel and policy choices in the 
Petroleum Ministry. Vaziri-Hamaneh pushed back, preferring to promote deputy 
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ministers from within the ministry itself. After a year and a half of bickering, Vaziri-
Hamaneh was ousted and replaced by the more compliant Gholam-Hossein Nozari who 
was more willing to place Ahmadinejad favorites in deputy minister positions
50
 
(Bozorgmehr, November 3, 2007, Bozorgmehr, November 15, 2007, Sampson, 
September 9, 2007). 
Ahmadinejad enjoyed more success in his crusade against the Plan and Budget 
Organization (now called the Management and Planning Organization or MPO). [AN 
quote on MPO] Ahmadinejad’s choice for head of the MPO was Farhad Rahbar, a 
university professor and economist with little previous government or policy experience 
(Likely Approaches of Ahmadinejad's New Economic Team, September 2005, Rahbar, 
2012). Rahbar had been warned that many MPO economists did not share the president’s 
economic policy vision or concern with rooting out corruption. As such, he commenced 
to demote or push into retirement many of the organization’s mid and high-level 
economists and bureaucrats
51
. Like many heads of this sixty-year-old organization before 
him, however, Rahbar soon found himself taking positions very similar to those of the 
individuals he had previously expelled. At its most basic, Rahbar soon learned that the 
PBO simply did not have the budget available to approve every single project and began 
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 One such economist who chose to stay despite being informed that ‘your services are no longer 
necessary’ claimed that unlike most of his colleagues, he was not altogether displeased with the new state 
of affairs. Given that the MPOs leadership no longer entrusted him with new assignments, he could 
simply sit in his office all day working on his own papers and projects Fathi, Nazila. October 1, 2008 In 
Iran, 3 Degrees of Separation from Truth. New York Times.. 
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urging the president to rein in spending and speed up privatization to free up additional 
funding (Anonymous, March 4, 2009, Secor, February 2, 2009). 
Frustrated by perceived MPO obstructionism, Ahmadinejad took bold action. In 
October 2006, Ahmadinejad took the MPO and other economic policymaking bodies by 
surprise when he issued instructions for the organization’s provincial offices to be 
removed from MPO supervision and placed under the provincial governors appointed by 
the Ministry of the Interior. Farhad Rahbar immediately wrote a letter to the president 
urging him to reconsider the move but was ignored. Within two weeks, Rahbar as well as 
a number of his deputies and top MPO economists resigned in protest while Majlis 
deputies threatened to investigate and review the move’s constitutionality (Ahmadinejad, 
October 19, 2006, Mpo Provincial Management Transferred, November, 2006, Samii, 
October 23, 2006). Undeterred, the president officially dismantled the MPO altogether 
the following summer when he issued orders that it be split into two separate bodies 
under the President’s office.  Economists, members of parliament, and the press howled 
in protest
52
 at the destruction of this long-time pillar of the country’s economic structure 
whose budgetary watchdog status was implicitly acknowledged by Ahmadinejad’s 
spokesperson who explained that the restructuring was necessary since “In the previous 
system, a long process was involved for Cabinet members to receive the budget they 
need”(Ahmadinejad Dismantles Mpo, Reducing Oversight of Government Performance, 
July 2007, Tait, September 29, 2007). 
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Populist Economic Policy Under Ahmadinejad 
Eager to begin fulfilling campaign promises, Ahmadinejad launched an energetic 
and fiscally expansionary drive to distribute windfall oil revenues through various 
government and social services to his constituents. In an innovation meant to highlight 
his commitment to rural areas, he began convening cabinet meetings in various provinces 
where he would also take time to visit with local authorities, listen to their concerns, and 
often provide immediate funding to address problems they raised (Tisdall, August 19, 
2005). Another project undertaken within months of inauguration was the creation of the 
Imam Reza ‘Love’ Fund of $1.3 billion dollars (.8 % of GDP!) which provided low 
interest loans to young people wishing to marry (IMF, 2006: Paragraph 8 and footnote 2, 
McDowell, September 1, 2005, Peterson, October 13, 2005). The March 2006 battle over 
Ahmadinejad’s first proposed budget was one of the more controversial and heated in 
history as the new president fought parliament to secure more funding for his programs.  
The final bill for the 2006/2007 year authorized over 20% greater government 
expenditures than the previous year. Expenditures were even further augmented by 
supplementary budget bills passed several months later to provide additional funding for 
imports of gasoline, food subsidies, salary raises for teachers, and some rural 
infrastructure projects (Ahmadinejad Gets Ready to Spend Oil Revenues, January 16, 
2006, Budget Squeaks through before Year-End, April, 2006, IMF, 2007:see Table #2 
and Paragraph 5).  
Funding these programs were massive revenues from spiking oil prices. In theory, 
all such revenues over a specified price point were to be deposited into the ‘rainy-day’ 
Oil Stabilization Fund (OSF) created several years earlier in order to provide a cushion 
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against future price falls. In fact, however, Ahmadinejad rapidly accelerated a creeping 
trend that had begun under Khatami of dipping into the OSF or preventing revenues from 
even reaching it in order to fund current budget expenditures as needed
53
. Despite some 
noisy protests against such practices, parliament generally went along with the 
President’s plans in this regard and OSF savings dipped well below the legal minimum of 
$5 billion (Amuzegar, 2005, Cbi Report Finds Osf Overcommitted, January 2007, Osf 
Deposits Nosedive, December, 2005). Nonetheless, by 2008, Ahmadinejad was being 
accused of bypassing the legislature altogether and withdrawing hundreds of millions of 
dollars without majlis approval (Ahmadinejad: Accountable? Not Me!, May, 2008). 
Ahmadinejad’s next move was to dissolve the OSF’s Board of Trustees and place it under 
the direct supervision of the government’s Economic Commission (IMF, 2008, Oil 
Surplus Fund, June 2008). By then it had become clear that the OSF concept had failed. 
Using his position as head of the Expediency Council, Hashemi Rafsanjani proposed and 
received the Supreme Leader’s blessings to create a new National Development Fund 
(NDF) into which 20% of all oil and gas revenues would be deposited and used for 
private and public investment projects but not, presumably, for budget support 
(Bozorgmehr, January 12, 2009, Taghavi, January 27, 2009). Both funds operated in 
parallel until July 2011, when the NDF formally replaced the OSF (Economy in Brief: 
National Development Fund Balance, February 2011, National Development Fund 
Replaces Osf, July 2011).  
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 The most blatant way of doing so was by changing assumptions regarding the expected price of oil in the 
annual budget. If the budget was based on $60 per barrel of oil, for example, much less money (only that 
portion over $60) would go into the OSF than if the budget were based on, say $30 per barrel of oil.  
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Another manner in which Ahmadinejad sought to distribute the oil wealth was 
through the provision of low-interest loans both for consumption (weddings, homes, etc.) 
but also for the private sector. His strategy was strongly supported and encouraged by 
members of parliament who agreed with him that increased loans to businesses would 
increase production thereby reducing inflation (Banking, Finance, Stock Market, April 
2006). Ahmadinejad was strongly opposed, however, by his economic team including 
U.S.-educated Central Bank chief, economist Dr.  Ibrahim Sheibani who, unsurprisingly, 
resented any diminishment of central bank independence and publicly questioned the 
logic behind such a move stating that “In the economy, what controls bank interest rates 
is the inflation rate; factors like bank interest rates are like objects on water and the lower 
the water goes, the lower they fall” (Central Banker Details Challenges Facing Financial 
Sector, May 17, 2006). Sheibani was ultimately overruled however and interest rates 
were slashed from 17% to 15% and then to 12% despite estimated inflation rates of 20% 
(McDowell, June 8, 2007, Tait, May 25, 2007). Sheibani promptly submitted his 
resignation and was replaced by Tahmasb Mazaheri, a civil engineer, and the former 
Finance Minister under President Khatami (Bozorgmehr, August 27, 2007, Governor of 
Iran's Central Bank Resigns, August 27, 2007). Mazaheri, was not initially opposed to 
low interest rates but became alarmed as inflation continued to increase and as 
skyrocketing real estate prices began to suggest that the easy credit was being invested 
into what was perceived as ‘safe’ investments rather than growth or employment 
generating activities. Mazaheri’s approach was to close the credit window altogether and 
resist any further presidential decrees to lower inflation (Bozorgmehr and Khalaf, March 
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5, 2008, Secor, February 2, 2009). Ahmadinejad’s response was to fire him (Bozorgmehr, 
September 21, 2008). 
 Another way of distributing oil wealth, of course, is through the awarding of 
government contracts to political allies and supporters. While the construction and 
engineering wings of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) had branched into 
non-military industrial projects since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, its role in the economy 
expanded rapidly after the ascension of Ahmadinejad, perhaps due to his personal 
relationships with and trust in IRGC leaders. In the summer of 2006, IRGC affiliate 
Khatam-ol-Anbia Construction Headquarters (KOA) took its first steps into the oil 
industry when it was awarded two no-bid contracts by the state-owned National Iran Oil 
Company worth about $3.4 billion (Ghazi, June 28, 2006, Special Feature, July, 2006). It 
further increased its capacity in the industry by purchasing or investing in private and 
publicly held oil industry services companies such as Oriental Kish and Petropars 
Limited (Lazrak, December 2006, Petropars Shares for Private Sector, May 2009). In 
Ahmadinejad’s second term, this trend continued as the IRGC moved into the 
telecommunications field with the purchase of majority shares of the Telecommunication 
Company of Iran, was awarded a $2.5 billion project to construct a coastal railway, and 
began construction of two gas pipelines from Hormozgan to Iran Shahr (Bozorgmehr, 
October 14, 2009, Koa Builds Two Gas Pipelines, October 2010, Revolutionary Guards 
Control Finance and Repression, March 2012). IRGC-associated individuals have also 
been promoted into various ministries. Most prominently was the 2011 promotion of 
Rostam Qasemi, the former commander of KOA to head the Petroleum Ministry (Iran 
Names Guards Commander Rostam Qasemi Oil Minister, August 3, 2011). The IRGC’s 
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expanded role has been noted by the United States which has expressed concerns that 
Iran is becoming a military dictatorship and has begun targeting sanctions against the 
IRGC and its affiliates (Daragahi, February 16, 2010, Koa Withdrawal: Retreat or 
Strategy?, July, 2010, Wehrey, et al., 2009). 
Domestic Outcry 
For many analysts, the Abadgaran domination of parliament and Ahmadinejad 
presidential win signaled a throwback to the early days of the revolution. Like the first 
group of post-revolutionary managers, this new political group and its IRGC allies were 
extremely suspicious and contemptuous of the West, valued loyalty and Islamic devotion 
over expertise, were driven by concern for the ‘poor and downtrodden’ and—as 
Ahmadinejad’s frequent references to the ‘hidden Imam’ suggested—were devoted to the 
concept of divine leadership of a morally pure nation. 
In an important regard, however, this comparison was inaccurate. Whereas the 
early 1980s were marked by public solidarity and support for the regime’s economic 
policies, Ahmadinejad’s policy direction and choices were questioned, vehemently 
criticized, opposed, and even mocked from the start. Ahmadinejad could not count on 
support for his policies even from within his own cabinet. His entire economic team 
(consisting of the CBI head, MPO head and Finance Minister) either quit or was fired 
over their opposition to various policies. The last to go, Finance Minister and economist 
Dr. Davood Danesh-Jafari said publicly that the reason for his departure was that 
“Ahmadinejad and I did not have common views on some issues….I was critical of the 
policies which caused money-supply growth”. (Iran's Outgoing Economy Minister 
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Blames Ahmadinejad for Economic Woes, April 23, 2008, Outgoing Minister Raps 
Ahmadinejad Policies, April 21, 2008).  
The majlis was also highly critical. From the beginning there were squabbles over 
cabinet ministers, budgets, implementation of the Fourth Plan, corruption and some of 
Ahmadinejad’s more bizarre initiatives like abruptly cancelling daylight savings time, 
changing banking hours, and announcing new work holidays. In January 2007, however, 
in an unprecedented move, 150 members of parliament wrote an open letter to the 
president attacking his economic policies which were blamed for continued stagflation of 
the economy (O'Rourke, January 24, 2007, Tait, January 16, 2007). Prominent MP’s 
publicly and repeatedly denounced the President. The head of the Majlis Research 
Center, Ahmad Tavvakkoli, for example, said that the government “has taken many bad 
decisions, notably acceleration in spending oil income….This has caused a rise in imports 
and the awakening of the inflation monster”. (Ahmadinejad's Economic Performance 
under Fire, October 30, 2007). 
Senior politicians and political rivals joined in the chorus. Rafsanjani, 
Ahmadinejad’s opponent in the 2005 presidential race and head of the Expediency 
Council was, perhaps unsurprisingly, an early and frequent critic of the President’s 
economic policies including his utter disregard for various economic development plans 
that had been agreed to before his ascension
54
 his constant shuffling of officials and 
mismanagement that had led to a crisis of inflation and unemployment (Macroeconomic 
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 In addition to the 4
th
 Development Plan, the 20-year Economic Perspective had been written and 
committed to with the blessings of the Supreme Leader in early 2005. 
211 
 
Issues: Criticsm of Economic Policies, December 2006, Rafsanjani Heaps Criticism on 
Iran's 'Trial and Error' Government, April 30, 2008, Rivalries: Ahmadinejad Vs. 
Rafsanjani, July, 2008). Senior clerics from Qom also began grumbling. In a speech in 
Qom, Grand Ayatollah Nasser Makarem Shirazi said “From different corners of the 
nation one hears complaints about high prices and inflation” while Senior Ayatollah 
Mohammad Reza Mahdavikani obliquely accused the president of refusing to take 
responsibility saying “we shift problems and faults onto others and in order to say we are 
innocent we blame others” (Top Iran Clerics Criticise Ahmadinejad over Economy, April 
19, 2008).  Even the Supreme Leader himself seemed to have become concerned urging 
the president to take action to reduce inflation and consumption (Khamenei 
Acknowledges Problems, April 2008, Khamenei Urges Ahmadinejad to Rein in Soaring 
Inflation, August 15, 2008, Speech by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i, March 22, 
2009). 
Perhaps even more interesting than the attacks from Ahmadinejad’s political 
peers, rivals, and superiors was the open criticism from well-known academics and 
economists.  During his first term as president, economists issued three separate open 
letters expressing concern about specific policies. The first letter, signed by 50 
economists and published by local media in June 2006, warned Ahmadinejad that his 
policies were likely to cause persistent inflation. The economists wrote that “we 
understand that the economic problems have not been caused overnight but it should be 
said that if your government’s policies continue, they can only worsen the situation and 
lessen people’s trust in the government”(Iranian Economists Lash out at Ahmadinejad's 
Policies, June 16, 2006). The second letter, written the following year and signed by 57 
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economists was worded more strongly, accusing Ahmadinejad’s government of “ignoring 
the basics of economics” and “making hasty and unscientific decisions” and that “instead 
of analyzing the situation, the government just argues that the official statistics are wrong 
and presents its own questionable figures to say the economy is prospering” (Harrison, 
June 12, 2007, Interview with Ahmad Maydari, July 2007). The third letter, written in the 
Autumn of 2008 was signed by 60 economists and pilloried the president not only for his 
failed economic policies but also for his “tension-creating” foreign policy style that has 
“scared off foreign investment and inflicted heavy damage” (Daragahi, November 10, 
2008). Clearly, and in stark contrast to the early post-revolutionary era, economists were 
far from timid in voicing their criticism and even derision of the government’s economic 
policies. 
All of the complaints and criticisms had electoral consequences as well. In the 
December 2006 municipal and Experts Assembly elections, mainstream conservatives 
trounced Abadgaran-associated individuals close to the President (Fathi, December 22, 
2006, Smyth and Bozorgmehr, December 17, 2006). In the 2008 parliamentary elections, 
Ahmadinejad allies retained their majority but the number of MPs associated with the 
conservative opposition grew (Keath, March 17, 2008). As the world witnessed, the 2009 
presidential election was highly contested and, some say, rigged. In the most recent 
parliamentary election, the majority of MPs were independents not allied with any 
particular political group (What Can We Expect from the New Majles, May 2012). 
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IMF-Style Reforms with a Populist Twist? 
Another important difference between the early post revolutionary era and 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency was the surprising continuation of IMF-style reforms like 
privatization and the elimination of subsidies. In a fascinating twist, both reforms moved 
forward under this populist president although at different rates, with different results, 
and with varying levels of presidential enthusiasm.  
Privatization and Justice Shares 
Since the beginning of Rafsanjani’s presidency in 1989, the sale of loss-making 
and bloated state-owned enterprises had been a high-priority item on the country’s 
economic agenda. Progress in this regard was extremely slow, however, given an 
underdeveloped private sector, fractured political support, and various constitutional and 
legal obstacles.  
When Ahmadinejad ascended to the presidency, he was not expected to champion 
a privatization program launched and implemented by his political enemies Rafsanjani 
and Khatami. The president’s Abadgaran allies had opposed the Fourth Plan’s section on 
privatization in 2004 and the President himself not only characterized earlier 
privatizations as having hurt the interests of the poor while enriching friends and relatives 
of the previous two administrations but even threatened to reverse ‘unjust’ sales 
(Amuzegar, 2007, Eqbali, July 3, 2006). By 2006, however, the consensus among 
political elites in favor of privatizing to raise capital efficiency and reduce the strain on 
the public purse was so strong that Ahmadinejad was compelled to go along. He was 
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quite successful, however, in amending the privatization program in a number of ways 
that made it more consistent with his redistributive inclinations.  
Shortly after taking office, Ahmadinejad began exploring ideas for expanding the 
beneficiaries of privatization to include the poorer classes. What emerged was the 
‘justice’ share program whereby up to 40% of all profit-making state enterprises listed on 
the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) would be ceded to eligible individuals at a discounted 
price which could be paid over a period of a decade or more (Anonymous, August 3, 
2006, IMF, 2007). The Justice Share program was given a boost in July 2006 when the 
Supreme Leader blessed it and issued a proclamation that removed legal barriers to 
privatization of up to 80% of most state-owned enterprises. The proclamation also 
included provisions for sales of shares to foreign investors, and articulated an expectation 
that government should relinquish its ownership role in favor of a regulatory and 
supervisory role for the domestic economy (Commentary: The Leadership Decree on 
Privatisation, July 2006, Eqbali, July 3, 2006).  
In ensuing years, the privatization program moved forward steadily but rather 
slowly resulting in additional prodding from the Supreme Leader as well as grumbling 
from outside observers (Fifield, February 10, 2008, Khamenei Wants Privatisation, June 
2007). More troublesome than the slow rate of divestment, however, was the emergence 
of the quasi-governmental sector as the primary purchaser of TSE-floated (non-Justice 
Share) shares. A number of studies including one by the Majlis Commission on 
Privatization and another by the State Inspectorate Organization determined that no more 
than 13.5 % of such shares had been ceded to the truly private sector (Bozorgmehr, May 
30, 2012, Majles Commission on Privatisation, January 2011). Instead, a handful of state-
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affiliated organizations such as the Social Security Organization, a variety of charitable 
foundations, and, of course, organizations associated with the security services were 
dominating such transactions
55
. Given this trend as well as the fact that Justice Shares 
were held on behalf of the poor by government-run investment funds
56
, the privatization 
program did little to shrink the overall size of government or move assets into the 
presumably more efficient private sector (Amuzegar, 2007, Bozorgmehr, May 30, 2012). 
It did, however, shift ownership and power within government from the official to the 
unofficial / quasigovernmental sector. 
Subsidy Reform 
The first decade after the revolution saw the speedy proliferation of subsidies and 
price controls aimed at protecting the population from economic sanctions and the war 
with Iraq. Essential goods including basic food items, medical services, rail and air 
transportation, and most expensively, energy products were maintained at artificially low 
prices that constituted an increasing fiscal burden as the country’s population grew. 
Attempts at reducing or eliminating subsidies had met with little success under 
Rafsanjani and Khatami. By 2008, subsidies had reached staggering levels, eating up an 
estimated 25% of GDP or $60-$100 billion a year (IMF, 2008, Iran's Bold Economic 
Reform, June 23, 2011, Nikou, 2010). Gasoline subsides had became particularly 
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 This trend was not entirely the result of presidential manipulation of sales to favored recipients. In many 
cases, the true private sector was simply not interested in purchasing what was on offer. 
56
 The creation of the complicated administration and management apparatus for the Justice Shares program 
has itself added to the size of government. 
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problematic insofar as public demand had grown well beyond domestic refining capacity, 
forcing the government to import increasingly expensive fuel for the country’s fleet of 
aging and inefficient vehicles.(IMF, 2008: paragraph 32, IMF, 2012) 
Price reform was not initially a priority for Ahmadinejad who was skeptical of 
structural reforms associated with the IMF and his presidential predecessors.  And it is 
not entirely clear what changed his mind. Cynics argued that Ahmadinejad’s true 
intentions were simply to gain political points among the lower classes that might benefit 
from subsidy reform and assert control over the vast monies that would be freed up 
(Ahmadinejad Looks toward 2009, August 2008). Perhaps exhausting budget battles with 
an obstructionist parliament over the annual and supplemental budgets necessary to cover 
ballooning gasoline imports helped to inspire a reconsideration of the costly policy 
(Majles Passes $2.5 Billion Import Bill, November 2006, Tait, March 7, 2007). Perhaps it 
was the encouragement of the Supreme Leader who called subsidy reform a “courageous 
action” (Barzin, July 2, 2007). In introducing the subsidy reform, Ahmadinejad himself 
highlighted social justice considerations arguing that blanket subsidies unfairly benefitted 
middle and upper class Iranians that have the means to consume greater amounts of 
subsidized products (Guillaume et al., 2011: page 17). 
Whatever his reasons, having decided on his course of action, Ahmadinejad 
proceeded boldly. His government first attempted to address the fuel import problem by 
rationing subsidized gasoline and, eventually, allowing for purchases above the rationed 
amount at free-market prices. (IMF, 2007, IMF, 2008, Taking Stock: Is the Gasoline 
Rationing Plan Working?, October 2007). Initiated in June 2007, the rationing program 
was met with riots and the burning of two gas stations but Ahmadinejad held firm, public 
217 
 
outbursts eventually calmed, and the president continued his push toward comprehensive 
subsidy reform with a bill submitted to the new majles in 2008 (Fathi, June 28, 2007, 
Fathi and Mouawad, June 28, 2007). After a great deal of debate, the proposed plan was 
rejected 132-102 (Iran Mps Hand President Setback on Economic Reform, March 10, 
2009). Members of parliament publicly expressed concern about the inflationary 
consequences of eliminating blanket subsidies and replacing them with cash handouts. 
Observers suspected, however, that many members were actually more worried about 
preventing Ahmadinejad from using such handouts to buy votes on the eve of a 
presidential election (Majles Rejects Subsidy Plan, March 2009). 
Given the tumult and controversy following the June 2009 election, it would have 
come as no surprise if the whole subsidy reform idea were scrapped or at least postponed 
while the country recovered from the protests and arrests rocking the nation. Undaunted, 
however, Ahmadinejad immediately submitted a second draft of a reform bill that was 
approved by both parliament and the Guardians Council the following January 
(Recknagel, January 14, 2012). The law stipulated that subsidies would be gradually 
eliminated over a five year period ending in 2015. A new government body, the Subsidies 
Management Organization, was to be created to manage and administer the resulting 
savings which were to be distributed in the following proportions: 50% to households in 
the form of cash handouts, 30% to industries hurt by the removal of subsidies, and 20% 
directly to the treasury to cover the costs of the new program (Guillaume, et al., 2011). 
Eager to push through the reforms as speedily as possible, Ahmadinejad frontloaded the 
subsidy elimination and on December 19, 2010, the price of bread doubled, gasoline 
quadrupled, and natural gas increased some eight times (Amuzegar, January 2012, 
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Salehi-Isfahani, 2011). In contrast to the earlier experience with gasoline rationing, 
however, riots did not ensue. The president was exuberant, saying “I believe that the 
Imam of Our Time [the 12
th
 Imam whose return the Shi’ite world awaits] has managed 
this plan and supports it” (Ahmadinejad: The Imam of Our Times Is Managing the 
Subsidy Reform Program, January 5, 2011, Yong, January 16, 2011).  
The two years since the subsidies elimination program began have been a 
particularly trying time for Iran. Domestic political turbulence has fractured the ruling 
elite and increased domestic instability and unpredictability while the Arab spring did the 
same on a regional level. U.S. sanctions have been tightened painfully making it 
increasingly difficult for Iran to find customers for its oil. In late 2011, the Iranian 
currency suddenly collapsed, declining 55% against the dollar (Spindle et al., January 17, 
2012). Inflation further fueled by subsidy reform and its cash handouts approached 30% 
(Ordinary Iranians Quietly Hope for Relieve from Sanctions and Isolation, April 21, 
2012). Cash handouts themselves became a problem as the government, struggling with 
budget deficits as well as continual bickering with the parliament, had trouble finding the 
funding to cover them (Subsidy Reform News, September 2011). In retrospect, subsidy 
reform could not, perhaps, have come at a worse time. Unflinchingly, however, 
Ahmadinejad began preparing for the second phase of the subsidy reform to be 
implemented in March 2012. It was the parliament that balked, refusing to fund the 
program at the level desired by the government and as of July 2012, the second phase of 
subsidy reform was on hold (Subsidy Reform Phase Delayed, June 2012). 
Ahmadinejad’s subsidy reform program was disparaged even by many 
economists who agreed in principle with the need for price reform but felt that the 
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implementation was badly prepared and recklessly executed. The program did win an 
important admirer, however. In an ironic twist, the neoliberal International Monetary 
Fund described this populist president’s program in glowing terms, crediting it with not 
only reducing the cost of subsidies by 15% of GDP but also, as a result of the cash 
handouts, reducing poverty incidence from 12 to 2 percent and “markedly improve[ing] 
income distribution” (Deghan, June 17, 2011, IMF, 2011, Iran's Bold Economic Reform, 
June 23, 2011).  
Economists and Ahmadinejad 
The experience of economists in earlier eras was relatively clear-cut. Either their 
opinions and presence in policy-making circles was solicited or it was not. Either their 
preferences drove economic policymaking or it did not. During the years of Abadgaran 
ascendency and Ahmadinejad’s presidency, however, the picture was and continues to be 
more complex. On the one hand, economists were informed that their services were no 
longer needed and the institutions that translated the fruits of their research into policy 
prescriptions were weakened and/or disbanded altogether. On the other hand, however, 
some of the most difficult and far-reaching structural reforms encouraged for years by the 
IMF and World Bank among others were finally initiated during this time period. What 
factors contributed to this result and what are the implications for our understanding of 
the conditions under which economists are likely to gain or lose influence of political 
leaders and the economic policy agenda? 
One of the more striking characteristics of the time period under consideration is 
the oil boom it comprised. When Ahmadinejad was elected president in June 2005, crude 
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oil was being sold for close to $60 per barrel. Three years later, prices had zoomed up to 
over $140 per barrel. After a brief fall in 2009, prices rose again and have stabilized 
around $90 per barrel since 2011. Economists may be more likely to be promoted to 
positions of power when the country they serve is in need of international resources from 
the financial or donor communities for which similarly-educated individuals signal 
competence and inspire trust. The experiences of economists under Ahmadinejad suggest 
that the effect works in reverse and that economists are more vulnerable to being 
discarded when their unique ability to loosen the purse strings of international investors 
or financial institutions is no longer deemed necessary. Flush with cash, Ahmadinejad felt 
no need to cater to the preferences of economists at the IMF or World Bank. 
Another important feature of the Abadgaran and Ahmadinejad era has been the 
renewed and vehement rejection of the Western model. The President and many of his 
allies personally served in the armed services during the war with Iraq. These men 
experienced the brutality of war first-hand, losing friends, loved ones, and limbs. Given 
the common perception that the United States provided Iraq with tactical and material 
support, they also had a very personal grudge and deep suspicion of the U.S. and the 
West. Theories of mimetic isomorphism point to the way political leaders seek to reduce 
uncertainty by consciously or unconsciously modeling themselves on particularly 
successful or salient states in the international system. Developing countries, for example, 
have been documented to pattern many aspects of their social and governmental 
organization upon the United States and other successful Western nations. The 
experience of economists under Ahmadinejad suggest that such mimetic tendencies might 
be mediated by the extent to which successful states are also perceived to be appropriate 
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models due to cultural, religious, or ideological similarities. That is, given Ahmadinejad’s 
outright rejection of the United States he also rejected economists perceived as supportive 
of American-style capitalism. 
While theories about the need for international resources and mimetic 
isomorphism perhaps explain why Ahmadinejad and his Abadgaran allies were initially 
dismissive of pro-market economists and their prescriptions for economic reform, there 
are other trends that are puzzling. Why, for example, did Ahmadinejad eventually 
embrace and implement, however imperfectly, IMF-style reforms like the elimination of 
subsidies and privatization of state-owned enterprises. And how is it that in marked 
contrast to the early post-revolutionary period, economists felt safe issuing stinging 
criticisms of Ahmadinejad’s economic mismanagement which were then used by his 
political enemies in an attempt to further discredit his rule? 
Functionalist and Epistemic Communities accounts of expert power emphasize 
the way that various crises or salient shocks render political leaders more open to expert 
advice and new interpretations of cause and effect. After close to three decades of Islamic 
Republican rule with all the shocks and crises it entailed, the first generation of Iranian 
political elites seems to have become more or less convinced of the utility of economists 
to help them understand complex trends, identify national interests, and suggest policy 
options. While economists were rejected by Ahmadinejad, they were embraced by his 
political opponents from the whole spectrum of conservative to reformist camps and 
therefore felt free to publicly voice their disagreements with the president.  
Ahmadinejad’s embrace of IMF-style subsidy reform and privatization is more 
difficult to interpret without additional information about the president’s motivation for 
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and expectations regarding the outcomes of such policies. Given the opposition of most 
economists to the timing and manner in which these programs were implemented, it is 
very possible that Ahmadinejad simply used them as a convenient way to carry on with 
his distributive policies. On the other hand, perhaps the president concluded that his 
earlier opposition was misguided and that notwithstanding his skepticism of capitalism, 
pro-market policies that shrink the public sector could have positive outcomes for the 
poorer classes as well. 
While this and earlier chapters investigated the experiences of economists during 
concrete time periods, the following chapter examines the entire period from 1953 to the 
present in order to identify long-term trends and better understand the factors that 







Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
Who whispers in the King’s ear, for how long, and to what effect? The purpose of 
this project is to determine the conditions under which economists and allied technocrats, 
whose policy preferences mirror those of the international financial and donor 
communities, are more likely to be ceded power over economic policy decisions. The 
primary hypothesis guiding this investigation has been that economists gain influence 
when the international resources they can deliver are valued and desired by the country’s 
political leadership; Economists lose influence when those resources are not valued or 
desired. 
In an effort to test this hypothesis as well as four alternate hypotheses, the 
previous six chapters presented a chronological narrative of the experiences of Iranian 
economists under a variety of social, political, and economic conditions. The present 
chapter seeks to investigate the role of specific independent variables more systematically 
in order to draw conclusions about the five hypotheses under consideration. 
Below, the operationalization of the dependent variable—the influence of 
economists—is reviewed and ten cases are drawn from the narrative in which the 
dependent variable is changed. This is followed by a review of the various independent 
variables along with estimates of their values during each of the case periods as drawn 
from the narrative. The last section summarizes and discusses the results of this analysis 
as regards the hypotheses and independent variables found to be most significant in 
promoting or hindering the influence of economists over economic policymaking and 
proposes further research that might generate additional insights in this regard. The 
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chapter then closes with consideration of the implications of these findings for 
scholarship on the role of expert advisors. 
The dependent variable: the influence of economists  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the influence of liberal economists refers to the extent 
to which individuals advocating those economic policies preferred by Western nations 
and international financial institutions are able to attain positions of policymaking power 
and see their preferences actualized into policy decisions. Below, ten distinct eras or 
‘cases’ are identified from the chronological narrative of economists’ experiences in Iran 
for which the extent of economists’ control over these two policy areas is evaluated. A 
summary of this evaluation is presented in Table 2. 






1 1953-1958 High 
2 1959-1962 Low 
3 1963-1972 High 
4 1973-1976 Low 
5 1977-1978 High 
6 1979-1987 Low 
7 1988-1992 High 
8 1993-1997 Low 
9 1997-2004 High 
10 2004-2009 Low 
Case #1: 1953-1958 (Policymaking power increases)  
In the time period immediately following the 1953 coup, as described in Chapter 
3, Ali Amini and Abol Hassan Ebtehaj heads of the Ministry of Finance and Plan and 
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Budget Organization (PBO) respectively, gained a great deal of influence of the type 
described above. Although no major structural reforms were implemented during this 
time of recovery from the tumultuous Mossadegh years, these two men did have a great 
deal of power over fiscal affairs. Amini set to work generating revenues through 
renegotiated oil deals with the multinational oil companies, aid packages from the United 
States, and implementation of the country’s first comprehensive progressive tax structure. 
At the same time, Ebtehaj waged several successful bureaucratic battles to ensure that 
large proportions of oil revenues would automatically be allotted to the PBO for use on 
the big infrastructure projects he deemed necessary to support Iran’s economic 
development. 
Case #2: 1959-1962 (Policymaking power decreases)  
By 1959, both Ebtehaj and Amini had been maneuvered out of power. In their 
absence, the policymaking bodies they once headed also lost ground. Power over the 
PBO was transferred directly to the office of the Prime Minister, thereby eliminating its 
independence and increasing political influence over decisions about which projects to 
fund. The PBO’s control over development projects was further eroded when 
responsibility for managing such projects was transferred to the relevant ministries. At 
the Ministry of Finance, the tax reforms Amini had initiated stagnated and the Ministry 
itself soon gained a reputation for corruption and dedication to protecting vested interests 
in the country’s taxation and budgeting apparatus.  
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Case #3: 1963-1972 (Policymaking power increases) 
During this time period, the Shah relied heavily upon a growing cadre of foreign 
educated economists and technocrats to which he deferred on most economic policy 
issues. The Plan and Budget Organization’s independence was restored and it was greatly 
strengthened with a mandate to streamline the country’s budgeting process and combine 
all development, administrative, and military expenses into one overarching budget under 
its own control. Interrupted reforms at the Ministry of Finance were also resumed with 
reforms in the tax code as well as the process of tax collection and administration. The 
White Revolution which, among other things, restructured property relations among 
various social classes, was also initiated during this period. And when inflation became a 
problem in the early 70s, the economic team was empowered to cool the overheated 
economy through a variety of monetary and fiscal policy interventions. 
Case #4: 1973-1976 (Policymaking power decreases) 
As the oil boom of the 1970s began, the Shah was famously dismissive of his 
economic policy team’s recommendations regarding the inability of the Iranian economy 
to absorb the massive capital inflows. The Shah blithely overruled his advisers concerns, 
disregarded painstakingly prepared budgets, and ushered in what amounted to “a 
spending spree, a frantic search of how to spend what there was” (Razavi and Vakil, 
1984: 80). When boom turned to bust and budget deficits began ballooning, the Shah’s 
first instinct was to begin blaming everyone (except himself) including the very economic 
advisors that had warned him against this path. In November 1976, an Imperial 
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Commission was launched to investigate waste, corruption, and the reasons for the 
Government’s inability to meet productions schedules. 
Case #5: 1977-1978 (Policymaking power increases) 
By 1977 the need for drastic policy reversals had become clear. The Shah’s long-
serving Prime Minister Amir-Abbas Hoveyda was replaced by the technocrat Jamshid 
Amouzegar who promptly instituted austerity measures designed to slash expenditures, 
budgets, and deficits and get the country on track for a slower but steadier pace of 
development. The coming of the Islamic Revolution, however, cut this time period short. 
Case #6: 1979-1987 (Policymaking power decreases) 
When Islamic revolutionaries took over the country in 1979, they were extremely 
suspicious of economists who had worked for the Pahlavi regime and whose constant 
forecasting, budgeting, and planning seemed to indicate a lack of faith in God’s favor. At 
the PBO, for example, despite several rounds of purges to rid the organization of non-
loyal elements, the organization was ultimately pronounced unredeemable and shut down 
altogether. During this period, the new regime’s leaders wrestled with fundamental 
questions about the relative merits of faith vs. reason, economic growth vs. contentment,  
and loyalty vs. ability generally concluding that economists and other technocrats had 
little of value to offer. 
Case #7: 1988- 1992 (Policymaking power increases) 
By 1988, however, the Islamic regime had become more open to economists’ 
policy suggestions and guidance. Among other things, economists helped to convince the 
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country’s leadership to end the war in Iraq and launch a family planning program to slow 
population growth. Under the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani economists initiated a 
number of World-Bank inspired structural reforms—like privatization and exchange rate 
unification—designed to reduce the government’s ownership of and interference in the 
economy. The Rafsanjani team also made significant adjustments to fiscal policy 
including the shifting of spending priorities away from agriculture and toward 
manufacturing/industry and allowances for foreign investment in domestic projects. 
Case #8: 1993-1997 (Policymaking power decreases) 
After the debt crisis of 1992, all further economic reforms of substance were put 
on hold and earlier privatization and exchange rate reform efforts were reversed or halted. 
Several members of Rafsanjani’s original economic team lost their jobs and were 
hounded by rumors and accusations (sometimes in court) of corruption. 
Case #9:1997-2004 (Policymaking power increases) 
Despite Leftist political associations that made many economists nervous, 
Khatami proved to be surprisingly amenable to the guidance of economists as regarded 
fiscal policies and structural reforms. During this time, the Oil Stabilization Fund was 
launched to hold and invest surplus boom-time oil revenues for use during times when oil 
prices might fall. Reforms initiated but later abandoned during the Rafsanjani era were 
taken up more successfully. The exchange rate was fully unified by March 2002. Trade 
liberalizing reforms were instituted to convert quotas and other non-tariff barriers into 
tariffs and then to lower the overall tariff rate. Additional reforms included financial 
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market liberalization, reengagement with the international financial community, and 
privatization.  
Case #10: 2004-2009 (Policymaking power decreases) 
The rise of the Abadgaran political group to power through the 2004 
parliamentary elections and 2005 election of President Ahmadinejad severely curtailed 
the ability of economists to pursue additional reforms or maintain those that had already 
been initiated. During the presidential campaign, the new president had openly opposed 
many of the Rafsanjani and Khatami era reforms and even accused his predecessor’s 
administrations of corruption. Ahmadinejad had little use for the policy advice of even 
his own economic advisors. Within a year, the head of the PBO had quit over his 
opposition to the president’s plan to dismantle his organization. The following year, the 
head of the Central Bank quit due to Ahmadinejad’s insistence on artificially low interest 
rates. And the year after that, the head of the Ministry of Finance also quit citing policy 
differences with the president as the reason for his departure. 
As summarized in Table 2, the ten cases together comprise five instances in which 
economists had a great deal of policymaking power and five instances in which they had 
very little policymaking power. They also include five instances from the Pahlavi era and 
five instances from the Islamic era
57
. In the following section, the various variables 
                                                 
57
 The post-2009 era has not been included in this analysis as less information is available regarding the 
goals and motivations of Ahmadinejad’s economic policies. 
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potentially mediating the influence of economists on economic policy decisions are 
considered and the extent of their significance in each of the ten eras is estimated. 
The independent variables 
In chapter one, the major bodies of literature on the influence of economists on 
economic policymaking were considered and five variables mediating the extent of this 
influence were identified. Below, each variable is considered in turn and the extent of its 
significance in mediating economists’ influence is estimated for each of the ten eras or 
‘cases’ identified above.  
Independent variable #1: International Resources (Coercive Isomorphism) 
The guiding hypothesis of this study is that economists are particularly well-
placed to access valued resources from the international financial and donor 
communities. In a number of Latin American countries, for example, it has been 
documented that U.S. trained economists came to dominate the policymaking process 
because of their ability to inspire trust in the similarly educated economists upon whom 
the country depended to release grant and loan money from international financial 
institutions or the foreign aid branches of western nations (Babb, 2001, Schneider, 1998). 
A major limitation of the Latin American studies, however, is the unidirectional nature of 
change in the dependent and independent variables. For example, during the time under 
investigation, Mexico’s need for international resources from the United States either 
stayed constant or increased as did the policymaking role of economists. The study of 
Iranian economists, however, provides a unique opportunity to investigate the extent to 
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which variation in the country’s need for international resources is responsible for 
variation in economists’ influence over policymaking positions and decisions.  
Based upon the narrative, the last column of Table 3 presents the extent to which 
politicians sought or desired international resources during each of the case periods under 
consideration. The historical record is clear that prior to the 1973 oil boom, the Shah 
greatly needed and desired international resources in the form of investments, loans, and 
grants for budgetary support, development projects, and military purchases among other 
things.  While the 1973 oil boom provided a temporary reprieve, the disappointing oil 
receipts after 1977 combined with over-exuberant spending during the boom years meant 
that the country was once again in need of international resources that economists were 
most capable of accessing.  











1 1953-1958 High High 
2 1959-1962 High Low 
3 1963-1972 High High 
4 1973-1976 Low Low 
5 1977-1978 High High 
6 1979-1987 Low Low 
7 1988-1992 Medium High 
8 1993-1997 Low Low 
9 1997-2004 Medium High 




For the first decade after the revolution, the country’s ideological commitments to 
self-sufficiency, and Islamic finance meant that Iran’s new theocratic leaders spurned the 
international financial community. This changed under Rafsanjani who understood that 
his ambitious post-war economic development plans could not be realized with domestic 
funding alone. While the 1992 debt crisis raised doubts as to the benefits of international 
finance, Khatami re-energized Rafsanjani’s initial efforts to attract investments, loans, 
and grants. Since the election of Ahmadinejad as well as skyrocketing oil prices, the 
country’s political leadership has had less need for or interest in engaging with the 
international financial community. 
This narrative accounting of the extent to which the country’s leaders sought 
international resources is confirmed by a more quantitative examination of aid inflows, 
balance of payments pressures, and budget deficits. Figure 12 presents the net official aid 
(development and otherwise) received by Iran as a percentage of GDP for the years 1965 
to 2009. Although data is not available for the 1953 to 1965 time period, the graph 
indicates that there were three primary peaks in aid inflows. The first occurs during the 
1960s where, as discussed above, the Shah sought international aid and finance for a 
variety of projects. While aid inflows dropped quickly during the oil boom, they peaked a 
second time as boom turned to bust before dropping once again after the revolution. The 
final peak occurred during the Rafsanjani and Khatami periods when these two presidents 




Figure 12: Net official aid received by Iran as a percentage of GDP (World Bank) 
Figure 13 presents Iran’s Balance of Payments from 1976 to 2000 and Figure 14 
presents the budget deficit and surplus as a percentage of GDP. The trends are a bit more 
difficult to interpret given the fewer number of years for which data are available. As 
might be expected, the positive balance of payments was diminished from 1976 to 1978 
as the oil boom turned to bust. This is a time period during which the need for 
international resources would have been high. In 1979, the country’s balance of payments 
suddenly improved perhaps as a result of the revolutionaries’ early commitment to 
decreasing ‘wasteful’ imports and spending that was associated with the monarchy. 
Despite a short reprieve in 1982, imbalances in the current account were a common 
feature of the 80’s and may have contributed to the embrace of Rafsanjani’s economic 
reform program. The balance of payments situation as well as the budget deficit 


































































































































have helped Khatami’s economic team promotes its preferred reform policies. Since then, 
as a result of the most recent oil boom, the balance of payments has been positive, the 
budget has been in surplus, and the need for international resources has been low. 
 
Figure 13: Balance of Payments as percentage of GDP (World Bank) 
 













































































































































If the desire for international resources is a significant driver of the empowerment 
of economists, the data ought to reveal high need for resource in those cases (1, 3, 5, 7, 
and 9) in which economists were ascendant and decreased need for resource in those 
cases (2, 4, 6, 8, and 10) in which economists were relatively less powerful (See Table 3). 
In fact, the data conforms fairly well to these expectations with only a few exceptions. In 
Case #2, the Shah dismissed important members of his economic policy team despite the 
fact that his government still depended a great deal upon American aid dollars. There is 
evidence that indicates, however, that the Shah was simply not aware of the extent to 
which the continued inflow of such aid dollars depended upon the presence of economists 
and other technocrats trusted to manage them. When he became aware of American 
expectations in this regard, however, he quickly promoted his political rival Ali Amini 
who as Prime Minister managed in short order to secure close to $70 million from the 
Americans. This knowledge that economists had been forced upon him perhaps explains 
why the Shah, as discussed above, often seemed contemptuous and resentful of his 
economic team. It might also explain why he was so quick to dismiss their opinions and 
advice when the oil boom of the 1970s freed him (or so he thought) from continued 
dependence upon the United States. 
Cases 7 and 9 are also somewhat problematic. On one hand, it is true that at the 
beginning of the Rafsanjani and Khatami presidencies, the country had decided that 
international loans and investments were necessary to facilitate employment generating 
private sector activities. As such it is plausible that economists were swiftly promoted to 
serve as the reassuring face of the Islamic Republic in interactions with the international 
financial community. On the other hand, the pursuit of international resources during the 
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Islamic era was never as intense as it was under the Shah and it is difficult to believe that 
the primary driver of economists’ ascendance to power during these periods was the 
desire to please these potential investors. 
Independent variable #2: Political power (Pluralist or Interest Group Analysis) 
Pluralist or political interest group analyses study economists as one of many 
competing groups wresting for policymaking power in return for domestic goods such as 
votes or dollars. These analyses consider, for example, the way that economists form or 
support political parties (Schneider, 1998: 80-82) and how they promote nondemocratic 
governance in order to overcome public opposition to their proposed reforms (O'Donnell, 
1973). Such a framework suggests that each time period in which economists were 
ascendant (Cases 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9) ought to be characterized by their participation in a 
popular political party that may have even engaged in antidemocratic methods to weaken 
or eliminate opposing groups. 












1 1953-1958 Y High 
2 1959-1962 N Low 
3 1963-1972 N High 
4 1973-1976 N Low 
5 1977-1978 N High 
6 1979-1987 N Low 
7 1988-1992 Y High 
8 1993-1997 Y Low 
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9 1997-2004 N High 
10 2004-2009 N Low 
 
Data from the cases do not, however, conform to these expectations (See Table 4). 
There are three cases—out of the ten considered here—in which economists wielded or 
sought to wield some sort of political power. In Case #1, Dr. Amini wielded a certain 
amount of political power given his political skills, powerful family, and general 
popularity. Such power ultimately impeded rather than contributed to his ability to hold 
economic policy positions and realize his policy preferences since the Shah saw him as a 
political threat and moved to eliminate him. In Case # 7, economists joined forces with 
Rafsanjani and worked not only to get him elected but also to remove or weaken Leftist 
politicians in parliament that they feared might seek to slow or block their economic 
reform program. In Case #8, many of those same economists worked to create the 
Kargozaran political group that they perhaps hoped would help them build the kind of 
political following that would facilitate implementation of their preferred economic 
reforms. 
Given that Case #1 cannot in fact be categorized as one in which economists’ 
advisory power stems from their political power, and that in Case #8, the advisory power 
of economists decreases despite their political activism, it seems that the political power 
of economists is not a particularly useful predictor of the ability of those economists to 
realize their policy preferences. 
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Independent variable #3: Time (Functionalism) 
Functionalists explain the growing dependence of politicians and policymakers 
upon economists as resulting from the increasing complexity of the modern world over 
time. As economic globalization has resulted in new forms of economic relationships and 
interdependencies, it has become more difficult for government leaders to identify the 
policy options most likely to further the nations’ interests. Economists’ expertise in this 
regard has, therefore, become an increasingly indispensible guide. 
Functionalist explanations of the reasons for economist’s influence result in 
predictions of a unidirectional increase in such influence over time. That is, in contrast to 
the results of the case analyses, the influence and power of economists in Iran would have 
been expected to increase in each chronologically ordered era. 
While the results of the case analysis clearly do not conform with the expectations 
of functionalist theorizing, such expectations are better fulfilled by the extent to which 
professionally trained economists have ascended to formal policymaking positions over 
time. Table 5 presents the educational backgrounds of the top members of Iran’s 
economic policymaking team (consisting of the head of the planning organization, head 
of the Central Bank, and the Minister of Finance) from 1955 to the present day. In order 
to facilitate recognition of trends in this regard, the right-most column presents a 
quantified summary of the number of economics degrees held by members of the team. 
While there is a good deal of variation from one year to the next, it is clear that, perhaps 
surprisingly, in the Islamic Republic, these three positions were much more frequently 
filled by formally educated economists than was true during the Pahlavi era. 
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That is, as predicted by functionalist theory, over time Iran’s economic policy 
team seems to have become increasingly dominated by formally trained economists   
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 0 = No economics training; 1 = Some economics training (BS in economics or significant job training); 2 
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The fact that economic policymaking positions have increasingly come to be seen 
as the domain of formally trained economists, but that these economists are as likely to be 
ignored as heeded, presents an interesting puzzle. On the one hand, politicians and 
policymakers in the Islamic Republic seem to have concluded that economists possess 
expertise particularly well-suited to identifying the economic policy choices that will 
most benefit the nation. On the other hand, some of these politicians have routinely 
ignored the advice they are given. And contrary to functionalist predictions, the 
increasing complexity of economic policy decisions has had little impact on the extent or 
frequency at which such advice is dismissed. 
Independent variable#4: Crises (Epistemic Communities) 
Like functionalists, scholars of Epistemic Communities attribute the growing 
clout of economists to the increasing uncertainty policymakers face in our modern and 
complex world. Unlike functionalists, however, scholars of epistemic communities do not 
assume that politicians automatically recognize this growing complexity or their own 
limitations in interpreting it and identifying the nation’s interests within it. Rather, a crisis 
or other unexpected shock is required to jolt policymakers into such recognition and 
create ‘teachable moments’ in which an epistemic community of experts can help them 
understand what caused the crisis and how to avoid similar crises in the future. 
Scholarship on epistemic communities suggests that each instance of an increase 
in economists’ power ought to have been preceded by a shock or crisis of the type 
described above and ought to have been accompanied by the presence of a strong 
epistemic community of economists. The major crises occurring during the time period 
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under consideration [see Appendix I for a timeline of major events] include: 1) The 1953 
coup d’etat; 2) The 1961 demonstrations over the Shah’s interference in parliamentary 
elections as well as a teacher’s pay cut; 3) The 1975 oil bust; 4) The 1979 revolution; 5) 
The perceived loss of the Iraq war in the late 80s; and 6) the 1992 debt crisis. As 
displayed in the last column of Table 6, cases 1, 3, and 5 through 8 were preceded by 
economic or political crises. 
The presence of an epistemic community can be determined by the strength of 
professional and associational ties between individuals sharing a common commitment to 
developing the country along the lines preferred by the international financial and donor 
communities. In Iran, such a community did not come into existence until the early 60s. 
In the earlier Ebtehaj and Amini years, economists were fewer in number and more 
isolated from one another. Thanks in part to Ebtehaj’s efforts to recruit like-minded, 
young, and Western-educated professionals, by the time of the ‘Golden Decade’ a strong 
group of economists were meeting regularly to discuss the country’s development needs 
and future direction. Members of this epistemic community gained and held many of the 
most important economic policy positions over the following two decades. After the 1979 
revolution, however, many of these individuals lost their jobs, homes, and even lives as 
the new regime placed little value upon economic expertise and was particularly 
suspicious of individuals that had served the Pahlavi monarchy. Within ten years, 
however, a new epistemic community of economists was formed. These individuals were 
deeply religious and committed to the success of the Islamic Revolution. Most of them 
had studied business or economics in the United States or England and came together in 
their quest to convince the political leadership that their expertise could be used to serve 
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and strengthen the Islamic Republic. Over the next twenty years, they labored in 
government and academia to guide economic reform efforts and train the next generation 
of Iranian economists. This epistemic community has maintained its efforts and activities 
even as the ascension of President Ahmadinejad led to their removal from most 
policymaking positions. As displayed in the fourth column of Table 6, cohesive and 
strong epistemic communities of economists existed in cases3 through 5 and cases 7 
through 10. 
Scholarship on epistemic communities suggests that those time periods following 
a major crisis in which a strong and active epistemic community exists are the ones in 
which economists should gain influence. That is, economists’ power ought to have 
increased in cases 3 5, 7, and 8. While this prediction holds for cases 3, 5, and 7, it does 
not for case #8. The 1992 debt crisis was a significant event and occurred during a time 
when an epistemic community of economists not only held positions of policymaking 
power but were also involved in the creation of the new pro-market Kargozaran political 
party. This finding highlights the value of investigating the power of economists with 
cases like Iran in which such power both increases and decreases. As scholarship on 
epistemic communities has been overwhelmingly dominated by studies of how expert 
power increases over time, the assumption has been that crises force policymakers to 
reevaluate the world’s complexity and their own ability to understand it in ways that 
always favor an increased reliance on expert opinion. In fact, however, the opposite can 
also be true. The 1992 debt crisis resulted in an interpretation that reduced the influence 
of economists due to their being seen as having promoted the very policies that 


















1 1953-1958 N Y High 
2 1959-1962 N N Low 
3 1963-1972 Y Y High 
4 1973-1976 Y N Low 
5 1977-1978 Y Y High 
6 1979-1987 N Y Low 
7 1988-1992 Y Y High 
8 1993-1997 Y Y Low 
9 1997-2004 Y N High 
10 2004-2009 Y N Low 
 
 
Scholarship on epistemic communities also suggests the converse proposition—
that economists will have less influence during those time periods that are either not 
preceded by a crisis or not characterized by the presence of an epistemic community. 
That is, in cases 1, 2, 4, 6, 9, and 10 economists ought to have less influence over 
economic policymaking. While this prediction is correct for cases 2, 4, 6, and 10, it is not 
correct for cases 1 or 9.  
Case #9 is particularly interesting. It does not seem to have been preceded by a 
significant crisis. Indeed, at the time that the Khatami team launched the economic 
reforms associated with the Third Development Plan, the country was in relatively good 
shape. In a fascinating twist on the epistemic communities literature, however, the 
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epistemic community of economists in Iran seems to have manufactured a crisis. Using 
what turned out to be grossly pessimistic assumptions for oil prices, economists from the 
PBO frightened President Khatami and other political leaders with a series of grim 
scenarios for Iran’s future that included catastrophic levels of unemployment and 
inflation. The active role played by the epistemic community of economists in creating a 
sense of impending crisis prompted Khatami, despite his Leftist leanings, to embrace 
Iran’s most successful and comprehensive structural reform program to date. The 
concerted effort by economists to achieve this result also challenges epistemic 
communities’ depictions of experts as neutral and disinterested providers of objective 
information and analyses.  
With these two modifications—economists actively manufacturing crisis and 
crises resulting in interpretation that may or may not favor economists—the predictions 
of the epistemic communities appraoch for increases or decreases in the power of 
economists are strikingly well aligned with actual outcomes except for Case #1.  
In one important way, however, epistemic communities’ explanations of 
economists’ power remains unsatisfying. Such descriptions of the reasons for and process 
by which political leaders seek expert opinion suggest that such leaders are actively 
seeking and perhaps even glad for the new knowledge and guidance provided. Evidence 
from the time period under consideration indicates however, that the Shah was often 
contemptuous of his economic team, resentful of his dependence on them, and anxious to 
lessen such dependence whenever possible. In contrast, the case material from the Islamic 
period indicates that political leaders on several occasions did, in fact, learn from and 
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come to value the expertise that economists provided. Possible reasons for this difference 
are explored further below. 
Independent variable #5: Successful Models (Mimetic Isomorphism) 
Mimetic isomorphism describes the way that organizations or states lacking 
means of identifying optimal goals, structures, or practices can look to the examples of 
particularly successful models as guides. Observing, for example, the fact that the 
strongest and most successful state in the international system—the United States—
actively solicits and incorporates the advice of economists might inspire developing 
nations to do the same in the hopes that emulating such methods will achieve similar 
results. Policymakers might also be more open to the advice of those economists and 
experts that share their admiration for and desire to emulate the American capitalist 
system. 
Given the fact that the United States has consistently been the most successful 
state in the international system throughout the seventy-year period investigated for this 
project, mimetic isomorphism in Iran should result in the power of pro-market 
economists increasing over time until it reached a level similar to that of the American 
model being copied. In fact, however, the fluctuating nature of economists’ power seems 
to indicate that mimetic isomorphism is not occurring.  
Perhaps, however, theories of mimetic isomorphism might be improved by 
additional elaboration of the characteristics or markers that identify a given state as an 
appropriate model for emulation. It seems likely, for example, that ideological or cultural 
similarity might be an important signal in this regard. That is, a small communist nation 
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might have sought to emulate the example of the Soviet Union in the 1960s while a 
developing Asian nation might have sought to imitate the practices of Japan. 
Incorporating ideological and cultural considerations results in new predictions 
about the power of economists in Iran. More specifically, during the Pahlavi era (Cases 1, 
2, 3, 4, and 5) when the Shah overtly sought to ‘catch up’ to the West, economists’ power 
might have been expected to uniformly increase. After the revolution, however, the new 
regime’s identity was based in large part on rejection of the western model. As a result 
Iranian economists in more recent years (Cases 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10) would be expected to 
have a very difficult time ascending to policy positions and/or realizing policy 
preferences.  





U.S. is Model Observed 
Power of 
Economists 
1 1953-1958 Y High 
2 1959-1962 Y Low 
3 1963-1972 Y High 
4 1973-1976 Y Low 
5 1977-1978 Y High 
6 1979-1987 N Low 
7 1988-1992 N High 
8 1993-1997 N Low 
9 1997-2004 N High 
10 2004-2009 N Low 
 
In fact, however, such expectations are not borne out by the actual observed 
outcomes in the cases (See: Table 7) and it is tempting to dismiss the significance of 
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mimetic processes altogether. It is possible, however, that the research design of the 
present study focused, as it is, on swings in economists’ power over relatively short 
periods of time, is simply not capable of capturing long-term processes like mimetic 
isomorphism.  Perhaps over time the position of economists in both the Pahlavi and 
Islamic eras was in fact trending toward the American example with dips in power being 
smaller than subsequent increases. Perhaps the Islamic revolution did in fact introduce a 
one-time absolute lowering of economists’ power but did not actually affect the overall 
trend. 
Unfortunately, however, the present study is limited to observing relative changes 
in economists’ power and cannot accurately measure longer term or absolute changes in 
such power. For the purposes of this study, therefore, mimetic isomorphism is determined 
to be an insignificant factor in mediating the power of economists to influence policy 
decisions. 
Discussion and proposals for additional research 
The primary hypothesis driving this investigation is that politician’s need for 
international resources is the primary driver of their reliance upon economists that are 
best able to inspire the trust and loosen the purse strings of individuals within the 
international financial and donor communities. The evidence reviewed above provides a 
great deal of support for this hypothesis. In almost every case in which the need for 
international resources was great, economists were able to control the policymaking 
process. And in almost every case in which the need for international resources was 
lessened, economists lost influence.  
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Alternate hypotheses inspired by scholarship on political interest groups, 
functionalism, and mimetic isomorphism can be rejected on the basis of the evidence 
provided above. The surprising result, however, is the extent to which epistemic 
communities of economists were able to take advantage of moments of political or 
economic crisis to expand their influence. Indeed, a question worth considering is 
whether the two variables found to be significant are actually the same. That is, since 
economic crises often result in increased need for international resources, perhaps these 
two variables ought to be collapsed into one and the resulting impact on economists’ 
power can be analyzed accordingly. 
The processes described by scholars of epistemic communities and coercive 
isomorphism are, however, quite distinct. Scholars of epistemic communities have 
demonstrated that economic crises result in ‘teachable moments’ in which politicians and 
policymakers are open to learning from experts and perhaps changing their own 
understandings of the best policy course for the nation. In contrast, the need for 
international resources does not comprise any learning. Political leaders face material 
consequences that can be quite unpleasant if they refuse to conform to the expectations of 
the individuals or states upon which they are dependent for aid, loans, or investment. 
The two processes also have very different implications for the economists 
involved. Epistemic communities are valued societies of experts with the ability to teach 
and persuade the highest political offices. As the Iranian example demonstrated, such 
communities can even help to precipitate or create teachable moments by exaggerating 
future economic conditions in a way that manufactures a crisis and captures the attention 
of policymakers. When economists are hired and promoted primarily for their value in 
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attracting the respect and dollars of the international financial community, however, they 
have fewer opportunities to influence the worldview and beliefs of the political leaders 
they serve.  
The available evidence suggests that the need for international resources was the 
primary driver of economists’ power during the Pahlavi era. After the 1953 coup, the 
Shah was compelled to depend on men like Amini and Ebtehaj whom the Americans 
trusted to manage the aid dollars they were pouring into the country (Case #1). The first 
chance he got once the country was stabilized, however, he dismissed these men only to 
realize the enormity of their role in maintaining American favor and safeguarding his 
throne (Case #2). Over the following ten years (Case #3), therefore, the Shah cultivated a 
cadre of young, Western-educated economists and technocrats who were empowered to 
run the country’s economy in a manner that would ensure continued American aid. The 
Shah’s resentment of and contempt toward his team was held in check until the oil boom 
of the 1970s (Case #4) promised to deliver bounty that would erase his dependence on 
the U.S. forever. When boom turned to bust (Case #5) however, the Shah once more 
turned to his economic team.  
During the Islamic Republican era, however, the teaching role of epistemic 
communities seems to have been more prominent. The revolution’s success (Case #6) 
created a temporary sense of divine favor that the exhausting war with Iraq diminished. 
Economists were able to use this ‘teachable moment’ (Case #7) to convince the political 
leadership—particularly those on the ‘right’—of the need for economic reforms. While 
economists lost some credibility as a result of the 1992 debt crisis (Case #8) they were 
able to regroup and manufacture a crisis that allowed them to influence and change the 
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worldview of important Leftist leaders like Khatami (Case #9). With a new group in 
power following the 2005 election (Case #10) economists were once again sidelined. It 
remains to be seen whether the current political and economic crisis brought about by 
draconian economic sanctions will create another teachable moment that will allow 
economists to influence the world view of yet another political group. 
Additional research would be needed to determine why leaders of the Islamic 
Republic were more amenable to changing their worldview than the Shah; and under 
what circumstances economists can expect to influence not only policy but also the 
beliefs of the leaders they serve. It would be particularly useful, for example, to identify 
cases in which economic crisis and resource dependency are de-coupled—an economic 
crisis that does not increase the need for international resources or increased resource 
dependence that was not precipitated by economic crisis. One may speculate, however, 
that in the absence of material incentives to entrust economists with economic policy, 
leaders would refuse to do so until they were actually convinced of the benefits of such a 
path. On the other hand, the presence of material incentives may cut short opportunities 
for reflection or new interpretations given that political leaders may automatically and 
without much thought quickly revert to those behaviors that will be rewarded by the 
external power. The fascinating and counterintuitive result for Iran is that economists 
under the Islamic Republic were far more powerful in their ability to actually change 
their political leaders’ minds than economists serving the Pahlavi regime. 
Further research into the process and impact of mimetic isomorphism would also 
be extremely useful. Such work could be facilitated by a more absolute measure of 
economists’ power (such as the number of economists working in government) that 
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allows for direct comparisons between the level of such power in the Islamic Republic 
versus the Pahlavi regime. Evidence that the Islamic Republic were trending toward an 
American model as regard the role of economists would be especially interesting given 
its explicit rejection of such a model. 
Implications of Findings 
This research project was conducted in the hopes of addressing an important gap 
in the current literature on expert power. While a great deal of theoretical and empirical 
work has been done to conceptualize and test the conditions under which economists gain 
policymaking power, very little exploration has been done of the conditions under which 
economists might lose power. The present study has sought to address this lacuna by 
investigating the significance of various variables in mediating increases or decreases in 
economists’ power over time in Pahlavi and Islamic Iran. The results indicate that 
economists are most likely to be promoted to policymaking positions in which their 
advice is followed when: a) the country they serve is in need of material resources from 
dominant states that are more willing to deliver said resources to countries whose 
economies are run by economists; or b) they have invested a great deal of time utilizing 
‘teachable moments’ resulting from economic crises to educate policymakers across the 
political spectrum as to the utility of the services economists can provide. 
Additional research should be done to test the generalizability of these results to 
other countries and determine the conditions under which resource dependence versus the 
activities of epistemic communities are likely to be the most important driver of variation 
in the dependent variable. One expectation that ought to be tested, for example, is that the 
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influence of economists in highly developed and well-off countries has little to do with 
their ability to deliver international resources given that such countries have little need of 
international aid and are already popular destinations for investment. The influence of 
economists in developed countries is expected to stem instead from the efforts of 





Appendix: Timeline of major political and economic events 
1949 
The Plan Organization is established and the first Seven Year Development Plan begins. 
 
1951 
Mossadegh is elected prime minister and nationalizes the oil industry. In response, 
Britain imposes an embargo of Iranian oil. 
 
1953 
Mossadegh is removed from power in a CIA supported coup d’état in August. General 
Zahedi becomes Prime Minister and Ali Amini is appointed Finance Minister. Britain 
refuses to end the oil embargo until a new agreement is negotiated. Iran, starved of 
finances after two years without oil revenues, gets by with emergency financial aid from 
the United States. Vice President Nixon visits the country in December. 
 
1954 
Ebtehaj takes over the Plan Organization. An oil agreement is finally concluded in 
October and Iran resumes international oil sales. 
 
1955 
Hossein Ala replaces Zahedi as Prime Minister. Amini becomes Minister of Justice.  
 
1956 
The Second Development Plan is launched. 
 
1957 
The World Bank approves a $75 million loan to Iran. Manuchehr Eghbal replaces 
Hossein Ala as Prime Minister.  
 
1958 
The Shah signs the Baghdad Pact thereby overtly abandoning it centuries-long policy of 
non-alignment. The “Qarani affair” leads to the imprisonment or demotion of a number 
of Iranian officials – including Ali Amini – on suspicion of treason. The U.S. conducts a 












The country is struggling with inflation, budget deficits, and balance of payments issues. 
The IMF offers $55 million in loans with the requirement that the government accept a 
series of austerity reforms intended to stabilize the economy. The Shah’s clumsy attempts 
to manipulate the parliamentary election backfires. Prime Minister Eghbal is blamed for 
rigged elections and replaced by Sharif-Emami. 
 
1961 
Austerity reforms result in political discontent. On May 4
th
 over 50,000 demonstrators 
clash with the Iranian army over cuts in teacher pay leading to Sharif-Emami’s 
resignation. Ali Amini becomes Prime Minister and, in the absence of an elected 




Amini is unable to raise enough funds to cover both the Shah’s military expenditures and 




The Shah launches the White Revolution. After criticizing these reforms, Khomeini is 
arrested. Municipal gate taxes (the last independent source of money to the provinces) are 
abolished. The Shah announces his support for a new political group headed by Hassan 
Ali Mansour and Amir Abbas Hoveyda which sweeps the parliamentary elections in 
October. The third development plan (a five-year plen) is launched. 
 
1964 
The new Mansur government takes office and launches a series of reforms. All 
government budgetary functions are ceded to the Plan Organization. Status of Forces 
agreement is signed with the US which gives American military personnel and all 
dependents immunity from prosecution in Iranian courts. Khomeini leads demonstrations 
against the agreement which result in his exile.  
 
1965 
Mansur is assassinated by a Khomeini loyalist and Hoveyda becomes prime minister (a 
position he holds for the next 12 years).  
 
1966 
Economic reforms are yielding results in high growth and relatively low inflation. In 
December a new agreement is negotiated between Iran and the oil consortium. 
 
1967 
Coronation of Mohammad Reza Shah. Iran is officially declared to have ‘graduated’ from 
the American aid program that had delivered $605 million in budgetary and development 





Fourth Development Plan is launched.  
 
1969 
Some of the strains from speedy development are beginning to show up in the form of 
inflation and a worrisome debt service ratio. Iran’s economic team institutes 
contractionary monetary policies. 
 
1971 
Iran and other OPEC nations negotiate a new deal – the ‘Tehran Agreement’ – with the 
multinational oil companies that result in an increase in revenues. Celebrations at 
Persepolis mark the 2500 year anniversary of the Iranian empire. 
 
1972 
Another round of OPEC negotiations with the multinationals results in a further increase 
in oil income. The Fifth Development Plan is unveiled and publicly debated at a 
conference in Shiraz.  
 
1973 
The Arab oil embargo due to the Yom Kippur war is launched and the oil boom begins in 
earnest. The Shah instructs the Plan Organization to revise the Fifth Plan in light of the 
additional capital inflows. 
 
1974 
At the Ramsar conference, options for a revised Fifth Plan are considered and the Shah, 
disregarding his advisors, opts for a massive spending increase that not only burns 
through oil revenues but also uses massive credits available from the international 
financial community based on expectations of future earnings. 
 
1975 
Iran announces plans to invest $15 billion in the United States over the next five years. 
Massive spending is running up against physical and human capital bottlenecks including 
port capacity, transportation, electricity, etc. Inflation is eating away at purchasing power 
and the government’s response is to institute price controls.  
 
1976 
With much of the West in recession, demand for oil drops. Without the expected oil 
revenues, cash is short, various projects are delayed or cancelled, and officials scramble 
to reschedule short-term debt. The Shah launches an Imperial Commission to investigate 
waste, corruption, and the reasons for the Government’s inability to meet production 







Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda is dismissed and replaced by Jamshid Amuzegar 
who launches an austerity program to cool the overheated economy. The Shah travels to 
the U.S. where his meeting with President Carter is interrupted by student protestors. 
 
1978 
The country is convulsed by increasingly large demonstrations and clashes with security 
forces. Martial law is declared and the country is put under military rule. 
 
1979 
In January the Shah leaves the country. The following month, Khomeini returns to Iran 
and the monarchy is abolished. Mehdi Bazargan is appointed prime minister of the 
provisional government. In a national referendum voters overwhelmingly vote for the 
creation of an Islamic Republic. Banks, insurance companies and large factories are 
nationalized. In another referendum the country’s new constitution is approved. Students 
seize the U.S. embassy.  
 
1980 
Banisadr becomes the first president of the Islamic Republic. The Islamic Republic’s first 
parliament is elected. Universities are closed as part of the Cultural Revolution to 
‘Islamicize’ the curriculum. The exiled Shah dies of cancer in Egypt. In September the 
Iraqi army invades Iran at Khuzestan. 
 
1981 
American hostages are released. Banisadr is stripped of power and impeached by 
parliament. He later flees the country. Musa Khayyer closes the Plan and Budget 
Organization. Several months later, Banki re-opens it. The new president, Rajai is killed 
in August. Khamene’i is sworn in as president and Mir Hussein Musavi is appointed 
Prime Minister.  
 
1983 
The first post-revolutionary five-year development plan is submitted to parliament where 
it is ultimately rejected. An Islamic Banking law is unanimously passed. 
 
1984 
Universities reopen after a purge of faculty and curriculum. Parliamentary elections are 
held and Rafsanjani is elected Speaker. The war with Iraq as well as Iran’s diplomatic 
and economic isolation are continuing to drain the country. 
 
1985 
In what comes to be known as the Iran-Contra affair, the U.S. attempts to win the release 
of hostages in Lebanon by offering a secret arms deal. Khamene’is reelected by a 






Price of oil drops to only $14.44 per barrel and Iran’s oil income drops to under $6 
billion. The government is now strictly rationing essential goods and foreign exchange 
and has instituted controls on imports, wages and prices. 
 
1988 
Close to 300 civilians are killed when the USS Vincennes mistakenly shoots down an 
Iran Air plane. PBO forecasts extrapolating forward from status quo conditions suggest 
that the combination of population growth with the absence of capital investments will 
result in unmanageable economic strains. In August, Khomeini agrees to a formal 
ceasefire with Iraq 
 
1989 
Khomeini issues a fatwa for Salman Rushdie’s death. Khomeini dies and Khamene’i 
becomes the new Supreme Leader. Constitutional changes eliminate the post of Prime 
Minister. Rafsanjani wins presidential election and launches an economic reform 
program under the auspices of the Islamic Republic’s first five year development plan. . 
A new family planning program is launched to slow population growth.  
 
1990 
The IMF visits Tehran for the first full-scale talks since 1978. Iran remains neutral after 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and resumes diplomatic ties with Iraq. Iran requests an 




Iran receives $250 million from the World Bank for earthquake relief. The government 
works toward unification of the exchange rate and by mid-year has eliminated four of 




In parliamentary elections, the Guardian’s Council heavily vets candidates disqualifying 
30 incumbents. Rafsanjani allies gain seats as a result.  
 
1993 
Exchange rate officially unified in March and the rial is devalued. But the program is 
undermined by a significant debt crisis. Rafsanjani is elected to a second term but with a 
much lower turnout and lower percentage of the vote. 
 
1994 
Continued debt crisis results in austerity measures and the reintroduction of multiple 






President Clinton signs executive orders banning U.S. companies from doing business in 
or with Iran. Second development plan initiated.  
 
1996 
 Members of a new technocratic political party, the Kargozaran, do very well in Majlis 
elections. The Iran Libya Sanctions Act is passed by the U.S. Congress threatening 
sanctions against non-U.S. companies that do business in or with Iran. 
 
1997 
Khatami, a little known cleric, wins a landslide with 70% of the vote in the presidential 
election, beating the conservative establishment’s choice. A coalition of 18 organizations 
and parties form the reformist 2
nd
 of Khordad front. 
 
1998 
In an interview with Christiane Ammanpour, Khatami reaches out to Americans and 
encourages people-to-people relations. Later in the year, Madeleine Albright calls on Iran 
to join the U.S. in drawing up a road map to normalization of relations. Rafsanjani ally 
Karbaschi is convicted on corruption charges and sentenced to five years in prison. 
Various newspapers are launched and re-launched by the 2
nd
 of Khordad group only to be 
closed down by hardliners. Iranian officials state that the Rushdie matter is closed; 
Britain responds by restoring diplomatic relations. Political ‘chain’ murders begin with 
the stabbing of Dariush Forouhar and his wife. 
  
1999 
First municipal elections held in which Khatami allies do very well. Price of oil falls 
below $10 per barrel. As part of his charm offensive, Khatami visits a number of Western 
nations including Italy and France. Government protests begin over the closure of more 
reformist newspapers and over 1,000 student demonstrators are arrested.  
 
2000 
The Third Development Plan is approved and launched. In the 6
th
 parliamentary elections 
the 2
nd
 of Khordad Front wins 65% of the seats despite heavy vetting by the Guardians 
Council. Madeleine Albright announces the easing of sanctions on Iran and apologizes 
for the 1953 coup.  Over U.S. objections, the World Bank resumes lending to Iran. 




Parliament passes laws necessary for compliance with WTO requirements. Khatami wins 
reelection. After September 11 attacks, Iran cooperates with the U.S. on Afghanistan. The 
National Tax Organization is established to develop streamlined procedures for tax 






President Bush declares Iran is part of the Axis of Evil. Russian technicians begin 
construction of Iran’s first nuclear reactor. The exchange rate is unified and placed under 
a managed float by the Central Bank. The “Law for Encouragement and Protection of 




Second municipal elections in Iran with only 15-25% voter turnout results in a 
conservative takeover. Shirin Ebadi wins the Nobel peace prize. Iran becomes a full 
member of MIGA.  
 
2004 
Iran accepts the IMF’s Article VIII obligations regarding currency restrictions. Seventh 
majlis elections are held after candidates are heavily vetted by the Guardians Council 
which disqualifies 3000 people including 80 incumbents and leads the ascendance of the 
new Abadgaran political group. The new conservative majlis demands significant 
changes of the Fourth Development Plan.  
 
2005 
Ahmadinejad wins the presidential election over Rafsanjani. The Tehran Stock Exchange 
falls dramatically in response to the election outcome.  
 
2006 
The Supreme Leader issues a decree to allow more industries to be privatized. 
Ahmadinejad pressures Iranian banks to lower interest rates. He also takes a step toward 
dismantling the PBO by transferring its provincial offices to the Interior Ministry. Iran 
hosts a controversial conference on the Holocaust.  
 
2007 
In January, 150 members of parliament write an open letter to the president attacking his 
economic policies which were blamed for economic stagflation. Protests erupt after the 
government imposes a gas rationing scheme.  
 
2008 
Inflation tops 26% and a number of economists, politicians and top clerics criticize the 
president over his handling of the economy. Attempts to impose a 3% value added tax 
results in a bazaar strike and a repeal of the VAT. 
 
2009 
Thirtieth anniversary of the revolution. Ahmadinejad is declared to have won the June 
presidential election but rival candidates including Mir Hussein Musavi charge vote-
rigging. Demonstrations and clashes ensue in which at least 30 people are killed and 





Parliament and the Guardians Council approve a subsidy reform program that goes into 
effect in December. The Stuxnet computer virus is detected in computers at the Bushehr 
nuclear plant.  
 
2011 
U.S. sanctions are tightened. Late in the year, the Iranian currency suddenly collapses 
declining 55% against the dollar.  
 
2012 
The U.S. imposes additional sanctions on Iran’s central bank. The rial falls to a new 
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